The
Philippine State, Society
& Economy, 1992-1998
Feb, 95
U.S. Bases By Another Name:
ACSA in the Philippine
By Daniel B. Schirmer, Philippine Bases
Network and Friends of the Filipino People
The Origins of ACSA.
Philippine-U.S. relations appear to be on the verge of a radical
and retrogressive shift, -- re-instating U.S. military dominance of the
island nation after it had been seriously challenged by the Senate's
defeat of the bases treaty in 1991, -- and returning the Philippines once
again to a limited role on the world stage as Washington's military
subordinate, a part first thrust upon it by U.S. colonization nearly one
hundred years ago.
The Pentagon's push to re-assert its military domination of the
Philippines is in line with its program to maintain the United States as a
military superpower, capable of fighting two major regional conflicts
(previously projected as a Korean and Mideast war) at the same time.
The pivot of this threatening reversion is an "Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement" (ACSA from here on) currently under
discussion. ACSA appears to be a decisive escalation of a process
opened up in November 1992 when the Pentagon began an attempt to
recoup its loss of 1991 by an arrangement giving the U.S. military
access to Philippine ports, air-fields, and military installations.
The arrangement of 1992 took the form of an agreement
between the executives of the two countries. Prior to the Philippine
constitution of 1987, arrangements for U.S. bases had also taken this
form. But the post-Marcos constitution, as a result of nationalist
pressures, had mandated that no foreign military presence could occur
in the Philippines except as a result of a treaty passed by a 2/3 vote of
the Senate. Despite its dubious constitutionality, the access agreement,
according to its Philippine and U.S. supporters, derived legitimacy
from a Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, a relic of the
Cold War. It was a meeting of the Mutual Defense Board, a body of
Philippine and U.S. military officials set up under the Treaty, that made
public the access agreement of 1992.
When it was first announced to the press in November of that
year, Admiral Charles R. Larson, then commander of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet, described the agreement in very modest terms, as if to allay the
anxieties of Philippine nationalists. It would, he said, amount to
nothing more than "ship visits, aircraft transits, and small unit
exercises." (1) In the same understated manner U.S. officials in the
Philippines suggested, tentatively, they might "eventually win a broader
military agreement with the Philippines." Meanwhile they expressed
satisfaction that under the just concluded agreement the U.S. could
"continue to use Philippine facilities in a fairly liberal manner, without
going through another crisis with the Philippine legislature." (2) These
officials failed to note, however, that in avoiding the legislature, they
also by-passed the Philippine constitution.
The ACSA of 1994 seems to be the "broader military
agreement" U.S. officials had earlier hoped for, judging from the text
of its first draft as published in the Manila Times of November 25,
1994. According to its terms the Philippine military is to provide
"Logistics Support, Supplies and Services" to the military of the United
States, and in return the military of the United States is to provide the
same to the military of the Philippines. It defines "Logistics Support,
Supplies and Services" to mean:
food, billeting, transportation, petroleum, oils, lubricants,
clothing, communications services, medical services,
ammunition, base operations support (and construction
incident thereto), storage services, use of facilities, training
services, spare parts and components, repairs and
maintenance service, and airport and seaport services.
Leaving out of consideration the services involved in supporting
14,000 U.S. troops previously assigned to Clark and Subic, the above
list reads like a fairly complete catalog of the "Logistics Support,
Supplies and Services" formerly provided the U.S. military by the U.S.
bases in the Philippines.
Involvement in the Superpower's Wars.
There is, however, one function of the U.S. bases that is not
included in this list: that of serving as a jumping off point for U.S.
military intervention in the Asia-Pacific region. Because of its strategic
central location in Asia, the Philippines has served as a staging area or
source of supply to U.S. military interventions in the region for nearly
one hundred years: from the intervention in China of 1900 to that in
Soviet Russia of 1918, from those in Korea and Vietnam of the '50s,
'60s, and '70s to that in the Gulf War of the '90s. (These are only the
major interventions; there have been many minor ones as well.)
In 1945, as the United States was preparing to re-establish its
military presence in the Philippines after the Japanese occupation of
World War II, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote: "The United States
bases in the Philippines should be considered not merely as outposts,
but as springboards from which the United States armed forces may be
projected." (3) These words define the U.S. military's chief interest in
the Philippines in the past, the present, and the foreseeable future.
The terms of ACSA clearly and definitely bind the Philippines
to give continued service to U.S. wars and interventions in the Asia-
Pacific region as is spelled out in Clause I, Applicability, section 1:
This Agreement is designed to facilitate reciprocal
logistics support between the Parties to be used
primarily during continued exercises, training, de-
ployments, operations, or other cooperative efforts,
***and for unforeseen circumstances or exigencies mandated
by the Treaty in which the recipient may have need of
Logistics Support, Supplies and Services.*** (Emphasis
added.)
The Philippine-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Defense, to which this clause
refers, mandates that each country shall come to the defense of the
other in case of armed attack upon the territory or armed forces of
either in the Pacific region. (In 1951, the year of its adoption, the
Treaty was aimed at the perceived threat of Soviet expansion, and it
later drew Philippine military personnel to U.S. wars in both Korea and
Vietnam.)
Lest there be any mistake as to what "exigencies" refers, on
three separate occasions the agreement defines how it will operate
"during times of active hostilities." For example, the agreement sets a
"monetary limitation" on the amount the military of either country may
spend in payment for services rendered and supplies acquired. But it
goes on to declare: "Annual monetary limitations do not apply during
jointly declared periods of active hostilities."
It was Admiral Larson who first gave public notice that the
Pentagon was re-establishing, via access, its former use of the
Philippines as a springboard for U.S. power projection in the Asia-
Pacific region. He revealed this at a press conference following a
meeting of the Mutual Defense Board in June 1993. Ms.C.M.Q.
Moreno, Managing Editor of San Francisco's Philippine News wrote an
account of this press conference that appeared in the paper for June 16-
23, 1993. At a later date Philippine Defense Minister, General Renato
de Villa, was to say that a meeting of the Mutual Defense Board held in
1993 initiated ACSA. While not explicitly identifying it as such, the
Philippine News story gives every indication that it was this June
meeting that originated ACSA.
Ms. Moreno wrote that the meeting had projected a new
Philippine-U.S. "security alliance," posing the matter in these terms:
"The United States military bases in the Philippines may have closed
down, but the American military presence in the archipelago is likely to
continue, if plans being mulled by a Filipino-American panel
materialize." The remarks of Philippine Foreign Secretary Roberto
Romulo, who attended it, placed the meeting in the same way. He
stressed the importance to regional security of "military-to-military
interaction," and said, "This meeting marks the starting point of fresh
and soon to become intensive engagement between our two countries."
For his part, Admiral Larson took note of "brewing conflicts" in the
Mideast and Korea and said that Washington was prepared to send
troops to both places. Then the Admiral declared: "The Philippines
may be used as a staging area for U.S. military operations should the
U.S. initiate involvement in those areas."
If Admiral Larson's attitude is any criterion, the U.S. military
expects the Philippines, under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty
and present access arrangements, to give support to the United States
should the latter become engaged in hostilities in the Pacific or the
Mideast. It is not so clear, however, that this works the other way
around. In November 1992, stimulated by the use of the Mutual
Defense Treaty to legitimize access, Philippine political leaders put
forward the notion that the Treaty covered U.S. military support for
Philippine claims to the much-disputed Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea. U.S. officials quickly denied this.
Special Military Relations: One-Sided.
If Washington's interpretation of the Mutual Defense Treaty
seems one-sided, ACSA, the Treaty's spawn, is, in its own terms,
overwhelmingly unilateral, while laying claims to mutuality like the
Treaty. The ACSA document calls for "cross-servicing," that is to say,
the military of the Philippines and of the U.S. are each to provide what
the other needs in support and supplies. Subic Base was for years the
main supply and repair depot of the U.S. Pacific fleet and the
installations there, now under Philippine control, would in all
likelihood be similarly useful under ACSA. "When did Filipinos have
warships? Only the U.S. has warships." (4) So did former Senate
President Jovito Salonga, a leader in the struggle against the bases,
puncture ACSA's pretensions to mutuality, as he spoke to the press in
November 1994 after ACSA was announced.
There is historical precedent for ACSA's questionable show of
equal treatment to the Philippines. Just after World War II the U.S.
government successfully pressed the Philippine Congress to pass a
Parity Amendment to the Philippine constitution, giving U.S. investors
in the Philippines the same rights as Philippine investors. (This was
done to get around a nationalist provision in the Philippine constitution
limiting the rights of foreign investors in that country.) In return
Washington gave Philippine investors in the United States the same
rights as U.S. investors. In those days Philippine investors in the
United States were about as plentiful as Philippine warships are in U.S.
ports today.
ACSA's gross imbalance appears in another way. Its terms say
that an explanatory document or "supplementary arrangement" must
accompany every order for goods and services. (Though "during times
of active hostilities" an order may be placed without one.) It then lists
three sets of U.S. military authorities who may negotiate the
supplementary arrangements. But the agreement specifies absolutely no
one on the Philippine side to make such arrangements. This omission
seems to indicate that the military on both sides take for granted the
relationship's one-sided nature.
It was, moreover, U.S. officials who took the initiative both in
the creation of ACSA and in its introduction to the Philippine public.
On November 12, 1994, Philippine Defense Minister de Villa told the
press that the agreement was drafted in 1993 at the instance of the U.S.
panel of the Mutual Defense Board. (5) This was the Philippine
Defense Minister's first public reference to the new agreement and it
came only after the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, John
Negroponte, had first announced its existence two days before. Then
Negroponte had said ACSA would permit U.S. warships to refuel and
resupply in Philippine ports and allow the U.S. military to spend up to
$12 million each year in the Philippines for supplies and services. He
made sure to add, however, that Philippine ships could similarly
resupply in U.S. ports and spend up to the same amount. He further
stated that Presidents Ramos and Clinton would discuss ACSA at their
coming meeting in Manila, and that the agreement would be signed at a
meeting of the Mutual Defense Board on December 15. The
Ambassador gave no further details. (6)
Prepositioning: Access in Another Form.
Ambassador Negroponte's announcement of ACSA came at the
very height of adverse public reaction to reports that Washington
intended to impose another, expanded form of access on the
Philippines: prepositioning, or the stockpiling of U.S. war materiel,
using ships as floating depots in foreign waters.
As part of the Pentagon's post-Cold War plan to achieve the
capability of fighting two major regional conflicts at once, the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992 had recommended the Army preposition
equipment aboard 16 ships to be located in a swing position between
Southwest Asia and Korea.(7) In September 1994 President Clinton had
asked Thailand to allow the U.S. to anchor six civilian ships containing
tanks, armored vehicles, heavy weapons, and military supplies in the
Gulf of Thailand. On October 31 Thailand turned down the request.
Malaysia and Indonesia immediately expressed support for Thailand's
decision. (8)
On November 5 Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs, held a press conference in which he
discussed President Clinton's coming visit to the Philippines on
November 12-13 (to take place on his way to the APEC conference in
Indonesia). Turning to the question of prepositioning, so recently
refused by Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Lord said the United
States was still looking for other locations in Asia, adding, "We have
other options."(9)
Manila papers carried the story and speculation arose that
Clinton would propose prepositioning to Ramos on his coming visit, a
rumor seemingly corroborated by an unidentified source in the foreign
office.(10) Whereupon a heated opposition arose (a result, in part at
least, of Philippine resistance to access since 1992). Senator Wigberto
Tanada, a leading opponent of both bases and access, told the press
prepositioning "would completely nullify the Senate's decision in 1991
regarding the bases treaty," and "make our country a bodega
(storeroom) for deadly U.S. weapons against countries deemed
unfriendly to the U.S. but not necessarily our enemies."(11) The
Philippine Star reported members of the Senate unanimous in their
opposition to the proposal.(12) Newspaper editors and columnists
spoke out in protest as did anti-bases, anti-access organizations like the
Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition. Simultaneously President Ramos,
Foreign Secretary Romulo, and Ambassador Negroponte denied
Washington had proposed prepositioning to the Philippines or that it
was on the agenda of the Ramos-Clinton meeting. All three, however,
left the door open for such a proposal in the future.
It was at this moment that Ambassador Negroponte introduced
ACSA to the Philippine public. In the discussion that followed,
President Ramos expressed support "in principle" for this new
proposal, while Foreign Secretary Romulo argued for it because of the
gain it would bring the Philippines from the sale of supplies and
services.(13) (Although profits from the U.S. Navy's use under ACSA
of two important services at Subic would not go to Filipinos, but to two
U.S. corporations: one of which bought up the Navy's fuel storage
tanks at Subic when the Navy pulled out, the other, the Navy's electric
power plants there.)
On the other hand, wrote the Manila Times, "Negroponte's
announcement drew sharp reaction because it came in the wake of
reports... of using the Philippines for the U.S. prepositioning
scheme."(14) In this highly charged atmosphere the opposition to
prepositioning, by and large, simply merged with the quickly aroused
opposition to ACSA.
Clinton Visits, and the Fight Against ACSA Begins.
Senator Blas Ople, chair of the Senate committee on foreign
relations, opened the attack on ACSA with a bitter condemnation of the
way in which Ambassador Negroponte had taken over its public
presentation: "That we owe this information to the unilateral
announcement of the U.S. government reflects poorly on the regard
with which it holds its Philippine counterpart."(15) (When de Villa also
objected publicly to Negroponte's behavior the Ambassador apologized
to him and Romulo -- but not to Ople -- for his "premature
announcement.")
Then Senator Ople went on to denounce the agreement's
substance. "It is a deliberate circumvention of the Constitution," he
said. "It is like trying to get by legal stealth what the Senate
disapproved of three years ago."(16) Senators Orlando Mercado, chair
of the Senate committee on defense, Wigberto Tanada, and Francisco
Tatad said they could not see how the Philippine government could
allow the presence of foreign troops and facilities here, even for a
limited period, without a treaty covering the agreement. Senator
Mercado vowed never to accept this arrangement.(17)
The Senatorial opposition came to a head, however, when
Senator Ople summoned Defense Secretary Renato de Villa and
Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo to appear before his committee and
shed light on ACSA, about which, he complained, the Senate had been
kept in the dark.
While editors and columnists again joined members of the
Senate in expressing disapproval, this time in addition protestors took
to the streets, linking their opposition to prepositioning and ACSA to
the visit of President Clinton. On November 11 at least 1,000 people
marched on the U.S. Embassy to protest the visit,(18) and on the 12th
(Clinton arrived late that night) rallies took place throughout Manila "as
activists denounced the visit as the revival of U.S. efforts to make the
Philippines a pawn for its military interests."(19) On the 13th they
massed at the Manila Hotel and Malacanang Palace where Clinton was
scheduled to appear.
According to the press many organizations participated in the
demonstrations, including Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition, League
of Filipino Students, Sanlakas, Gabriela, Bayan, Buklod, and KMU.
Besides opposition to a return of the U.S. military presence,
demonstrators expressed related concerns about Amerasian children,
toxic waste at the former base sites, and prostitution of Philippine
women by returning U.S. military personnel.
Police armed with tear gas and truncheons met demonstrators
everywhere, and as a result a number suffered injuries. "The violent
dispersal of several demonstrations," wrote Today, "recalled protest
rallies during the Marcos dictatorship."(20)
While they cast an unmistakable shadow on Clinton's visit, the
demonstrations did not break the smooth flow of his schedule, which
emphasized the question of "security" that Undersecretary Lord had
said would be important to the visit. Ambassador Negroponte's ACSA
announcement had keynoted this theme, and Clinton followed suit with
visits to Corregidor and the U.S. cemetery for the dead of World War
II, both places symbolic of U.S.-Philippine military collaboration.
At the U.S. cemetery Clinton vowed the U.S. would "remain
engaged with the Philippines." This was "Clinton's closest reference to
Washington's reported plans to seek a new form of military access to
the country," wrote a reporter for the Manila Times of November 14.
The perceptive comment of the Times reporter pointed to a difficulty
the leaders of the two nations faced when they spoke in public about
the new post-bases military arrangements, since the Pentagon treats all
access arrangements as classified. At their meeting in Washington a
year before they had met this problem by referring to the access
agreement in a very limited and elliptical manner. They did the same at
their joint press conference on November 13, where, without
mentioning ACSA by name, both spoke favorably of joint military
exercises, and Ramos referred to the "re-watering, refueling and minor
repairs, and also rest and recreation" involved in servicing. What was
striking about their Manila press conference was Ramos' remark that
"the servicing aspect is already being done," and Clinton's
announcement that the U.S. "will be able to supply the Philippine
armed forces with two C130s soon" -- which Ramos later said the
Philippines would have to pay for (as specified in the agreement's text).
In other words, both leaders referred to provisions of the unnamed
ACSA as if they were already in place and operating.
Both the Washington and the Manila meetings of the two
presidents saw attempts to raise the access relationship a notch higher.
Before he visited Washington in 1993, sources in the Philippine
Foreign Office let it be known that the President intended to grant
Clinton automatic access, in a manner reminiscent of Marcos' grant of
unhampered U.S. military operations on the bases. Similarly before
Clinton's arrival in Manila came Negroponte's announcement of
ACSA.
Negroponte and his superiors may have thought that the
nostalgic symbolism of the U.S. president's itinerary would help the
Philippine public swallow what amounted to a decisive escalation of the
Philippine-U.S. military relationship. Conversely, for those opposed to
ACSA, the Clinton visit provided an opportunity to focus public
attention unfavorably on this new development.
Malaya thought the U.S. President's visit "marred by hundreds
of protestors demonstrating against U.S. influence, some shouting
`Clinton Out!' and `Yankees Go Home!'"(21) While to the Philippine
Star "the only fly in the ointment" was "the criticism from the
Philippine Senate for the re-supplying and re-fueling for U.S. warships
calling in the country."(22) In the eyes of the Manila press it appeared
that the opposition to ACSA may have scored in this particular contest
for public opinion.
A Setback for the Pentagon.
A week later when Defense Secretary de Villa testified before a
joint hearing of the foreign relations and defense committees of the
Senate there was little doubt that the recent opposition had given the
agreement's supporters a setback.
When ACSA had been first announced General de Villa had
defended it, saying it would not allow stockpiling of weapons (so hotly
protested after the rumor of prepositioning), would not lead to a return
of the U.S. military presence, and would respect the Philippine
constitution.(23) Then a week later he told the Senators that he found it
necessary to reject ACSA because of "ambiguities" in its first draft.
This would have to be revised to clearly differentiate the storage
mentioned in the text from any suggestion of stockpiling. The draft
would also have to be rid of any taint of automatic grants. He would
have to send it back to the Mutual Defense Board for revision, and it
could not possibly be signed by December 15 (the date set by
Ambassador Negroponte). De Villa stated clearly, however, that the
rejection of the first draft, did not mean that the proposal would no
longer be entertained.(24)
Evidently, however, some Philippine defense officials did not
put too much hope in de Villa's plans to deal with ambiguities, nor did
they seem overly enthusiastic about ACSA itself, as reported in the
Manila Times of November 23:
Sources involved in previous bases talks say
if the language used by the U.S. is ambiguous,
the ambiguity is deliberate. That is how the
U.S. operates when it comes to bases agreements.
.... Likewise a high defense official involved
in previous talks says that when the U.S. military
says `access,' they actually mean `presence,'
or arrangements that would result in bases under
another name.
Defense committee "insiders" also told Today that the draft
rejection and the postponement of the signing were a "setback in the
U.S. attempts to project itself in political flash points in Asia and the
Mideast." If the opposition of the Senate and the protests in the streets
had anything to do with Defense Secretary de Villa's change of
position, then it can be seen as a concession to the opposition, designed
to draw the heat from it by delay and to throw it off track.
A "Routine" Agreement -- Say Ramos and Negroponte.
De Villa's maneuver gave support to the main line of defense
put forward by ACSA's two principal proponents: President Ramos and
Ambassador Negroponte. This was to the effect that ACSA was merely
a routine affair of supply and refueling, similar, said Negroponte, to
agreements the U.S. had with South Korea, Singapore, and Australia.
Consequently when de Villa set about revising the draft to remove any
hint of stockpiling, this appeared to be an attempt to guarantee its
routine nature.
But to say that ACSA was merely an ordinary affair of supply
and refueling, similar to U.S. agreements with other countries, was to
hide its unique and decisive function: the restoration to the U.S.
military of its use of the Philippines as a stepping stone for intervention
in Asia and the Mideast.
Further hiding the truth about the agreement were the
Ambassador's remarks accompanying his announcement of ACSA, as
reported by the Philippine Daily Inquirer of November 11:
"Negroponte denied the claim of the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition
that Pentagon and Philippine defense officials have signed a pact
allowing American troops to use the Philippines as a staging area for
Korea and the Middle East."
The Ambassador may not have known of Admiral Larson's
interventionist statement of June 1993. But in view of his
responsibilities and experience how could Negroponte have been
unaware that the agreement he was introducing allowed the U.S.
military to use Philippine ports, airfields, and military installations for
"unforeseen circumstances or exigencies"?
The Manila Chronicle, in an editorial of November 23 generally
favorable to ACSA, found the Ambassador's distortion of its reality
beyond belief, writing:
There is no denying the fact that the Philippines
will perform some form of supporting role in
the U.S. strategy of forward movement in the
region. Should the U.S. decide on military
action in the Korean peninsula, the ACSA could
be used to support a troop build-up there.
In the case of massive deployment in the
Persian Gulf, U.S. troops travelling through
Asia can choose to source supplies from the
Philippines.
At this point Ambassador Negroponte's defense of ACSA may
be better understood if some of his diplomatic past is recalled. He was
Ambassador to Honduras from 1981 to 1985 and gave full support to
the Reagan-sponsored Contra war against the Nicaraguan government,
an executive policy that contravened the will of the U.S. Congress. In
1983, during his stay,
... the US operation was so large that the CIA
opened a press bureau in a Honduran Holiday Inn
to brag about its exploits. Some 300 to 400
North American military personnel worked in the
small country. The 116 members of the U.S. Embassy
made it the largest in all Latin America.(25)
In effect it was from the Embassy that the Contra war was run. While
he was there the Pentagon had Honduras under an access arrangement
with U.S. troops rotating in and out for joint exercises with Honduran
forces, and it used Honduran territory as a staging area for the Contras.
Be that as it may, even before he announced and defended
ACSA Ambassador Negroponte's public discussion of U.S. access
policy lacked credibility. In May 1994, as former Mayor Gordon of
Olongapo, the city near Subic, was touring the United States to drum
up investment for the converted base area, he let slip that U.S.
warships would soon be docking at Subic for supplies and repairs.(26)
Whereupon Negroponte stepped into the picture to deny categorically
that the United States had made any proposal for such ship visits. In
fact, as Defense Secretary de Villa later testified, the United States had
done just this nearly a year earlier, when it proposed ACSA to the
Mutual Defense Board.
The Manila Times prints the text of ACSA.
Then suddenly, at one stroke, it became more difficult for the
supporters of ACSA to spread misinformation about it, and they
suffered another setback. On November 25 the Manila Times printed
the text of ACSA. On November 12 after Negroponte's announcement,
the editor of the Philippine Star had called for the Philippine
government to release the text of ACSA. But it was a representative of
the free press of Manila, not the Ramos government, that took this
step. Considering the Pentagon's policy of keeping all access
agreements classified and its high-placed friends in the Philippine
government, the move of the Manila Times was a bold one, reminiscent
of the New York Times publication of the secret Pentagon papers,
during the Vietnam War.
The Manila Times editorial that accompanied the text led off
with a description of what it called three "major loopholes" in the
document. The second and third of these warned that ACSA could
bring the Philippines an open-ended stay of U.S. troops, and visits by
nuclear-armed U.S. warships, both banned by the constitution.
Since November 1992 opponents of access policy had
consistently regarded U.S. small unit exercises on Philippine soil and
the visits of U.S. nuclear-capable warships as unconstitutional and had
protested these accordingly. The defeat of the bases treaty in 1991
clearly made the presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines
unconstitutional. Under a separate provision the Philippine constitution
of 1987 banned nuclear weapons from the country, and since the U.S.
Navy neither confirms nor denies the presence of nuclear weapons on
its vessels, the opponents of access had regarded the visits of nuclear-
capable warships as unconstitutional. The fact that the Bush
Administration had banned nuclear weapons from surface warships
except in times of crisis did not change the problem.
In November 1994, however, ACSA brought with it something
new, the detailed commitment of the Philippine military to aid the U.S.
military "during times of active hostilities." In its editorial the Times
gave first place to a warning of this eventuality:
The original draft could involve us in a war
not of our own choosing or making. The draft
requires us to service U.S. logistics needs
for training and operations, and even in the
event of "unforeseen circumstances or exigencies"
--- perhaps a polite euphemism for war.
The draft does not require that the "unfore-
seen circumstances" be a war in which Philippine
interests are at stake, only that "the recipient
may have need of Logistics Support, Supplies and
Services."
The editorial's emphasis on the role of the Philippine military in
servicing the U.S. military -- even as the latter made war to further
U.S. interests -- points to a possibility that ACSA might affect
Philippine sovereignty in some ways even more negatively than did the
U.S. bases. These bases were more or less self-contained military
facilities, controlled by the U.S. They were a U.S. source of services
and supplies to U.S. military forces in peace or war. As ACSA seems
to have it, the U.S. military without the bases under its control would
depend much more on the Philippine military for services and supplies.
This suggests an even closer relationship between the Philippine
military and the U.S. military, one that could further undermine an
independent role on the part of the Philippine military, one that could
drag the Philippine nation even deeper into a war not of its own
choosing.
The editorial called attention to "some lower level military staff"
who "are supporting an ACSA as a quid pro quo for more military
equipment, or U.S. military aid." This, wrote the Times, " would
swiftly bring us back to the days of the bases -- selling our sovereignty
for a mess of pottage." (With this difference, it should otherwise be
noted: due to budget constraints, the post-Cold War U.S. Congress is
much less inclined to give foreign aid of any sort.)
The prime warning from the Times about ACSA and U.S. wars
of intervention evidently impressed leaders of the Philippine House of
Representatives, drawing them onto the line of opposition already
occupied by the Senate leadership. Speaker Jose de Venecia expressed
concern that ACSA could involve the Philippines in a war unwittingly.
Majority leader Rodolfo Albano echoed Venecia's concern and drew
attention to a resolution filed two days earlier by Representative
Bonifacio Gillego, chair of the House Committee on civil, political and
human rights. Gillego's resolution expressed the opposition of the
House to ACSA because of its unconstitutionality. Albano spoke
favorably of the resolution's adoption by the House.(27) In addition to
these leaders, a member of the House with a well-known name,
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., son of the late martial law ruler, was also on
record against ACSA.
On the same day as the Manila Times editorial, Senator Anna
Dominique Coseteng, who had been an active opponent of the bases,
warned of another adverse effect ACSA might have. Citing the
difficulties the opposition presented to the proponents of this new
proposal, she warned of U.S. poll-meddling in 1995 in support of
candidates who favored ACSA. She called ACSA "a means for the
Americans to lord it over the Philippines again."(28)
How They Used the Meeting of the Mutual Defense Board.
In the weeks before the December meeting of the Mutual
Defense Board the proponents of ACSA had seen difficulties and
setbacks, as Senator Coseteng suggested. These did not seem to deter
its main backer -- the Pentagon. This huge bureaucracy was intent as
ever on keeping the United States a military superpower, a global
policeman. And for this, huge military budgets were not the only
necessity. Equally important was the capability of global military
intervention with forward deployment in key locations by means of
bases or access agreements. Perhaps the Pentagon was buoyed up by
the situation in the United States where both major parties gave it full
support. After the Republican victory in the November Congressional
elections Clinton called for a $25 billion increase in military spending
over six years, while the Republicans wanted $60 billion. This despite
the fact that Clinton was carrying on peace negotiations with North
Korea, setting aside, for the moment at least, previous projections of
that country as a major regional enemy. If the editorials in the New
York Times were any indication, Clinton's Korean policy had the
support of important members of the corporate elite, who were busy
profiting from the flourishing markets of Asia, a process that tension
and war on the Korean peninsula would tend to disrupt. Whether war
or peace in Korea, the Pentagon wanted military supremacy in the
Pacific, and that meant ACSA in the Philippines.
In the Philippines, however, conditions appeared to be rather
different, despite efforts of the Ramos Administration. In the past three
years President Ramos has packed the Philippine government with
active and retired military officers, even as the U.S. military imposed
access on the Philippines. There can be no doubt that the continued
militarization of the Philippine government has strengthened the official
hold of U.S. access policy on that country. In addition Malacanang has
entered into agreements for joint military exercises with such
neighboring states as Malaysia and Singapore, and these can only have
served to encourage public acceptance of the close Philippine-U.S.
military engagement ACSA entails. War scares over the Spratly Islands
have also had the effect of promoting the military emphasis in
Philippine government policy associated with ACSA. In spite of all
this, it has seemed evident that overt political support for ACSA has
been largely confined to high officials in the Philippine government and
military. Arrayed against these have been a vocal opposition in the
Philippine Congress and press, and a volatile popular resistance.
It was symptomatic of this situation that ACSA was mentioned
"only in passing" at the December 16 meeting of the Mutual Defense
Board. "Sources said members of the MDB agreed not to discuss it
until the controversy over the proposed accord passes."(29)
Deprived by the opposition of their planned agenda, the
proponents of ACSA used the occasion of the Board meeting to press
their case in familiar terms. The highest U.S. military official in the
Pacific, the head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Richard C.
Macke, came forward to tell a post-meeting press conference that the
U.S. had "absolutely no intentions to stockpile weapons here through
ACSA."(30) With these words the Admiral gave support to those who
were active in the Philippines for ACSA. An important argument these
last used on its behalf was to stress the point that indeed ACSA was not
prepositioning, leaving the inference of its acceptability as what
President Ramos called "the lesser issue."(31) It was in the same
minimizing fashion that Admiral Larson had recommended access in its
first form in 1992, presenting it as a matter of no great significance,
only ship visits, etc. In fact the policy of the U.S. government with
respect to Philippine access resembled what has been called "the salami
tactic" when other great powers have encroached on the sovereignty of
smaller nations: just a slice here, just a slice there, until, before you
know it, the whole sausage is gone.
Against this background the comment that "ACSA could be the
prelude to prepositioning" made by certain military officials to the
Manila Times, seems especially acute.(32) As Defense Secretary de
Villa explained, there are three stages of access: port visits, supplies
and services, and prepositioning. The Pentagon and its Philippine
friends have set the first two in place. Why not -- after a decent interval
-- the third? However that may be, it must not forgotten that, even
without prepositioning, ACSA accomplishes what is uniquely important
for the U.S. military in relation to the Philippines: its restoration as a
base for intervention.
Joining Admiral Macke in the use of the Mutual Defense Board
meeting as a podium was Defense Secretary de Villa, who tried once
again to demonstrate the "routine" nature of ACSA by echoing
Negroponte's argument that ACSA was similar to agreements the U.S.
had with other countries. De Villa, in turn, said ACSA was similar to
Philippine agreements for defense cooperation with Singapore,
Malaysia, France, and South Korea.(33) As with Negroponte's effort,
this was a comparison to hide a difference. None of the countries de
Villa mentioned was a military superpower; none had used the
Philippines as a springboard for military intervention in Asia five times
in the past century; and none showed every intention of doing so again,
should it serve its interests.
After the meeting General de Villa's revisions of the draft of
ACSA were also brought forward to bolster the case. Defense officials
said more revisions had been needed to make sure "we are not dragged
into a war in the Mideast."(34) Evidently the Philippine defense
department felt called upon to express this new concern after the stir
caused by the publication of ACSA's text and the Manila Times
editorial.
De Villa had originally emphasized the need to make sure the
text carried no suggestions of stockpiling or automatic access.
Reporters for the Manila Times having studied the revisions aimed at
stockpiling said they did indeed make the matter of U.S. storage, under
ACSA's terms, somewhat more difficult. Automatic access was the
concession Ramos was reported to have made to Clinton in 1993 to
strengthen the access policy for the U.S. Ridding the text of any
suggestion of automatic grants (or stockpiling) would have the effect of
seeming to scale back ACSA and so to mollify nationalist sentiment.
De Villa's revision of automatic grants was as follows: where the
original draft had said that "each party agrees to satisfy requests from
the other party for Logistics Support, Supplies and Services," the
revised version replaced "to satisfy" with "to favorably consider." A
ranking defense official, summing up the matter of revisions and their
effect, said ACSA remained "conceptually the same."(35) Judging from
the revision of automatic grants, this is easy to believe.
Gathering Elements of a Constitutional Crisis.
Altogether it was a strange and anomalous situation that
obtained in December after the meeting of the Mutual Defense Board.
Top military officials of both the Philippines and the United States had
put off signing ACSA until the Board's next meeting in March 1995.
There were indications, however, that provisions of the agreement were
already in operation whether it had been signed or not. Certainly the
remarks of Presidents Ramos and Clinton at their Manila press
conference had intimated that, as far as they were concerned, ACSA
was an accomplished fact. At a press conference on November 25
commemorating the second anniversary of the U.S. troop pullout from
the Philippines, Satur Ocampo, former spokesperson for the National
Democratic Front, condemned ACSA and offered the following
judgement: "In truth the plan is already laid down."(36)
It may seem unusual that an agreement was evidently being put
into effect before it had been signed and ratified by top officials of the
Philippine and U.S. military, who were, formally at least, the
contracting parties. But this peculiarity was only the shadow of a much
more acute and significant abnormality. In reality, as opponents of
ACSA had warned again and again, the Philippine nation was facing a
profound constitutional crisis.
The 1987 constitution had given the Philippine Senate the power
to determine whether U.S. bases should be permitted and that body had
voted "no." Despite this, President Ramos, with ACSA, had made an
executive agreement allowing the U.S. military to replicate the decisive
functions of the bases, but under another name and in another form,
and this agreement was now apparently in operation.
No reasonable person could doubt that the Philippine Senate's
duly constitutional ban had been essentially intended to eliminate the
functions the U.S. bases performed for the U.S. military, not merely
the name and form under which they were carried out. The
understanding that ACSA did indeed reproduce the bases in a way that
access in its earlier form did not made many more people than before
aware of the constitutional violations inherent in the access policy as it
applied to the Philippines. The prospect of prepositioning that had been
thrust before Philippine eyes added to this number.
Restoring the integrity of the Philippine constitution was
becoming a matter of concern to many Filipinos. In essence these
constitutional violations were caused by the intrusions of the U.S.
military. But it was ACSA that, in the very first instance, opened the
door to the U.S. military and its intrusions. To redeem the integrity of
the Philippine constitution, clearly it was necessary to do away with
ACSA. But how was this to be done? As the Mutual Defense Board
was holding its meeting on December 16, a leading opposition group
gave answer: abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty: A Way Out?
Access policy in the Philippines had been connected with the
Mutual Defense Treaty from the very beginning. Out of the November
1992 meeting of the Mutual Defense Board that established this policy
came not only Admiral Larson with his projection of U.S. ship visits,
aircraft transits, and small unit exercises, but also a press release
explaining the background of the new development. Noting the
"cooperation arrangements" that were to replace the bases, this release
said "the MDT (Mutual Defense Treaty) and the MDB (Mutual Defense
Board) are expected... to provide an effective framework and forum for
coordinating military-to-military activities between the two allies."
The bases had been established in 1947 and soon took their
place as important installations in carrying out U.S. Cold War policies
in Asia. It was on the groundwork of the bases that the Mutual Defense
Treaty was established in 1951. Now with the bases gone, the
relationship was reversed, and the Mutual Defense Treaty was serving
as a foundation for the re-establishment of the U.S. military presence in
the Philippines.
In the current discussion of ACSA, it had been Ambassador
Negroponte who had re-affirmed the key role of the Mutual Defense
Treaty. He did this in the spring of 1994 when he denied ex-Mayor
Gordon's suggestion that the U.S. was about to send warships to Subic
again for repairs and supplies. What was really happening, said the
Ambassador, was the occasional visit to a Philippine port of a U.S.
warship, sanctioned by the Mutual Defense Treaty.(37)
Taking the opposite point of view Senator Wigberto Tanada
denounced the ship visits announced by Gordon as unconstitutional and
joined Representative Bonifacio Gillego to rebut Negroponte and call
for the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which Representative
Gillego said "Was no longer in keeping with the desire of the people of
the Asia-Pacific region to work out a demilitarized and denuclearized
region."(38) (Before making these statements Senator Tanada and
Representative Gillego had both attended an international conference
held in Manila on peace and disarmament in post-Cold War Asia.)
Then in November, after Negroponte's announcement with its
acknowledgement of ship visits for repair and re-fueling, the spring
protests of Tanada and Gillego were verified, and their call for Treaty
abrogation taken up by others.
An editorial in the Philippine Daily Inquirer of November 23
questioned the validity of the Mutual Defense Treaty, making the
Philippines "the only Southeast Asian nation that has a residual mutual
defense treaty with the US." In addition argued the editorial, "The
treaty is serving as the vehicle in which new security schemes are being
processed and percolated." As if to prove the editorial's point the
publication of its text two days later made clear ACSA's dependence on
the Mutual Defense Treaty. In its opening sentence the draft asserted:
"This agreement is executed in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the
Mutual Defense Treaty."
In the Manila Times of November 29, a retired Philippine Navy
Captain, Danilo Vizmanos, military consultant to the Nuclear Free
Philippines Coalition, also identified the Mutual Defense Treaty as "the
convenient instrument used by US and RP military authorities in
restoring the U.S. presence in the Philippines," but he carried the
argument one step further, elevating the Treaty to a place in the
primary focus of those opposing ACSA. "The central issue at bar," he
wrote, "is not only the ACSA, it is the continuing existence of the
anachronistic and indefensible RP - US Mutual Defense Treaty."
By the time of the Mutual Defense Board meeting the Nuclear
Free Philippines Coalition had come to an important conclusion about
these matters and drove the point home in a statement published by the
Manila Chronicle on December 17:
The Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition called
yesterday for the abrogation of the 43-year-old
Mutual Defense Treaty with the US to prevent once
and for all any attempt by the United States to
stockpile lethal weapons within Philippine territory.
University of the Philippine's Prof. Roland
Simbulan, chairman of the coalition, said with
the treaty in place, the US can always resurrect
proposals to station troops and install equipment
in the Philippines.
Proponents of constitutional restitution and opponents of ACSA
had often advocated submitting ACSA to the Senate as a treaty, there to
vote it down. This, as Professor Simbulan saw it, would serve only as a
temporary remedy; nullification of the Mutual Defense Treaty would be
permanent.
Senator Wigberto Tanada and Representative Bonifacio Gillego
had called for the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty because it
was no longer in keeping with conditions in post-Cold War Asia. A
statement, widely quoted in the Philippine press, made by Malaysian
Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir in rejection of the Pentagon's
proposal for prepositioning, suggests why many Filipinos may believe
this to be the case: "We don't feel there is a need for such a base in
Southeast Asia, because we don't feel threatened by China or Japan.
There is no tension in our region, no enemies, no fear... why should
we create it?"(39)
In such circumstances Filipinos who want to see their country's
constitution and sovereignty restored may feel free to go ahead on the
course suggested by the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition, conscious
that it can be followed to the end with no harm to their nation, but with
solid benefit instead.
As far as the other signatory is concerned, the elimination of the
Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty would bring discomfort only to
a very small minority in the United States -- the arms manufacturers
and high military officials whose profits and careers depend on massive
military budgets, and who for this reason work to keep the
interventionist attitudes, structures, and military dispositions of the
Cold War in place.
A move against the Mutual Defense Treaty on the part of the
Philippine people would be consonant with the needs and desires of the
great majority of the people of the United States. For them the huge
military budgets held over from the Cold War stand in the way of the
satisfaction of their needs for jobs and housing, for health care and
education.
Indeed the abolition of the Mutual Defense Treaty would tend to
do away with the most negative --the military-- feature of the "special
relationship," while it would tend to strengthen its most positive aspect:
the friendship between the peoples of the Philippines and the United
States.
There appear to be grounds for the opponents of ACSA to face
the future with some confidence. It would be difficult to say the same
of ACSA's supporters. Their policy evidently is to sit tight and wait
"until the controversy over the proposed accord passes." Past
experience, however, casts doubt on whether what they look forward to
will come about. In the two years and more the U.S. has imposed its
access policy on the Philippines the trend has been the opposite, the
resistance has grown rather than diminished. A more realistic outlook is
suggested by an editorial, "Re-inventing the bases," in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer of November 23:
As far as the Philippines is concerned, any
arrangement that re-instates the bases in
Philippine waters or on land in whatever
euphemism they are labelled is unacceptable.
What should be clear to the US is that among
America's Cold War allies, it is only the
Philippines that decided to end the bases and
that anti-bases sentiment still runs deeply
and strongly.
Footnotes.
1.) Daily Globe, 7 November, '94.
2.) Philip Shennon, New York Times, 6 November, '92.
3.) Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, The United States and the
Philippines, ISHI, Philadelphia, 1981, p. 60.
4.) Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 November, '94.
5.) Standard, 17 November, '94.
6.) Manila Times, 11 November, '94.
7.) Lt. Paul D. Wisniewski, "Dueling Prepo," Armed Forces
Journal International, September '94, p. 22.
8.) Wm. Branigan, Washington Post, 23 November, '94.
9.) Manila Bulletin, 6 November, '94.
10.) Malaya, 9 November, '94.
11.) Today, 10 November, '94.
12.) Philippine Star, 12 November, '94.
13.) Philippine Star, 12 November, '94.
14.) Manila Times, 12 November, '94.
15.) Manila Chronicle, 12 November, '94.
16.) Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 November, '94.
17.) Today, 15 November, '94.
18.) Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 November, '94.
19.) Today, 13 November, '94; Boston Sunday Globe, 13
November,'94.
20.) Today, 11 November, '94.
21.) Malaya, 14 November, '94.
22.) Philippine Star, 13 November, '94.
23.) Today, 13 November, '94.
24.) Philippine Star, 22 November, '94.
25.) Walter La Feber, Inevitable Revolution, W.W. Norton &
Company, New York, 1993, pp. 310-311.
26.) Philippine Star, 4 May, '94.
27.) Manila Times, 26 November, '94.
28.) Today, 26 November, '94.
29.) Manila Times, 17 December, '94.
30.) Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 December, '94.
31.) Transcript of Ramos-Clinton press conference, 13 November,
'94.
32.) Manila Times, 25 November, '94.
33.) Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 December, '94.
34.) Manila Times, 17 December, '94.
35.) Manila Times, 17 December, '94.
36.) Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25 November, '94.
37.) Today, 4 May, '94.
38.) Today, 4 May, '94.
39.) Malaya, 10 November, '94
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