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Copyright (c) 1997 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology

Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology

 

 

1997

 

 

8 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 65

 

LENGTH: 27533 words

 

ARTICLE: COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: REVITALIZING THE

FEDERAL WIRETAP LAWS TO ENHANCE PRIVACY

 

James X. Dempsey*

 

SUMMARY:

... The ongoing worldwide revolution in communications technology

is fundamentally changing the way people conduct their business and

private lives. ... Sections IV through IX apply these themes to

specific policy issues: (Section IV) the legal status of Internet

communications and records stored digitally in cyberspace; (Section

V) implementation of the 1994 federal legislation imposing

surveillance assistance requirements on telecommunications carriers;

(Section VI) the role of encryption; (Section VII) protection of

wireless communications; (Section VIII) revisions, including those

sought by the Clinton Administration, in the laws governing

wiretaps, pen registers and "trap and trace" devices; and (Section

IX) emerging issues concerning law enforcement cooperation and

privacy protection in the international arena. ... While some

technological developments have made electronic surveillance easier,

more intrusive or more revealing, the FBI in the early 1990's began

to complain about the ways in which technological developments were

making law enforcement interception more difficult. ... The plain

language of CALEA and the legislative history indicate that

"call-identifying information" means the numbers dialed by a

subscriber to direct a communication, or other signaling information

that serves the same call routing purpose as the dialed digits. ...

Changes in technology since 1994 when Congress adopted the CALEA

legislation pose equally difficult problems, while also creating

opportunities for enhancing privacy. ...

 

TEXT:

 

That the individual shall have full protection in person and in

property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been

found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature

and extent of such protection. n1

 

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n1. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4

Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).

 

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I. Introduction

 

The ongoing worldwide revolution in communications technology is

fundamentally changing the way people conduct their business and

private lives. These changes are producing challenges for both

privacy and law enforcement interests, stretching the limits of

existing legal rules. Striking the proper balance between privacy

and law enforcement in the electronic realm has always been a

complex endeavor. Changes in communications technology have required

periodic reexamination of privacy protections and law enforcement

capabilities. It is time again for such a review.

 

There are broad grounds for concern that modern systems of

communication are not private. Despite the convenience and the

widespread popularity of cellular and other wireless telephones,

they are notoriously insecure. n2 The open, networked nature of the

Internet, while the source of its power as a medium, also makes it

uniquely vulnerable. n3 Electronic communications systems generate

vast quantities of transactional data that can be readily collected

and analyzed. n4 The globalization of communications infrastructures

threatens to turn the Bill of Rights into a local ordinance.

 

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n2. Adam Clymer, Gingrich Is Heard Urging Tactics in Ethics Case,

N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1997, at A1. See also Cellular Privacy: Is

Anyone Listening? You Betcha: Oversight Hearing before the Subcomm.

on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House

Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. Feb. 5, 1997 [hereinafter Cellular

Privacy Hearing].

 

n3. Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy, National

Research Council, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information

Society (Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds. 1996) [hereinafter NRC

Report].

 

n4. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A

Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L.J. 195

(1992).

 

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Meanwhile, law enforcement agencies, particularly at the federal

level, are putting increasing emphasis on electronic surveillance.

n5 The use of year-long wiretaps on multiple individuals in the

"Pizza Connection" drug trafficking case, the "Ill Wind" defense

procurement fraud investigation, and the "Operation Polar Cap" money

laundering investigation is seen as representing the future of law

enforcement. n6 Louis Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), has called wiretapping "one of law

enforcement's most valuable investigative techniques." n7 Freeh

argues that wiretapping is crucial to the investigation of cases

involving terrorism, espionage, organized crime, drug trafficking,

public corruption, and violent crime. n8 Without this technique,

Freeh has testified, "law enforcement at the Federal, State, and

local levels will be crippled." n9 Not surprisingly, therefore, a

number of public policy debates in recent years have centered around

law enforcement proposals to preserve or expand government

surveillance capabilities in light of technological developments.

 

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n5. Jim McGee, Wiretapping Rises Sharply Under Clinton, Wash. Post,

July 7, 1996, at A1.

 

n6. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & FBI, Report on a Study of the Use of

Electronic Surveillance Prepared by the United States Department of

Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as Required by

Section 810 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996, Submitted to the United States House of Representatives and

the United States Senate 21-22 (July 1996) [hereinafter July 1996

Electronic Surveillance Report to Congress].

 

n7. Encryption, Key Recovery, and Privacy Protection in the

Information Age: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

105th Cong. (June 4, 1997) (testimony of Louis J. Freeh).

 

n8. See id. at 9-10.

 

n9. See Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced

Telecommunications Technologies and Services: Joint Hearings on H.R.

4922 and S. 2375 Before the Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and

Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd

Cong. 6 (1994) [hereinafter Digital Telephony Hearings] (testimony

of Louis J. Freeh).

 

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This article addresses the privacy issues raised by new

communications and computer technologies and the needs of law

enforcement. Section II summarizes the principles underlying the

federal wiretap laws and questions whether those laws currently

provide adequate protection to privacy in light of judicial

interpretations and technological enhancements in surveillance

capabilities. Section III addresses some of the broad implications

of ongoing changes in communications technology for privacy and law

enforcement and identifies five trends that should guide the

development of privacy protections for the digital age. Sections IV

through IX apply these themes to specific policy issues: (Section

IV) the legal status of Internet communications and records stored

digitally in cyberspace; (Section V) implementation of the 1994

federal legislation imposing surveillance assistance requirements on

telecommunications carriers; n10 (Section VI) the role of

encryption; (Section VII) protection of wireless communications;

(Section VIII) revisions, including those sought by the Clinton

Administration, in the laws governing wiretaps, pen registers and

"trap and trace" devices; and (Section IX) emerging issues

concerning law enforcement cooperation and privacy protection in the

international arena. Each of Sections IV through IX includes

recommendations for strengthening privacy protections while

preserving necessary law enforcement capabilities.

 

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n10. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No.

103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1001-1010 and

scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter CALEA].

 

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The focus of this article is limited to government access to

communications and stored electronic data and attendant issues,

deferring to others the consideration of important questions

concerning the disposition of control over personal information as

between employers and employees or between businesses and customers.

n11

 

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n11. See David N. King, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector

Workplace: Protection from Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging

"Privacy Gap," 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 441 (1994). See also Sandra

Petersen, Your Life as an Open Book: Has Technology Rendered

Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 Fed Comm. L.J. 163 (1995);

Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law

Reflect American Values?, 72 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 271 (1996); Oscar H.

Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An

Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal

F. 77 (1996); Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail And Voice Mail:

Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 Am. U. L. Rev.

219 (1994).

 

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II. Electronic Surveillance and the Need for Strong

PrivacyProtections

 

 

 

The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have

taken place in the last century have made possible today the

widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques ...

Both proponents and opponents of wiretapping and electronic

surveillance agree that the present state of the law in this area is

extremely unsatisfactory and that the Congress should act to clarify

the resulting confusion. n12

 

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n12. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 67 (1968) (Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act).

 

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A. The Legal Framework

 

In important ways, electronic surveillance has always posed greater

threats to privacy than the physical searches and seizures that the

Fourth Amendment was originally intended to cover. n13 To begin

with, "electronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate."

n14 Interception of a telephone line provides to law enforcement all

of the target's communications, whether they are relevant to the

investigation or not, raising concerns about compliance with the

particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment and posing the

risk of general searches. n15 In addition, electronic surveillance

involves an on-going intrusion in a protected sphere, unlike the

traditional search warrant, which authorizes only one intrusion, not

a series of searches or a continuous surveillance. n16 Officers must

execute a traditional search warrant with dispatch, not over a

prolonged period of time. If they do not find what they were looking

for in a home or office, they must leave promptly and obtain a

separate order if they wish to return to search again. n17

Electronic surveillance, in contrast, continues around-the-clock for

days or months. Finally, the usefulness of electronic surveillance

depends on lack of notice to the suspect. n18 In the execution of

the traditional search warrant, an announcement of authority and

purpose ("knock and notice") is considered essential so that the

person whose privacy is being invaded can observe any violation in

the scope or conduct of the search and immediately seek a judicial

order to halt or remedy any violations. n19 In contrast, wiretapping

is conducted surreptitiously.

 

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n13. "The 'indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement

raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments,' and imposes 'a heavier responsibility on this Court in

its supervision of the fairness of procedures' ...." Berger v. New

York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967) (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385

U.S. 323, 329, n. 7 (1966)).

 

n14. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).

 

n15. See id.; Standards Relating to Elec. Surveillance, Am. Bar

Ass'n Project on Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice, 87-95

(Approved Draft, 1971).

 

n16. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 57, 59.

 

n17. See id. at 57.

 

n18. See Lopez, 373 U.S. at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

 

n19. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the centrality of

knock and notice to the Fourth Amendment's protective scheme. See

Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997); Wilson v. Arkansas,

514 U.S. 927 (1995).

 

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In 1967, in the landmark Berger and Katz cases, the Supreme Court

ruled that electronic surveillance was a search and seizure covered

by the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment. n20 In Berger,

the Court condemned lengthy, continuous or indiscriminate electronic

surveillances, but in Katz, the Court indicated that a short

surveillance, narrowly focused on interception of a few

conversations, was constitutionally acceptable if approved by a

judge in advance and based on a special showing of need. n21

 

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n20. See Berger, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347 (1967).

 

n21. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 59; Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-59.

 

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Responding to the Supreme Court's Berger and Katz opinions and to

the arguments of law enforcement that wiretapping was a vital weapon

in the efforts against organized crime, n22 Congress, in 1968,

authorized law enforcement wiretapping under a system of protections

intended to compensate for the uniquely intrusive aspects of

electronic surveillance. n23 According to the Senate report, the

legislation had "as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of

wire and oral communications and (2) delineating on a uniform basis

the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of

wire and oral communications may be authorized." n24 The wiretap

provisions were enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act of 1968, so the federal wiretap law is still

referred to sometimes as "Title III." n25

 

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n22. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement:

Hearings on S. 300, S. 552, S. 580, S. 674, S. 675, S. 678, S. 798,

S. 824, S. 916, S. 917, S. 992, S. 1007, S. 1094, S. 1194, S. 1333,

and S. 2050 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. passim (1967).

 

n23. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended

at 18 U.S.C. 2510-22 (1996)).

 

n24. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968).

 

n25. States may authorize wiretapping under restrictions at least as

strict as the federal law, and most have done so. See 18 U.S.C.

2516(2). As of December 31, 1996, forty-five jurisdictions

(including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin

Islands) had laws on the books authorizing wiretapping, while eight

states (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, South

Carolina, and Vermont) did not allow wiretapping by state and local

police. See Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the United States

Courts, 1996 Wiretap Rep. at 13 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 Wiretap

Rep.]. Every year, about half of the states that do authorize

wiretapping report not a single use of it by state and local law

enforcement agencies, according to the annual Wiretap Reports of the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts. In 1995, for

example, over half of the states that authorized wiretapping (22 out

of 40) did not utilize the technique (including, e.g., such large

states as Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin).

Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the United States Courts, 1995

Wiretap Rep. at 12 (1996).

 

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In brief, the legislation Congress enacted in 1968 had the following

components: the content of wire communications could be seized by

the government in criminal cases pursuant to a court order issued

upon a finding of probable cause; n26 wiretapping would be otherwise

outlawed; n27 wiretapping would be permitted only for specified

crimes; n28 it would be authorized only as a last resort, when other

investigative techniques would not work; n29 surveillance would be

carried out in such a way as to "minimize" the interception of

innocent conversations; n30 notice would be provided after the

investigation had been concluded; n31 and there would be an

opportunity prior to introduction of the evidence at any trial for

an adversarial challenge to both the adequacy of the probable cause

and the conduct of the wiretap. n32 "Minimization" was deemed

essential to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity

requirement, compensating for the fact that law enforcement was

receiving all of the target's communications, including those that

were not evidence of a crime. n33 The showing of a special need, in

the form of a lack of other reasonable means to obtain the

information, was viewed as justification for the failure to provide

advance or contemporaneous notice of the search. n34

 

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n26. 18 U.S.C. 2518(3) (1996).

 

n27. 18 U.S.C. 2511 (1996).

 

n28. 18 U.S.C. 2516(2) (1996).

 

n29. 18 U.S.C. 2518(3)(c) (1996).

 

n30. 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) (1996).

 

n31. 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(d) (1996).

 

n32. 18 U.S.C. 2518(9), (10) (1996).

 

n33. Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Wiretapping And

Eavesdropping 14.5, at 14-11 to 14-12 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter

Fishman & McKenna]; James G. Carr, The Law Of Electronic

Surveillance 5.7(a), at 5-28 to 5-31 (1986). See also Clifford S.

Fishman, The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic Surveillance:

Title III, the Fourth Amendment, and the Dred Scott Decision, 28 Am.

U. L. Rev. 315 (1979).

 

n34. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968).

 

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In 1978, Congress regulated wiretapping in national security cases

through another statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(FISA). n35 This law authorizes the government to carry out

electronic surveillance in the United States upon obtaining a

judicial order (from one of a panel of Article III judges designated

by the Chief Justice) based upon a probable cause finding that the

target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. n36 FISA

was intended to be used primarily in foreign intelligence and

counter-intelligence cases and therefore did not offer some of the

protections required under Title III. n37 Most significantly, FISA

does not require that the target ever be given notice of the surveil

lance, even after the investigation is closed, unless the government

seeks to use the results in a criminal prosecution. n38 In addition,

for individuals who are not U.S. citizens or permanent resident

aliens, the statute does not require probable cause to believe that

the target is engaged in criminal conduct. Rather, it is enough that

the target is an agent of a foreign power. n39 Even for U.S.

citizens, the statute allows surveillance where there is probable

cause to believe that the person is engaged in clandestine

intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, "which

activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal

statutes of the United States." n40

 

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n35. Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. I, 101, 92 Stat. 1783 (1983) (codified

at 50 U.S.C. 1801-11 (1996)).

 

n36. 50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(3)(a).

 

n37. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Oversight Hearings

before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the

Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th

Cong. 2-18 (1983) (testimony of Mary Lawton).

 

n38. Cf. 50 U.S.C. 1806(c).

 

n39. 50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(1) (defining an "agent of a foreign power").

 

n40. Id. at 1801(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

 

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A third major piece of legislation regulating electronic

surveillance was enacted in 1986, when Congress made an initial

response to the emergence of wireless services and the digital era

with the adoption of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

(ECPA). n41 Title III had been limited to voice communications,

whether face-to-face or over a wire. ECPA extended Title III to

include wireless voice communications and electronic communications

of a non-voice nature, such as e-mail or other computer-to-computer

transmissions. n42 ECPA was intended to reestablish the balance

between privacy and law enforcement, which Congress found had been

upset, to the detriment of privacy, by the development of

communications and computer technology and changes in the structure

of the telecommunications industry. Among the developments noted by

Congress were "large-scale electronic mail operations, cellular and

cordless phones, paging devices, miniaturized transmitters for radio

surveillance, and a dazzling array of digitized networks." n43

Privacy, Congress concluded, was in danger of being gradually eroded

as technology advanced. n44

 

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n41. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.

99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in sections of 18 U.S.C. including

2510-21, 2701-10, 3121-26).

 

n42. ECPA, in fact, did not extend all of Title III's protections to

electronic communications. The court order authorizing the

interception of electronic communications can be based upon

suspected violations of any federal felony, rather than the limited

list of crimes that can serve as a predicate for telephone

interceptions. See 18 U.S.C 2516(3) (1996). In addition, no

statutory exclusionary rule applies to non-voice interceptions that

violate the procedures in the law. See 18 U.S.C. 2515 (1996)

(exclusionary rule only refers to wire or oral communications, not

electronic communications).

 

n43. H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 18 (1986).

 

n44. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 2-3, 5 (1986); H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at

16-19 (1986). See also H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 18 (stating that

"legal protection against the unreasonable use of newer surveillance

techniques has not kept pace with technology.").

 

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In addition to the twin goals of privacy and law enforcement, ECPA

sought to advance a third goal: supporting the development and use

of these new technologies and services. n45 Congress affirmatively

wanted to encourage the proliferation of new communications

technologies, but it recognized that consumers would not trust new

technologies if the privacy of those using them was not protected.

n46

 

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n45. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 5 (noting that legal uncertainty

over the privacy status of new forms of communications "may

unnecessarily discourage potential customers from using innovative

communications systems").

 

n46. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986); H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 19

(1986).

 

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ECPA made it a crime to knowingly intercept wireless communications

and e-mail, but authorized law enforcement to do so with a warrant

issued on probable cause. n47 In ECPA, Congress also began to

recognize the privacy implications of transactional data generated

by communications systems. ECPA established rules for the use of pen

registers, which capture numbers identifying outgoing calls, and for

trap and trace devices, which capture numbers identifying incoming

calls. n48 In addition, it set rules for law enforcement access to

information identifying a subscriber of an electronic communications

service. n49 ECPA also eased certain procedural requirements for

interception of wire communications by federal law enforcement

officers. n50

 

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n47. 18 U.S.C. 2701-03 (1996).

 

n48. 18 U.S.C. 3121-27 (1996).

 

n49. 18 U.S.C. 2703(c).

 

n50. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 106, 100 Stat. 1848, 1856-57 (1986)

(amending 18 U.S.C. 2518).

 

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When law enforcement officials discuss wiretapping today, they often

hasten to emphasize how stringent are the privacy protections of the

legal framework established between 1968 and 1986: that wiretaps are

available only for the most serious cases; n51 that authorization to

conduct a tap is sought only when all other investigative techniques

have failed; n52 that applications are subject to rigorous judicial

scrutiny; n53 that wiretaps are conducted in such a manner as to

minimize the interception of innocent conversations; n54 and that

parties whose conversations are intercepted are entitled to obtain

after-the-fact judicial review of the authorization and conduct of

wiretaps. n55 Law enforcement officials cite these protections as a

way of reassuring legislators and the public that the intrusiveness

of electronic surveillance is well regulated.

 

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n51. See Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 6, 8, 16-20

(testimony of Louis J. Freeh).

 

n52. See id. at 6, 8, 16, 22, 123.

 

n53. See id. at 16, 22.

 

n54. See id. at 22, 24.

 

n55. See id. at 16.

 

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B. Erosion of the Wiretap Laws' Protective Scheme

 

There is substantial evidence, however, technological developments

aside, that the protections initially established in 1968 and

reaffirmed in 1986 are not working as intended. It appears

increasingly apparent that components of the balanced legislative

scheme have been watered down by Congress itself and by the

judiciary:

 

(1) Wiretapping is no longer confined to violent and major crimes.

Although Congress recognized in 1968 that wiretapping was an

extraordinary technique that should be used only for especially

serious crimes, the list of offenses for which wiretapping is

permitted has been expanded steadily ever since - from the original

26 in 1968 to 95 in 1996. n56 The original list was largely limited

to espionage and treason, violent crimes, and offenses typically

associated with organized crime. The current list has been so

expanded that wiretapping is now authorized for cases involving

false statements on passport applications and loan applications or

involving "any depredation" against any property of the United

States. n57 Further expansions are promoted in response to each new

law enforcement concern that receives legislative attention.

Wiretapping is used only rarely in cases involving homicide,

kidnapping, or terrorism. In 1996, 71% of wiretaps nationwide were

in drug cases. n58

 

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n56. 18 U.S.C. 2516 (1996).

 

n57. Id.

 

n58. 1996 Wiretap Rep., supra note 25, at 8.

 

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(2) The yearly number of federal, state and local law enforcement

wiretaps has gone up steadily, from 564 in 1980 to 1,149 in 1996.

Wiretaps increased 9% in 1996 alone. n59 Judges rarely deny wiretap

applications. In 1996, only one wiretap application was denied;

1,149 were approved. n60 For seven years in a row, 1989 through

1995, no judge, state or federal, denied a single government request

for wiretapping. n61 In that period, judges approved 6,598 wiretap

orders in criminal cases. n62 There has been equally dramatic growth

in the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. In 1995, the

law enforcement agencies of the federal Justice Department alone

executed 3,414 pen register orders covering the telephone facilities

of 7,899 persons and 1,558 trap and trace orders affecting the

telephones of 3,902 persons. n63 No judge has ever been known to

deny an application for a pen register or trap and trace device,

because the law states that a judge must approve any application

signed by an Assistant United States Attorney (or higher-ranking

government attorney) who certifies that the information likely to be

obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. n64

 

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n59. Id. at 7.

 

n60. Id.

 

n61. Id. at 29.

 

n62. Id.

 

n63. Report on the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices

by the Law Enforcement Agencies/Offices of the Department of Justice

for Calendar Year 1995, Report submitted to the House and Senate

Judiciary Committees, April 30, 1996 [hereinafter Pen Register

Report].

 

n64. 18 U.S.C. 3123(a) (1996).

 

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(3) While Katz indicated approval of wiretaps of short duration, the

longest wiretap in 1996 lasted 420 days. n65 The average length of

intercepts has increased steadily, from an average of 21 days in

1980, to an average of 38 days in 1996. n66 The average number of

calls intercepted per wiretap has also increased steadily, from

1,058 per intercept in 1980 to 1,969 in 1996. n67

 

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n65. 1996 Wiretap Rep., supra note 25, at 8.

 

n66. See Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the United States Courts,

1990 Wiretap Rep. at 29 (1991); 1996 Wiretap Rep., supra note 25, at

29.

 

n67. Id.

 

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(4) The courts authorize electronic surveillance even when law

enforcement agencies have not exhausted all other reasonably

available techniques. n68 In United States v. Garcia, n69 for

example, the Eighth Circuit held that electronic surveillance

approval does not require the exhaustion of all normal investigative

techniques. n70 Representative of the judicial attitude is the

conclusion of one court that the purpose of the statutory exhaustion

requirement is "simply to inform the issuing judge of the

difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques." n71

 

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n68. Fishman & McKenna, supra note 33, 8:47 at 8-96 to 8-97 & nn.

36-37 (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974);

United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1974);

People v. Milnes, 527 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Colo. 1974); Bell v. State,

429 A.2d 300, 302-04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Commonwealth v.

Fenderson, 571 N.E.2d 11 (Mass. 1991); State v. Monsrud, 337 N.W.2d

652, 657 (Minn. 1983); State v. Lozano, 311 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Neb.

1981); People v. Versace, 426 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1980); State v.

Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1083 (R.I. 1981)).

 

n69. 785 F.2d 214, 223 (8th Cir. 1986).

 

n70. Id. at 223.

 

n71. See United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 564-65 (5th Cir.

1974).

 

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(5) The minimization requirement also has not been strictly enforced

by the judiciary. n72 In Scott v. United States, n73 the Supreme

Court held that the complete recording of all conversations on a

phone line belonging to the woman with whom the subject of the order

was living was acceptable. Law enforcement agents in that case had

made essentially no efforts to minimize the interception of

nonpertinent calls, despite the high proportion of calls on the line

that were nonpertinent. The Court justified this pattern of

recording on the ground that the subject often used coded language

in very brief conversations. In Scott, 40% of the conversations

intercepted were relevant, but the lower courts have read the case

as effectively eliminating the requirement to minimize the recording

of innocent conversations. Scott's impact is illustrated by United

States v. Ozar, n74 where the Eighth Circuit upheld the "two minutes

up/one minute down" technique recommended by the Justice Department,

in which FBI agents listened to two out of every three minutes of

every phone conversation. In Ozar, the government intercepted a

total of 8,126 minutes of the defendant's telephone conversations,

of which 223 minutes, or 2.75% were deemed pertinent to the ensuing

charges. The Court of Appeals held that this was not a violation of

Title III, not because the conversations were short and coded, as in

Scott, but because they were lengthy and complicated. n75

 

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n72. Fishman & McKenna, supra note 33, 14-4 at 14-8 to 14-11; Robert

Plotkin, Breaking the Code: Excluding Illegal Wiretap Evidence, 10

BNA Criminal Practice Manual 432 (1996).

 

n73. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).

 

n74. Ozar v. United States, 50 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 193 (1995).

 

n75. Id. at 1447-48.

 

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(6) Defendants' after-the-fact challenges to the authorization or

conduct of surveillance are rarely sustained. n76 Between 1985 and

1994, judges nationwide granted 138 suppression motions while

denying 3,060, for a 4.3% suppression rate. n77

 

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n76. Plotkin, supra note 72, at 432.

 

n77. Compiled from Wiretap Reports covering the years from 1985

through 1994.

 

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(7) The FISA court in its entire seventeen-year history has never

turned down a government electronic surveillance request. n78 Little

is known publicly about these taps, but the Justice Department has

released figures showing that in 1996, the FISA court issued a

record 839 orders, up 20% from the prior year. n79 Meanwhile, FISA

has been used increasingly in criminal cases, n80 for which it was

not designed. The government does this by claiming that it is

conducting parallel intelligence and criminal investigations and

proceeds under the more flexible FISA standards. In another very

troubling development, Congress recently authorized the use of FISA

evidence in secret deportation proceedings, allowing the evidence to

be introduced without disclosure to the respondent, thereby

dispensing with one of the statute's key procedural protections. n81

 

 

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n78. Jim McGee & Brian Duffy, Someone to Watch Over Us, Wash. Post

Mag., June 23, 1996, at 9, 12.

 

n79. 67 Federation of Am. Scientists, Secrecy and Government

Bulletin (May 1997)(citing April 18, 1997 U.S. Dep't of Justice

report to Congress).

 

n80. McGee & Duffy, supra note 78, at 9, 13.

 

n81. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-132, 401, 110 Stat. 1214, 1262 (codified at 8 U.S.C.

1534(e)).

 

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C. Enhancements in Government Surveillance

 

 

 

In the long term, digital telephone technology will enhance the

FBI's ability to collect, share and analyze information. Many of

these enhancements will come without any FBI development effort,

driven by consumer demand. n82

 

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n82. FBI Budget Justification for FY 1992, at 67, reprinted in

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and

Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992: Hearings Before a Subcomm.

of the House Committee on Appropriations, 102nd Cong. 738 (1991).

 

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In many ways, it is clear that this 1991 prediction by the FBI is

coming true. While Section IV examines Congress' response to FBI

concerns that new technology is making electronic surveillance

harder, there are other ways in which new communications and

computer technologies provide substantial advantages to law

enforcement.

 

Wireless Services. In a host of circumstances where, in the past,

persons would have used pay phones or not made a call at all, they

now use cellular or other wireless phones, which are readily tapped

at central switches. (It is normally far easier to identify a

target's wireless service provider than it was to predict which pay

phone he or she would use.) Proportionately more wireless phones are

tapped by law enforcement than traditional wireline phones. n83

Indeed, law enforcement has been so quick to utilize this capability

that in some urban areas cellular companies had been unable to

accommodate simultaneously all of the law enforcement agencies

seeking to tap cellular phones from mobile telephone switching

offices, and therefore had to install additional capacity.

 

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n83. Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 152 (testimony of

Thomas E. Wheeler).

 

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Location information. In the course of processing calls, many

wireless communications systems collect information about the cell

site (or the sector within a cell site) of the person making or

receiving a call. Systems may even locate a cellular phone merely

while it is turned on, even if it is not handling a call. n84 The

technology is proceeding in the direction of providing more precise

location information, a trend that has been boosted by the rulings

of the Federal Communications Commission in its "E-911" (enhanced

911) proceeding, which requires service providers to develop a

locator capability for medical emergency and rescue purposes. n85

Wireless phone location information can be obtained by law

enforcement. If it is a record collected and stored as part of the

billing process, it can be obtained under current law by a mere

subpoena. To obtain it in real-time, law enforcement agencies have

been using court orders issued under 18 U.S.C. 2703 (d). In 1994,

three of the four manufacturers of cellular switches had developed

the software capability to deliver location information to law

enforcement immediately upon call completion. n86

 

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n84. Tim Friend, Using Cell Phones to Reach Out and Find Someone,

USA Today, Dec. 16, 1997, at 6D; Albert Gidari, Locating Criminals

by the Book, Cellular Bus., June 1996, at 70.

 

n85. In June 1996, the FCC adopted a Report and Order and Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking in Docket 94-102, requiring wireless service

providers to modify their systems within eighteen months to enable

them to relay to public safety authorities the cell site location of

911 callers. Further, the FCC ordered carriers to take steps over

the next five years to deploy the capability to provide latitude and

longitude information locating wireless telephone callers within 125

meters. Finally, the FCC proposed requiring at the end of the five

year period that covered carriers have the capability to locate a

caller within a forty foot radius for longitude, latitude and

altitude, thereby, for example, locating the caller within a tall

building. In re Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure

Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Sys., FCC Docket

No. 94-102, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (last modified Jan. 2, 1997) [hereinafter FCC E-911

Order] available at

<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/1996/fcc96264.txt>.

 

n86. Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 152-54 (testimony

of Thomas E. Wheeler).

 

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E-mail and other on-line communications. E-mail is in some respects

easier to intercept than regular mail. Indeed, since e-mail messages

are often stored with a service provider for a period of time before

they are read by the intended recipient (and even sometimes after

they are read), e-mail is less transient than telephone calls and

thus more vulnerable to interception. Law enforcement can intercept

a person's e-mail and other Internet activity in real-time, by

monitoring the phone line that serves as most people's connection to

the Net. n87 This allows law enforcement, when it chooses to do so,

to obtain an extraordinary window into a person's life. More

readily, e-mail messages can be obtained from the host computer of

the service provider. This is the method most commonly used by law

enforcement to access e-mail. n88 In this way, e-mail interception

is easier than telephone interception: while a person might have one

telephone number at home, a different number at work, and another

when traveling on business or vacation, most people have only one

e-mail address to which all their e-mail is sent, and where it is

all subject to being accessed by the government. n89

 

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n87. See Michael J. Sniffen, First Computer Wiretap Produces Hacking

Charge Against Argentine Student, Associated Press, Mar. 29, 1996

(where communications through a major Harvard University computer

were sifted in a search for patterns used by a suspected hacker);

Gaylord Shaw, Wiretap Nets a Hacker: In a cyber-monitoring first,

U.S. accuses Argentinian, Newsday, Mar. 30, 1996, at A6.

 

n88. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F.

1996) (search warrant for e-mail served on America Online); United

States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).

 

n89. By lurking in online "chat rooms," law enforcement officers are

able to monitor communications. See Graeme Zielinski, Tracking

Pedophiles on Vast Internet No Easy Task, Chicago Tribune, July 6,

1997, at C1 ("In a sense, the Internet has proven a boon to

investigators, said an FBI investigator. 'These guys used to be in

some back shed somewhere. We couldn't get to them....Now we can get

inside their minds.'").

 

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Remote monitoring. Technology has freed law enforcement intercepts

of the constraints of geography. Agents monitoring wiretaps do not

have to sit hunched in vans outside the target's house. Instead, the

intercepted communications can be transported hundreds or thousands

of miles to a monitoring facility at a law enforcement office. It is

now common in investigations spanning multiple jurisdictions to

establish a single monitoring plant and transmit there in real-time

all intercepted conversations to be monitored, minimized, and

recorded. The courts have held that a single federal judge can issue

wiretap orders for telephones any where in the country, so long as

the personnel listening to the conversations work in the judge's

jurisdiction. n90 The Drug Enforcement Agency forwards intercepts

from many different investigations to a central facility in Utah,

where they are transcribed and translated by military personnel. n91

 

 

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n90. United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1992).

 

n91. Jim McGee, Military Seeks Balance in Delicate Mission: The Drug

War; As Involvement Expands, Law and History are Basic Guidelines,

Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1996, at A1.

 

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Computer analysis. As noted above, law enforcement has recognized

the informational richness of signaling and transactional

information. Computer analysis is key to law enforcement

exploitation of this data. Computers have made it possible for law

enforcement agencies to analyze vast amounts of information about

personal communications patterns far more easily. Pen registers,

which recorded the numbers dialed on a particular phone line, have

been superseded by multiline dialed number recorders, and these, in

turn, have been computerized, allowing agencies to automatically

search for revealing patterns of calls. The DEA has developed an

integrated system called TOLLS that will electronically load

telephone call data from dialed number recorders into a mainframe

system for matching and analysis. n92 Further computer analytic

developments may be around the corner. Voice recognition technology,

for example, would free law enforcement from the most labor

intensive aspects of monitoring conversations, removing one of the

biggest practical constraints on the number of interceptions made.

 

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n92. David Burnham, Above the Law 159 (1996) (citing U.S. Dep't of

Justice, 1994 Congressional Authorization and Budget Submission,

vol. 2, DEA section, at 47).

 

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Title III allows law enforcement to take full advantage of these

enhancements, requiring telephone companies, service providers and

all other communications carriers to provide all technical

assistance to law enforcement agencies seeking to carry out

authorized interceptions. n93

 

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n93. See 18 U.S.C. 2518(4) (1996).

 

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III. Five Broad Technological Trends Affect Privacy and Law

Enforcement, Posing Challenges and OfferingOpportunities

 

 

 

Telecommunications, of course, did not stand still after 1986.

Indeed, the pace of change in technology and in the structure of the

telecommunications industry accelerated and continues to accelerate.

n94

 

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n94. H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, pt.1, at 12 (1994) (report on CALEA).

 

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Behind the individual enhancements to surveillance capabilities

identified above are five broad technological developments n95 that

profoundly challenge the assumptions made by Congress in 1968 when

it first established the rules for electronic surveillance, and in

1986 when it reaffirmed those assumptions:

 

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n95. A list such as the one that follows cannot be comprehensive of

the changes underway in the digital world. Others, for example,

would point to the developing "convergence" among voice, data, and

images as another major trend in telecommunications. However, the

trends discussed here were identified because they seem to have

major implications for government surveillance and privacy.

 

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(1) The dramatic development of the Internet has transformed all

over again methods of gathering, processing and sharing of

information, which had already been transformed by the computer

itself. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the

Internet. n96 In 1986, when ECPA was enacted, there were about

50,000. n97 By June 1996, there were over 9.4 million host computers

worldwide linked to the Internet. Including users who connect to the

Internet via modem, some 40 million people worldwide can access the

Internet. n98 In commercial terms, networking has had enormous

implications. The average number of electronic point-of-sale

transactions in the United States went from 38 per day in 1985 to

1.2 million per day in 1993. n99 Estimates for the potential of

"Internet commerce" range up to "tens of billions of dollars by the

turn of the century." n100

 

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n96. Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

 

n97. Id. n98. Id.

 

n99. Office of Technology Assessment, Information Security and

Privacy in Network Environments, 1-2 (1994).

 

n100. The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,

July 1, 1997, at 2 (the "Magaziner report").

 

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The Internet is not like the telephone system, or the mail, or mass

media. Rather, the Internet combines a much broader range of

functions, serving not only the one-on-one functions of the

telephone and the mail, but also the information functions of TV,

newspapers and the library; the artistic functions of a movie

theater and a museum; the political functions of a town meeting

hall; n101 the marketing and shopping functions of a mall; the

organizing functions of door-to-door canvassing; n102 and the

social, even romantic functions of a nightclub or coffee house. As

an intentionally open system of linked computers, the Internet is

inherently insecure. n103 The dramatic development of the Internet

as a networked global communications medium and the expansion in the

range of transactions that occur on-line have produced a qualitative

change in the nature of communications and, accordingly, in the

nature and amount of the information that is exposed to both lawful

interception and illegal intrusion or misuse.

 

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n101. U.S. Senate hearings have been broadcast live over the

Internet. See e.g., <http://www.crypto.com/events/072596/>;

<http://www.crypto.com/events/062696/>;

<http://www.hotwired.com/wiredside/96/25/stuff/senate.28.8.ram>.

 

n102. Grassroots groups across the political spectrum use the

Internet to inform, organize and galvanize. The "Encryption Policy

Resource Page" features an "Adopt Your Legislator" campaign,

connecting Internet users with information about their legislators'

positions on the encryption issue. The page operates in conjunction

with e-mail alerts to interested citizens so that they can contact

their representatives when legislative action is imminent. The

Encryption Policy Resource Page: Adopt Your Legislator! (visited

July 26, 1997) <http://www.crypto.com/adopt>.

 

n103. NRC Report, supra note 3, at 300.

 

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(2) Signaling information has become an increasingly rich source of

information about habits of association and commerce. Congress in

1968 n104 and again in 1986 n105 assumed that there were two

categories of data: content (which would receive the highest

protection) and a category of minimally revealing dialing or routing

information. However, in recent years, transactional data has

evolved into a third, hybrid type, providing detailed information

about a person's habits of association and commerce. n106 Yet this

"profiling" data was totally unprotected until 1986 and has since

been subject only to the most minimal protection. (Congress again

tightened the standard for access to certain e-mail addressing

information in 1994, as discussed below in Section IV.) On the

Internet, this data gives a rich picture of a person's life. n107 In

a similar development in the area of voice communications, advanced

signaling systems have also blurred the distinction between

call-identifying information and call content. There is some concern

that the development of packet switching may obliterate the

distinction between signaling data and communications content. n108

In some cellular and other wireless telephone systems, this

signaling data includes location information, potentially turning

wireless phones into tracking devices. n109 Law enforcement is

increasingly turning to transactional or signaling data as a source

of investigative importance. n110

 

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n104. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit.

III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 802, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C.

2510-20).

 

n105. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.

99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in sections of 18 U.S.C. including

2510-21, 2701-10, 3121-26).

 

n106. Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 158, 160-61,

166-78 (testimony of Jerry Berman, including Expanded Protection for

Online Transactional Information, memorandum of the Electronic

Frontier Foundation).

 

n107. See, e.g., Alan Boyle, Eyes Are On You When You're Online

(last modified Sept. 10, 1997)

<http://www.msnbc.com/news/34363.asp>; Jeffrey Rothfeder, No Privacy

on the Net, PC World, Feb. 1997, at 223; John M. Broder, Making

America Safe for Electronic Commerce, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1997.

 

n108. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Electronic

Surveillance in a Digital Age, at 57-61 (July 1995) [hereinafter OTA

Electronic Surveillance Report].

 

n109. Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 33 (testimony of

Louis J. Freeh), 154 (testimony of Thomas E. Wheeler), 158

(testimony of Jerry Berman); H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 17

(1994).

 

n110. See Pen Register Report, supra note 63.

 

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(3) The rapid expansion of wireless services, which are increasingly

used not just by the wealthy and in business applications, but by

ordinary citizens for personal conversations, has made electronic

communication almost totally flexible and constantly available, yet

also more insecure. The number of wireless customers has gone from

92,000 in 1984 to 44 million by the end of 1996. n111 Moreover,

wireless transmission is no longer important only for voice

communication, but is becoming increasingly important for data

transfer. Wireless modems and wireless local area networks are

linking computers and transferring data that could include

proprietary information, medical records, and financial data. n112

Wireless links are increasingly serving as gateways to the global

information infrastructure. While offering attractive advantages of

flexibility, wireless communications are less secure than

traditional landline communications. n113

 

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n111. United States Wireless Demographics (visited July 25, 1997)

<http://www.wow-com.com/professional/reference/CusDemog.cfm> (citing

Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, Year-End 1996 Data

Survey).

 

n112. See Maryam Alavi, Dick Tracy's Office : Business Applications

of Wireless Technologies, in The Emerging World of Wireless

Communications (Institute for Info. Studies ed., 1996). See

generally, Boyle, supra note 107.

 

n113. See Cellular Privacy Hearing, supra note 2.

 

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(4) Control over technology has shifted away from the hands of

government and a few monopolies. Telephony itself is now

characterized by competition and rapid innovation, producing an

environment with many new products, services and features, and many

new service providers. State-of-the-art encryption technology is no

longer subject to government monopoly. Users can now affirmatively

choose encryption technology that will enhance their privacy and

protect the security of their data against criminals. The Internet

was designed from the outset as a decentralized medium for rapid

transmission of information, and has evolved to a state of

unprecedented openness. Barriers to participation are low; anyone

with a computer and a modem can be a publisher. Services and even

entirely new infrastructures are developing rapidly in response to

user demands. n114 Government efforts to control the development and

spread of technology become harder to sustain.

 

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n114. For example, certificate authorities are developing to verify

identity in the digital world. See generally A. Michael Froomkin,

The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce,

75 Or. L. Rev. 49 (1996).

 

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(5) The globalization of communications technology and networks is

breaking down national borders. One of the great strengths of the

Internet is that it can be as easy to send an e-mail message to New

York as to Nairobi. The information infrastructure is now global, as

are the markets for telecommunications products and services. On the

one hand, the irrelevance of borders means that government controls

over information and technology become harder to maintain. On the

other hand, enforceable privacy protections have not yet emerged for

the global information infrastructure.

 

The remainder of this article examines how these trends have

affected the balance between privacy and law enforcement and how

that balance can be re-established.

 

IV. Protecting "Papers" in Cyberspace - The Internet and the

FourthAmendment

 

ECPA was intended to establish rules for government surveillance in

the digital world. In many respects, it has proven to be a durable

statute. However, technology has evolved in ways not contemplated

when ECPA was enacted. In drafting ECPA, Congress assumed that it

would be adequate to extend to electronic communications the

constitutional conclusion that underpinned Title III in 1968: that

capture of electronic communications would not be an unreasonable

intrusion if there were stringent ex parte judicial review before

the fact, minimization during a search, and equally stringent

adversarial review after the investigation had been completed. n115

That assumption, however, was made when few if any foresaw the

development of the multiple forms of activity that are carried on

today in "cyberspace." The interactive nature of the Internet, with

the rapid emergence of features such as home banking, telecommuting

and even telemedicine, has produced an environment in which many

people spend hours each day "on-line." n116 In this context, to

intercept all of a person's electronic communications means a lot

more today than it did in 1968 or 1986. These developments call for

an examination of the effectiveness and coverage of ECPA.

 

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n115. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 2-3, 5 (1986).

 

n116. See generally, Paul Gilster, Digital Literacy (1997); Sherry

Turkle, Life On The Screen (1995); Howard Rheingold, The Virtual

Community (1993).

 

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A first step toward examining ECPA would be to assess how the rules

it set for governmental access to e-mail and other computer

communications are working. Unfortunately, however, there is no

publicly available data on which to base such an assessment. While

the wiretap provisions of Title III require very detailed reports on

interception of voice communications and interception of e-mail in

transit, there is no similar requirement for collecting and

publishing information on the extent of government access to e-mail

and other electronic communications while they are in storage with

service providers incident to transmission, by far the easier and

presumably the more common means of government's accessing

electronic communications. n117 This deficiency should be corrected

by amending ECPA to require that courts and prosecutors submit

reports on orders sought and granted for electronic communication

access under 18 U.S.C. 2703, for inclusion in the Administrative

Office reports on wiretapping. Until such a change can be enacted,

Congressional committees should exercise their oversight authority

to obtain such data from the federal agencies and the major service

providers.

 

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n117. Cf. 18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.

 

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Another issue that needs to be re-addressed is whether one of the

key protections established in 1968, the minimization rule, can be

applied to non-voice communications. Minimization means that law

enforcement is not supposed to record non-relevant communications.

At the time ECPA was enacted, it was assumed that this was

impossible in the e-mail context: law enforcement must get all the

communications to and from a target, and read each one to determine

if it is relevant. n118 In 1986, in fact, the Senate Judiciary

Committee expressly addressed this concern and suggested that

minimization should be conducted by the initial law enforcement

officers who review the intercepted communications. The committee

stated that "Those officials would delete all non-relevant material

and disseminate to other officials only the information which is

relevant to the investigation." n119 This solution has been

criticized as unrealistic. n120 Actually, it is not that different

from what happens in the case of ordinary telephone wiretaps, since

the initial law enforcement personnel who monitor voice intercepts

conduct an initial review of each conversation to decide whether to

record it or not.

 

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n118. Larry Downes, Electronic Communications and the Plain View

Exception: More "Bad Physics," 7 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 241, 263-67

(1996).

 

n119. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 31 (1986).

 

n120. Downes, supra note 118, at 267.

 

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Technology, however, may offer a solution, producing more effective

minimization than is available in the context of voice

communications. Whether law enforcement accesses e-mail from the

telephone company (or access provider) while in transmission, or

from an e-mail service provider while it is in storage incident to

transmission, it may be relatively easy for the service provider to

perform the minimization. The service provider can use screens or

filters to select from the e-mail messages to or from parties

identified in the order only those containing certain key words or

phrases that would be identical to those used by monitors in the

voice context. n121 As the investigation proceeds and law

enforcement learns more about the patterns of the target, the

interception can become more discriminating.

 

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n121. Law enforcement already took this approach in one case

involving interception of computer communications. See Sniffen,

supra note 87.

 

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Another set of assumptions are being challenged by the profound

changes occurring as a result of the Internet. These concern the

degree of protection from governmental access one can justifiedly

expect with respect to transactional records held by third parties.

In 1976, the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller ruled that

individuals had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in

business records that were held by a third party. n122 Miller

involved checks held by a bank, and the rationale of the case

assumed a world of paper records, yet the holding in its broadest

implications has been applied unquestioningly to the electronic

world. Thus, in 1979, the Court in Smith v. Maryland ruled that the

use of a pen register to collect the phone numbers dialed on a

surveillanced line did not implicate Fourth Amendment interests.

n123

 

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n122. See 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

 

n123. See 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

 

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ECPA responded to Smith by requiring a judicial order for pen

registers and trap and trace devices. n124 For transactional

information relating to e-mail and other electronic communications,

ECPA required a subpoena, a warrant or a court order. n125 In 1994,

Congress recognized that transactional data associated with e-mail

and other computer communications was emerging as a hybrid form of

data, somewhere between addressing information and content, and was

becoming increasingly revealing of personal patterns of association.

Therefore, Congress set a higher standard for access to

transactional data regarding electronic communications and

eliminated subpoena access. n126 Congress should examine the Justice

Department's interpretation and application of the new standard to

see if it is adequate or should be strengthened. Such an examination

must give adequate attention to the communicative, associational

nature of the transactional data itself in an online environment.

(Congress should also strengthen the procedure for access to

transactional records in the ordinary telephone context, a point

discussed below in Section VIII.)

 

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n124. 18 U.S.C. 3121 (1996).

 

n125. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 201, 100 Stat. 1862 (adding 18 U.S.C.

2703(c)).

 

n126. See 18 U.S.C. 2703(c) (1996).

 

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Finally, reexamination of ECPA must question the assumption that

there is a distinction between the communication of content and its

storage. In an era when people work for "virtual companies" and

conduct personal, political and business lives in "cyberspace," that

distinction is increasingly blurred. The growth of online commerce,

politics and relationships, the shift to distributed, networked

computing, the growth of the World Wide Web as an information

source, and the ready ability to encrypt records stored with third

parties, call into question the application to the Internet of

concepts developed for governmental access to business records in a

relatively static, paper-based environment and may radically change

the legal notion of what is a reasonable expectation of privacy.

 

It is time to reconsider how the lines have been drawn between

records entitled to full Fourth Amendment protection and records

under Miller that fall outside the protection of the Fourth

Amendment. There are now essentially three legal regimes for access

to electronic data: (i) the traditional Fourth Amendment standard,

for records stored on an individual's hard drive or floppy disks;

(ii) the Title III-ECPA standard, for records in transmission; and

(iii) a third standard, the scope of which is probably unclear, for

records stored on a remote server, such as the research paper (or

the diary) of a student stored on a university server or the records

(including the personal correspondence) of an employee stored on the

server of the employer. n127 As the third category of records

expands because people find it more convenient to store records

remotely, the legal ambiguity grows more significant. Are the

records stored on such a server accessible by mere subpoena? Are

they covered by the "remote computing" provisions of ECPA? n128 If

the records were seized from the individual's hard drive or floppies

using a warrant or subpoena, contemporaneous notice would be

required. n129 If the records were seized in transmission, a court

order would be required, but the interception could proceed

secretly. n130 If the records were seized from a third party, notice

might be delayed. n131 Do these distinctions make sense? Is the

delay or denial of notice for stored records acceptable any longer?

Conceptions of the Fourth Amendment developed in a 20th century

world of paper records may not be applicable to 21st century

technologies where many of our most important records are not

"papers" in our "houses," but are "bytes" stored electronically and

accessed remotely at "virtual" locations.

 

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n127. See 18 U.S.C. 2701-2703 (1996).

 

n128. See 18 U.S.C. 2703.

 

n129. Standard Fourth Amendment practice requires notice, achieved

by service of the warrant or subpoena on the person possessing the

items to be seized or produced. Wayne R. La Fave, Search And

Seizure, 4.1-4.13 (3d ed. 1996).

 

n130. See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii) (1996).

 

n131. See 18 U.S.C. 2703(b).

 

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V. Preserving Government Surveillance Capabilities While Protecting

Privacy and Encouraging Technological Innovation

 

While some technological developments have made electronic

surveillance easier, more intrusive or more revealing, the FBI in

the early 1990's began to complain about the ways in which

technological developments were making law enforcement interception

more difficult. n132 These difficulties were often encompassed by

the term "digital telephony," although digital transmission itself

was not really the problem. In fact, there were a number of

problems. Some of the difficulties related to the rapid growth of

wireless systems, which are easily tapped at the central switches

but did not always have the capacity to accommodate multiple

surveillances. Others were related to the increased competition in

the telecommunications industry, which meant that a target could use

two or more service providers, making one-stop surveillance

impossible. Some problems arose due to services and features that

put more control in the hands of users. During the 1994 hearings,

the FBI voiced concerns about a number of these problems, some of

which existed in analog systems, but which had become more common in

digital switches. Among them were problems intercepting calls

rerouted through call forwarding services and the inability to

identify the destination of calls made using a speed dialing

feature. n133 Some problems had to do with physical changes in the

networks. For example, the FBI anticipated increasing trouble in

covertly isolating the communication stream associated with a

particular target as multiplexed transmission technologies and fiber

cables replaced the paired copper wires that traditionally had been

associated uniquely with each customer. n134

 

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n132. See Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 5-6

(testimony of Louis J. Freeh).

 

n133. See id. at 121 (information submitted by Louis J. Freeh,

"Technology-Based Problems Encountered by Federal, State, and Local

Law Enforcement Agencies").

 

n134. See id. at 24 (testimony of Louis J. Freeh).

 

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Congress responded to these technological developments by enacting

the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994

(CALEA, sometimes referred to as the "digital telephony"

legislation). n135 CALEA requires telephone companies to ensure that

new technologies (and some old technologies) do not impede law

enforcement interception of communications. n136 The legislation

mandates, in effect, that carriers must take steps to ensure that

the broad technological trends in the industry do not eliminate law

enforcement access to communications of targeted individuals.

 

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n135. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C.

1001-1010 and scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C. (1994)).

 

 

n136. See id. at 103, 104.

 

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In adopting CALEA, Congress explicitly stated its intention to

preserve the balance among the three interests that had guided the

drafters of ECPA in 1986: law enforcement needs, privacy, and

technological innovation. n137 Congress accepted the FBI's

assurances that the legislation would preserve the status quo in

terms of law enforcement surveillance, without expanding govern ment

capabilities. n138 Congress stressed specifically that the

surveillance requirements of CALEA should be narrowly interpreted.

n139 Congress also required carriers to change their systems to

protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to

be intercepted. n140 To ensure that implementation did not block

technological innovation, Congress prohibited the FBI from dictating

network or equipment design standards. n141 Finally, Congress also

amended some provisions of ECPA to heighten privacy protections.

n142

 

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n137. H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 22 (1994).

 

n138. When FBI Director Louis Freeh appeared before a joint hearing

of the House and Senate Judiciary subcommittees in August 1994 to

support the final version of CALEA, he stressed that the legislation

would preserve wiretapping as it had existed since 1968:

 

 

 

Without question... court-authorized electronic surveillance is a

critical law enforcement and public safety tool. I think we have

reached a remarkable compromise and achievement in preserving that

tool as it has existed since 1968 ....We believe that the

legislation, as introduced this past Tuesday, offers the strongest

investigative assurances that the authority which Congress gave us

in 1968 will continue unimpeded by technology...

 

 

 

Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 112-13. These

assurances followed a series of statements of Director Freeh to the

same effect at the March 18, 1994 hearing of the same subcommittees.

Id. at 7, 9, 10, 16, 29-30, 14, 49.

 

n139. Congress stated as follows:

 

 

 

The Committee intends the assistance requirements in section 2602 to

be both a floor and a ceiling. The FBI Director testified that the

legislation was intended to preserve the status quo, that it was

intended to provide law enforcement no more and no less access to

information than it had in the past. The Committee urges against

overbroad interpretation of the requirements. The legislation gives

industry, in consultation with law enforcement and subject to review

by the FCC, a key role in developing the technical requirements and

standards that will allow implementation of the requirements. The

Committee expects industry, law enforcement and the FCC to narrowly

interpret the requirements.

 

 

 

H.R. Rep. No. 103-827 at 22-23.

 

n140. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 17; CALEA, 103(a)(4)(a)

(codified at 47 U.S.C. 1002(a)(4)(a)).

 

n141. See CALEA, 103(b)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1002(b)(1)).

 

n142. See Pub. L. No. 103-414, 202-207.

 

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However, since CALEA was enacted, a struggle has been underway in

which the FBI, on behalf of law enforcement generally, has attempted

to broadly interpret the requirements of CALEA, by dictating system

design and mandating, nationwide, certain capabilities in excess of

traditional interception practices. n143 The most notable and

troubling aspect of this campaign is the FBI's effort to use CALEA,

in contravention of explicit assurances during the drafting process,

to require cellular phone companies and other wireless service

providers to have location tracking capability built into their

systems for law enforcement purposes. n144 The FBI is also claiming,

for example, that CALEA mandates interception of certain conference

calls after the targeted facility has been dropped from the

conversation, thus continuing the surveillance against parties and

facilities for which no judicial approval was granted. n145 Seeking

to exploit the increasing value of signaling information, the FBI

has argued that CALEA requires the configuration and delivery of a

signaling channel that includes detailed message notifications about

the targeted facility. The FBI maintains that this configuration and

delivery should be performed whether or not there is a call in

progress and for facilities not identified in the surveillance

order. n146 In a provision with far reaching implications,

anticipating the adoption of packet switching protocols that could

obliterate the distinction between signaling and content, n147 the

FBI and industry have proposed allowing carriers to deliver

communication content to law enforcement under a mere pen register

order, depending once again on law enforcement to sort out the

signaling information from the content. n148

 

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n143. John Markoff, Telephone Industry Seeks Aid in Wiretap Battle

with F.B.I., N.Y. Times, July 16, 1997, at A13; Jim McGee, FBI Calls

for Greater Wiretap Capability, Phone Industry Pressed to Install

New Surveillance Equipment, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 1997, at C13; John

Markoff, Dispute Arises Over Proposal For Wiretaps, N.Y. Times,

February 15, 1997, at 35; Seth Schiesel, F.B.I. Reduces Scope of

Proposal on Wiretapping Phone Networks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1997,

at A11; Jim McGee, Heightened Tensions Over Digital Taps, Wash.

Post, Oct. 27, 1996, at H1; John Markoff, Cellular Industry Rejects

U.S. Plan for Surveillance, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1996, at A1; John

Markoff, F.B.I. Wants Advanced System To Vastly Increase

Wiretapping, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1995, at A1.

 

n144. Telecommunications Industry Liaison Unit, FBI, Electronic

Surveillance Interface Document, at 39, 50 (June 24,

1996)[hereinafter ESI Document].

 

n145. Id. at 17.

 

n146. Id. at 32 (feature status message providing updates whenever

the subject alters a network-provided feature); 41 (surveillance

status message indicating the status of the tap if the subject is

not making or receiving a call); 36-37 (party hold and party join

message); 32-33 (incoming call identifying message).

 

n147. See OTA Electronic Surveillance Report, supra note 108, at

57-61.

 

n148. Telecommunications Industry Assoc., Standards Proposal No.

3580-A, Proposed New Standard, "Lawfully Authorized Electronic

Surveillance," 22-25 (July 31, 1997) [hereinafter SP 3580-A].

 

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A. Congress' Legislative Mandate for Surveillance Features Was

Premised on the Effective Enforcement of Strict PrivacyProtections

 

CALEA was based on the dual premise that (i) Title III and other

laws authorizing electronic surveillance have strict legal

requirements and (ii) those requirements are being stringently

enforced by the courts to protect privacy. As suggested above, this

premise is becoming increasingly tenuous. If privacy protections

afforded by the wiretap laws are not being strictly enforced, then

the foundation of CALEA falters and the legislation becomes far more

threatening, requiring as it does the ubiquitous adoption of

features in the nation's telephone systems to ensure ready

government access.

 

The premise of CALEA would also be negated by legislative weakening

of the wiretap standards. Already the Justice Department has

successfully won Congressional repeal of the provision extending

ECPA to wireless data transfers. n149 The extension of ECPA to

wireless data transfers was one of the privacy enhancements adopted

in CALEA with the intent of balancing privacy concerns with law

enforcement needs. n150 In addition, in its proposed anti-terrorism

law forwarded to Congress in 1995, the Clinton Administration sought

numerous weakening changes in Title III, including: (i) weakening

the sanctions against illegal wiretapping, (ii) facilitating the

procurement of roving taps and warrantless taps, n151 and (iii)

creating exemptions from the carefully crafted privacy protection

standards of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. n152

Although many of the Clinton changes were not enacted, the Justice

Department has continued to pursue them and has proposed others that

would loosen the privacy standards of the wiretap laws. n153

 

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n149. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 731, 110 Stat. 1214, 1303 (amending 18 U.S.C.

2510(12)).

 

n150. See Pub. L. No. 104-414, 203.

 

n151. H. Rep. No. 105-896 (1997).

 

n152. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 401, 110 Stat, 1214, 1258.

 

n153. See July 1996 Electronic Surveillance Report to Congress,

supra note 6.

 

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As discussed in Section VIII, many of the proposed changes in the

wiretap laws should be rejected on the merits. However, the fact

that CALEA now requires telephone companies to design their systems

to facilitate law enforcement surveillance is an additional reason

to oppose any weakening of the wiretap standards. If the Executive

Branch and Congress wish to fulfill the intent of CALEA, they should

strengthen, not weaken, the privacy protections of Title III, ECPA

and FISA. Unless these laws, in light of judicial interpretation and

continuing technological developments, offer meaningful protection

to privacy, the foundations of CALEA will be eroded.

 

B. In CALEA, Congress Denied the Government Design Control and

Mandated Privacy Protection

 

During the Bush Administration, the Justice Department urged

Congress to adopt legislation that would have created de facto

licensing authority over the development and deployment of new

communications technology. n154 Telecommunications companies and

civil liberties groups opposed the legislation, arguing that any

legislation should be narrowly crafted to address identified

problems while providing for public accountability and protecting

privacy and not interfering with the innovation and competitiveness

that have fueled the digital revolution. After hearings and

consultations with industry, privacy groups, and law enforcement,

Congress rejected the broad approach originally proposed by the FBI.

Instead, with the strong support of the FBI, Congress enacted CALEA,

which established minimum functional requirements intended to

preserve rather than expand law enforcement access to

communications, and deferred to industry to develop solutions. n155

 

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n154. Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 67 (prepared

statement of Jerry Berman and Ronald L. Plesser); 71 (Interim Report

of the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group on the FBI's

Digital Telephony Proposals).

 

n155. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C.

1001 et seq. (1994)).

 

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CALEA requires telephone companies to design (and in some cases

retrofit) their networks to ensure that law enforcement agencies can

carry out electronic surveillance on advanced digital equipment and

services. n156 Three of its four requirements are intended to

preserve law enforcement access. These pertain to (1) the

interception of call content; n157 (2) the interception of

call-identifying information; n158 and (3) the delivery to law

enforcement of intercepted call content and call-identifying

information. n159 In contrast, the fourth requirement of CALEA,

section 103(a)(4), requires carriers to protect the privacy and

security of communications not authorized to be intercepted. n160

 

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n156. 47 U.S.C. 1002(a).

 

n157. Id. at 1002(a)(1).

 

n158. Id. at 1002(a)(2).

 

n159. Id. at 1002(a)(3).

 

n160. Id. at 1002(a)(4).

 

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Congress intended that, in the first instance, common carriers and

equipment manufacturers, not government agencies, would develop

publicly the details for implementation of these assistance

requirements. n161 Congress expected that this approach would temper

law enforcement demands with considerations of privacy and

innovation, as well as cost and competitiveness. If industry failed

to produce a standard or if any agency or person had concerns about

the standard, the legislation gave the Federal Communications

Commission the authority to develop an appropriate standard, taking

into account the need to protect privacy and to promote innovation.

n162

 

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n161. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 26 (1994).

 

n162. See CALEA, 107(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006(b)). See H.R.

Rep. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 27.

 

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A distinction should be drawn between what CALEA mandated as a

minimum national standard for law enforcement access versus what

expansions in surveillance capability will be available to law

enforcement as a result of market-driven technological developments.

Before CALEA, some changes in telecommunications technology were

making law enforcement surveillance harder, while other changes were

making surveillance easier or more productive. CALEA was intended to

"preserve the status quo" by ensuring that technological

developments did not erode law enforcement access to call content

and identifying information. Congress did not intend to impede the

development of technology that makes surveillance easier or more

fruitful, nor did it intend to deny law enforcement the authority to

take advantage of those developments. n163 Congress left intact the

existing authority under 18 U.S.C. 2518(4), which authorizes law

enforcement to take advantage of all technological developments

enhancing surveillance capability and requires companies to make

available whatever advanced capability they have. But Congress did

not mandate the nationwide ubiquitous installation of every

technologically possible surveillance enhancement. Instead, Congress

mandated the nationwide availability only of certain minimum

features, based upon its understanding of past surveillance

practices as described in the CALEA hearings and based upon the

FBI's description in the CALEA hearings of what its needs were. n164

 

 

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n163. Congress did intend in CALEA to raise the legal standard for

access to certain categories of information, including location

information that was already available in some systems and

transactional data associated with e-mail. See H.R. Rep. No.

103-827, pt. 1, at 17-18, 31-32.

 

n164. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 17-18, 31-32.

 

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C. CALEA Implementation: Law Enforcement Efforts to Require Carriers

to Provide Expanded SurveillanceCapabilities

 

In some respects, the checks and balances Congress wrote into CALEA

have worked as intended. The FBI published in the Federal Register,

under a notice and comment procedure, a capacity notice that was

widely criticized and withdrawn. n165 The FBI published a second

capacity notice revealing much more data about historical

surveillance patterns, n166 but that second notice also raised

serious questions which the Bureau must address in finalizing the

capacity requirements. In terms of capability, industry bodies

drafted "safe harbor" technical standards to provide the detail

necessary to translate CALEA's broad functional requirements into

network and equipment specifications. n167 The FBI had extensive

input in the standards process, articulating law enforcement's

desires and pushing hard for an expansive reading of the

requirements.

 

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n165. Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law

Enforcement Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 53643 (1995) (Initial Notice and

Request for Comments).

 

n166. Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance

for Law Enforcement Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 1902 (1997) (Second Notice and

Request for Comments).

 

n167. CALEA, 107(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006(a) (1994)).

 

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Unfortunately, the FBI's participation went beyond the consultation

intended by Congress and instead amounted to an effort to dominate

the standards process and dictate specific surveillance features.

Nonetheless, as of October 1997, industry had largely rejected FBI

demands for surveillance features that, in contravention of the

clear intent of CALEA, would expand the government's electronic

surveillance capability beyond its current reach. n168 In two

respects, however, industry acceded to FBI demands for features that

would go beyond the status quo.

 

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n168. The House Judiciary Committee set forth its intent as follows:

 

 

 

 

The Committee intends the assistance requirements in section 2602 to

be both a floor and a ceiling. The FBI Director testified that the

legislation was intended to preserve the status quo, that it was

intended to provide law enforcement no more and no less access to

information than it had in the past. The Committee urges against

overbroad interpretation of the requirements....The Committee

expects industry, law enforcement and the FCC to narrowly interpret

the requirements.

 

H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 22-23.

 

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(1) Location information. Industry yielded to FBI insistence that

cellular and other wireless systems be designed to provide

information on the location of their customers as they make and

receive calls. This involves capturing and delivering to law

enforcement the signals that identify a wireless telephone user's

location for call processing purposes. n169 It is clear from the

legislative history that Congress did not intend to impose

geographic location information as a CALEA requirement with respect

to cellular or other wireless systems. n170 Concerns with "location

tracking" were initially a major source of opposition to the

legislation, so the FBI was eager to disavow any interest in

location information at an early stage. Thus, early in 1994, the FBI

expressly assured Congress that CALEA did not mandate provision of

location information, n171 and nothing in the legislative history

suggests that any of the changes made as the legislation proceeded

through the drafting process were intended to bring location

information within the scope of CALEA requirements.

 

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n169. See Gidari, supra note 84, at 70.

 

n170. "The bill requires telecommunications carriers to ensure their

systems have the capability to... (2) Isolate expeditiously

information identifying the originating and destination numbers of

targeted communications, but not the physical location of targets

.... " H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 16.

 

n171. In the hearings leading to enactment of CALEA, FBI Director

Freeh testified that CALEA would not require carriers to make

location information uniformly available. Freeh testified that "call

setup information" (later "call-identifying information") listed as

a CALEA requirement was not intended to include location

information. Freeh was very clear in disavowing any interest in

covering such information:

 

 

 

[Call setup information] does not include any information which

might disclose the general location of a mobile facility or service,

beyond that associated with the area code or exchange of the

facility or service. There is no intent whatsoever, with reference

to this term, to acquire anything that could properly be called

'tracking' information.

 

 

 

Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 29.

 

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(2) Packet switching. In a decision that has potentially

far-reaching implications for the future of telephony, the Internet

and government surveillance, the proposed CALEA implementation

standard issued in July 1997 would allow telecommunications

companies using "packet switching" n172 to provide the full content

of customer communications to the government even when the

government is only authorized to intercept addressing or signaling

data. n173 Despite indications that it is feasible to provide

signaling information separate from the content in a packet

switching environment, the proposed standard would allow companies

to deliver the entire packet data stream, including call content,

when law enforcement is entitled to receive only dialing or

signaling information under a pen register order. Such orders are

issued without probable cause and without the discretionary review

accorded to full call content interceptions. The proposed CALEA

standard relies on law enforcement to sort out the addressing

information from the content, keeping the former but ignoring the

latter. This approach, were it followed, could totally obliterate

the distinction between call content and signaling information that

was a core assumption of ECPA and of CALEA itself. It also would

violate section 103(a)(4) of CALEA, which requires the

telecommunications industry to protect communications not authorized

to be intercepted.

 

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n172. In the future, telecommunications systems will rely

increasingly on "packet switching" protocols similar to those used

on the Internet. This development has potentially profound

implications for government surveillance. In a packet switching

system, communications are broken up into individual packets, each

of which contains a segment of the communication plus addressing

information that gets the packets to their intended destination,

where they are reassembled. Previously utilized primarily on the

Internet for electronic communications, this technology offers

substantial advantages in the voice environment as well, and

telecommunications companies are beginning to incorporate it in

their systems. See OTA Electronic Surveillance Report, supra note

108, at 57-61.

 

n173. SP 3580-A, supra note 148, at 22-25.

 

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In the old analog systems, law enforcement agencies authorized to

receive signaling information were provided with access to the

target's entire line, including content. n174 With subsequent

developments in technology, the signaling data was carried on a

channel separate from the call content. In this respect, technology

itself enhanced privacy, creating an environment in which a law

enforcement agency conducting a pen register could receive only

information it was entitled to receive. Absent CALEA, packet

switching might have reversed that privacy enhancement. However,

CALEA imposed on the industry an affirmative obligation to protect

privacy. Yet, the proposed industry standard initially failed to

ensure that law enforcement agencies receive only the information

appropriate to the level of authorization in hand.

 

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n174. See Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 753, 353 S.E.2d 19, 21

(1987).

 

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Another capability sought by the FBI, but rejected by industry as of

November 1997, was the ability to monitor all conversations during a

conference call initiated by a targeted facility, even if the

targeted facility is on hold or has hung up from the call. n175 It

is questionable whether law enforcement has authority under the

particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Title III to

intercept communications involving only non-targeted facilities just

because a targeted facility initiated a conference call.

 

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n175. The matter arises as follows: A is the intercept subject. A

sets up a conference call with B and C using the conference call

capability provided by A's service provider. Then A puts B and C on

hold (or hangs up entirely) and calls D. The FBI is seeking the

delivery of both A's conversation with D and the conversation

between B and C. It is not clear that there is legal authority to

intercept the ongoing conversation between B and C after A has hung

up. Title III, embodying the Fourth Amendment standard of

particularity, requires the specification in the order of the

telephone facility to be tapped and the particular conversations to

be seized. The Supreme Court has held that conversations between

unknown individuals using a specified telephone line could be

lawfully intercepted under Title III. See United States v. Kahn, 415

U.S. 143 (1973). Lower courts have upheld the roving tap authority

so long as it is limited to the interception only of conversations

of named subjects. See United States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266,

1318 (D. Mass. 1991); United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057,

1062 (S.D. Cal. 1990). No court has held that there is authority to

intercept the communications of unknown persons using unspecified

facilities while the named target is on another monitored call.

 

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A number of the enhancements sought by the FBI were related to the

Bureau's attempts to exploit transactional data. In legislative

terms, the FBI tried to force more information into the definition

of the CALEA term "call-identifying information." The plain language

of CALEA and the legislative history indicate that "call-identifying

information" means the numbers dialed by a subscriber to direct a

communication, or other signaling information that serves the same

call routing purpose as the dialed digits. This includes the

switch-based information equivalent to a seven or ten digit phone

number that directs a call when a voice dialing or speed dialing

feature is used. n176 The term likely includes information

indicating that the party under surveillance has terminated a call

by hanging up. However, the FBI argued that this term includes much

more. For instance, at various points in the CALEA implementation

process, the FBI argued that carriers must build in the capability

to provide not only location-related information on wireless phone

users, but "location-related updates during calls." The Bureau also

asked for detailed "call progress" tones relating to both the target

of the investigation and persons with whom the target is

communicating, and messages during three-way calls that would

indicate when a party, who is not the target of the surveillance,

drops off a three-way call. Further, the FBI sought "voice message

waiting" tones to notify the government when a surveillance target

has a voice mail waiting and feature status messages that would

notify the government in real time when a surveillance target

changes his or her mix of service features. n177

 

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n176. H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 21 (1994).

 

n177. ESI Document, supra note 144, at 36 (party disconnect, party

hold, and party join messages), 34 (message waiting indicator), 32

(feature status message).

 

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D. The Role of Congress and the FCC in Ensuring Balanced

Implementation ofCALEA

 

Both Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have

oversight roles to ensure that CALEA is properly implemented in a

way that preserves the crucial balance between privacy and law

enforcement powers.

 

CALEA requires the FBI to obtain annual appropriations for

implementing the law. n178 This has allowed the House and Senate

Appropriations Committees to examine the issues posed by

implementation and to withhold funds until they are satisfied that

implementation is proceeding appropriately. In 1995, the first year

after CALEA was enacted, Congress declined to appropriate any funds

for implementation. n179 In 1996, Congress established a CALEA

Compliance Fund but blocked the FBI from expending any funds until

it had submitted a detailed implementation plan. n180 In 1997, after

reviewing the implementation plan, both Houses expressed concern

about the lack of priority in the FBI's plan. The Senate

Appropriations Committee declined the Administration's request for $

100,000,000. n181 Instead, the Committee directed the FBI to create

a working group with the purpose of creating "a more rational,

reasonable, and cost-effective CALEA implementation plan." n182 The

Committee recommended that no funds be expended for CALEA

implementation until the working group provided a plan satisfactory

to the Committee. n183 The House-Senate conference committee on the

fiscal 1998 appropriation for the Department of Justice came to a

somewhat different resolution. The conference agreement, which

passed the Congress and was signed into law, included no additional

funding for CALEA implementation, but the report noted that there

had been recent discussions between the Committees on

Appropriations, the Justice Department and representatives of the

telecommunications industry. n184 As a result of these discussions,

the conference report stated, an agreement had been reached, which

included a commitment by industry and law enforcement to provide to

the Committees on January 4, 1997 cost estimates for the deployment

of "the solution," along with a timetable for deployment and signed

agreements from two carriers or equipment manufacturers (presumably

to begin development of the solution). n185

 

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n178. See Pub. L. No. 103-414, 110; H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 19

(1994).

 

n179. See Pub. L. No. 104-99.

 

n180. H.R. Rep. 104-863 (1996), printed in Cong. Rec. H1164, H11646

and H11649-50 (1996).

 

n181. S. Rep. No. 105-48, at 23 (1994).

 

n182. Id.

 

n183. Id.

 

n184. 143 Cong. Rec. H10836 (1997).

 

n185. Id.

 

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The FCC has ample jurisdiction to ensure that CALEA implementation

protects privacy. The most important source of the FCC's

jurisdiction is section 107 of CALEA, which authorizes the

Commission to intervene to establish an implementation standard if

the industry standard-setting process fails to produce an acceptable

standard. n186 In that event, the FCC is required to ensure that the

standard protects the privacy and security of communications not

authorized to be intercepted and achieves other specified public

policy goals, including promotion of technology innovation. n187 Any

party, including public interest groups, may seek a proceeding under

section 107 to challenge CALEA implementation. Also, section 105 of

CALEA requires that carriers ensure that any interception within

their switching premises be activated only in compliance with a

court order and with the affirmative intervention of an individual

officer or employee of the carrier. These provisions give the FCC

ample authority to reject elements of the FBI-industry

implementation standard that go beyond preserving the status quo and

that do not adequately protect privacy. Attention also needs to be

given to law enforcement compliance with the new language in the pen

register and trap and trace section, requiring the use of reasonably

available technology that limits pen registers and trap and trace

devices to the collection of "dialing and signaling information used

in call processing." n188

 

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n186. Section 107 of CALEA states:

 

 

 

If industry associations or standard-setting organizations fail to

issue technical requirements or standards or if a Government agency

or any other person believes that such requirements or standards are

deficient, the agency or person may petition the Commission to

establish, by rule, technical requirements or standards that...(2)

protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to

be intercepted.

 

 

 

47 U.S.C. 1006.

 

n187. CALEA, 107(b)(1)-(5) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006 (b)(1)-(5)).

 

n188. 18 U.S.C. 3121(c) (1996).

 

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E. CALEA as an Exercise in Control and Accountability

 

CALEA imposed on the nation's telecommunications systems an

unprecedented new obligation: to design their systems and services

with the objective (along with all their other objectives related to

provision of quality service) of ensuring the government's ability

to carry out electronic surveillance. It was the judgment of

Congress that wiretapping was a law enforcement capability worth

preserving. And Congress had before it the acknowledgment of

industry representatives that, unless action was legislatively

forced, the electronic surveillance capability might be lost or

substantially diminished as a result of technological development.

n189 However, Congress fully recognized the dangers to privacy and

technological innovation inherent in what it was mandating.

Therefore, Congress wove throughout CALEA a series of limitations,

and it established a series of checks and balances, lodging in a

number of entities authority to influence or control the

implementation of the law.

 

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n189. H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, pt. 1, 15-16 (1994).

 

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Thus, CALEA spelled out four capability requirements. n190 These

four requirements, while phrased in general terms, are nonetheless

exclusive; anything that law enforcement would want to require under

CALEA has to fit under one of these four requirements or it cannot

be mandated. Further, Congress specifically excluded certain

capabilities. It specified that carriers have no obligation to

ensure the ability to unscramble encrypted communications when the

user controls the encryption keys. n191 It specified that a given

carrier has no responsibility to continue monitoring when a target

using cellular roaming moves out of the carrier's service area and

into the service area of another carrier. n192 The legislation

denied to law enforcement any authority to dictate system design.

n193 Instead, the legislation defers to industry to establish

standards. n194 Any publicly available standard adopted in good

faith to implement the requirements of the law constitutes a safe

harbor. Companies are deemed in compliance with the act if they

comply with the industry standard. n195 Law enforcement cannot

unilaterally declare a standard deficient. If law enforcement is not

satisfied with the industry standard, it must petition the FCC to

adopt a different standard, and the FCC's latitude is limited by a

specified set of criteria that must guide the development of a

standard. n196

 

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n190. CALEA, 103(a)(1)-(4) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1002(a)(1)-(4)).

 

n191. Id. at 103(b)(3) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1002(b)(3)).

 

n192. Id. at 103(d) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1002 (d)).

 

n193. Id. at 103(b)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1002(b)(1)).

 

n194. Id. at 107(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006(a)).

 

n195. CALEA, 107(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006(a)).

 

n196. CALEA, 107(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006(b)).

 

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The concept of "reasonableness" appears throughout the legislation.

Carriers are obligated to make available only such call-identifying

data as is "reasonably available." n197 The FCC may grant an

extension of time for compliance if compliance within the specified

period is not "reasonably achievable." n198 A court can order

compliance only if alternative technologies or facilities of another

carrier are not "reasonably available" to law enforcement for

implementing the interception and only if compliance is "reasonably

achievable." n199 Carriers are not required to bear the costs of

retrofitting equipment installed before January 1, 1995 if

compliance is "not reasonably achievable." n200

 

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n197. Id. at 103(a)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1002 (a)(2)).

 

n198. Id. at 107(c) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006(c)).

 

n199. Id. at 108(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1007(a)).

 

n200. Id. at 109(b)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1008(b)(2)).

 

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Congress also included in CALEA mechanisms of public accountability.

Capacity requirements must be adopted only after a public notice and

comment proceeding in the Federal Register. n201 Technical standards

for implementing the capability requirements have to be "publicly

available." n202 Funding is subject to the annual appropriations

process, with hearings, reports, and enacted laws. The Attorney

General is required to issue periodic reports on implementation.

n203

 

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n201. CALEA, 104 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1003).

 

n202. Id. at 107(a)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1006(a)(2)).

 

n203. Id. at 112 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1010).

 

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As a series of checks and balances, CALEA placed authority over

implementation in a number of hands. Thus, industry bodies develop

the standards. Upon the petition of industry, law enforcement or any

other person, the FCC can develop a superseding standard. The FCC

was also granted the authority to issue extensions of the compliance

deadline, and to determine that compliance is not reasonably

achievable with respect to a certain service or carrier. The courts

have jurisdiction over compliance proceedings. n204 Congress has

control through its appropriations committees, which must annually

appropriate funds for compliance and therefore can use the power of

the purse to control how the legislation is being implemented. n205

The Judiciary Committees and the Commerce Committees, as the

authorizing committees, can always revisit the legislation and amend

it as circumstances change and in light of experience.

 

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n204. Id. at 108(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1007(a)).

 

n205. CALEA, 110 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 1009).

 

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For the CALEA legislation to work in a balanced fashion, the

limitations and reasonableness provisions written into law by

Congress must be invoked and the entities with responsibility for

overseeing the implementation of the statute must choose to exercise

their authority to preserve the intended balance. The FBI has

substantial resources and the politically powerful anti-crime

rhetoric at its disposal, and it has the ability to mobilize state

and local law enforcement to promote its position. Thus, the FBI

will dominate the implementation process unless the other government

institutions exercise the authority granted them under the statute

to promote the counterbalancing values of privacy and innovation. In

this sense, CALEA is merely one more manifestation of the on-going

efforts in our democratic society to regulate the police and

national security powers of the government. Congress, deeming it

necessary to preserve an electronic surveillance authority, can

legislate limits and controls, but those limits must be enforced and

the controls must be exercised by the executive and regulatory

agencies, future Congresses, and the courts.

 

VI. Realizing the Privacy-Enhancing Potential of

EncryptionTechnology

 

Illegal electronic intrusion into computer networks is a rapidly

escalating crime problem. White collar criminals, economic espionage

agents, organized crime groups, foreign intelligence agents, and

terrorist groups have been identified as "electronic intruders"

responsible for penetrations of American computer networks. It is

estimated that the Pentagon's computers are subject to hackers'

attempts 250,000 times a year. The United States Government relies

upon the National Information Infrastructure (NII) for the

efficient, uninterrupted flow of electronic information for air

traffic control, military communications, energy distribution,

public safety, and other essential government programs and services.

Intelligence and industry forecasts indicate the United States is

just beginning to realize the potentially damaging effects and

extent of the computer crime problem. n206

 

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n206. FBI, U.S. Dept. of Justice, FY 1998 Authorization and Budget

Request for the Congress, at A-3 (1997).

 

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On balance, the advantages of more widespread use of cryptography

outweigh the disadvantages. n207

 

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n207. NRC Report, supra note 3, at 300.

 

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Newer communications media are inherently insecure. n208 Wireless

telephones have great advantages in convenience compared with

wireline counterparts, yet, since wireless phones transmit over the

airwaves, eavesdropping is easier not only for curious neighbors but

also for burglars identifying potential targets and industrial spies

stealing trade secrets. n209 Similarly, decentralized computer

networks such as the Internet have low barriers to entry, are much

less expensive, are more robust and can be used to accomplish a far

greater variety of tasks than the proprietary networks of the past,

but, again, at the expense of intrinsic security. The

vulnerabilities of the national and global information

infrastructures have been recognized not only by the FBI, but also

by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information

Warfare-Defense n210 and by the President's Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection. n211 The losses to date from inadequate

system security are enormous. In one series of transactions in 1994,

an international group of criminals penetrated Citicorp's

computerized electronic transfer system and moved about $ 12 million

from legitimate customer accounts into their own accounts in banks

around the world. n212 In 1996, after a comprehensive study, the

National Research Council concluded, "Of all the information

vulnerabilities facing U.S. companies internationally, electronic

vulnerabilities appear to be the most significant." n213

 

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n208. Hal Abelson et al., The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow and

Trusted Third-Party Encryption, at 5 (1997).

 

n209. See Cellular Privacy Hearing, supra note 2.

 

n210. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information

Warfare-Defense (Nov. 1996) (last modified June 29, 1997)

<http://www.jya.com/iwd.htm>. The Task Force recommended spending $

3 billion over the next five years hardening the nation's

telecommunications infrastructure against attack, noting that the

Defense Information Infrastructure is largely dependent upon the

commercial telecommunications system.

 

n211. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,

Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure (Nov.

1997) available at <http://www.pccip.gov/report index.html>.

 

n212. See NRC Report, supra note 3, at 23.

 

n213. Id. at 31.

 

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Given these inherent vulnerabilities, widespread use of encryption

to protect communications and stored data is essential to prevent

fraud and other forms of crime in the digital age. At the same time,

encryption poses challenges to law enforcement and national security

agencies, which have raised the specter of criminal suspects'

undecipherable stored information or voice communications. This has

led to a vigorous legislative debate over control of encryption

technology. n214

 

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n214. Id. at 31.

 

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In some ways, the encryption debate has been a conflict between two

competing models of security, one in which private individuals,

businesses and governments choose from a variety of encryption

options to protect their security, and another wherein the federal

government assumes the primary responsibility for protecting

personal and business as well as governmental security through

government-promoted weaknesses in encryption technology. n215 While

there are law enforcement equities on both sides of the encryption

issue, the centralized model of security based on

government-controlled encryption weaknesses is incompatible with

certain defining characteristics of the digital communications

revolution: decentralization, competition, globalization, and the

dynamics of decreasing cost and increasing computing power that have

put more control and more choices in the hands of end users.

 

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n215. See Abelson et al., supra note 208, at 6-7.

 

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The Executive Branch's various efforts to impose a centralized model

of security on a decentralized medium have delayed full realization

of the Internet's economic, personal and democratizing potential.

They have also hurt the competitiveness of American computer

companies by prohibiting export abroad, thereby inhibiting in the

U.S. the use of strong encryption that is already available

overseas. n216 At the same time, given the already widespread

proliferation of user-controlled encryption technology, the

centralized model cannot offer assurances of achieving the desired

law enforcement access. Strong non-escrowed encryption is and will

continue to be available to those who want it. There are currently

hundreds of encryption products available worldwide. This led the

National Research Council to conclude that, on balance, the

security-enhancing, crime-preventing benefits of encryption outweigh

the impediments to law enforcement. n217

 

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n216. It has also been argued that there is a First Amendment right

to use and export encryption. See Bernstein v. Department of State,

945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

 

n217. NRC Report, supra note 3, at 300.

 

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Globalization is a key factor, and the global market has rejected

all government proposals to control encryption technology. U.S.

proposals in 1993 for government agencies to serve as key escrow

agents were immediately rejected by business and individual users as

involving an unacceptable level of vulnerability. n218 More recent

approaches that depend upon government licensing or "registration"

of escrow agents or other forms of government control of decryption

mechanisms (including proposals to require key recovery features as

a condition of receiving public key certificates) are also not

achieving market acceptance. n219 The type of ubiquitous,

near-instantaneous key escrow, key recovery, or key management

"infrastructure" sought by the U.S. government is so complex, so

vulnerable, so expensive and/or so cumbersome - so fundamentally at

odds with user needs - that it will not by accepted by users. n220

 

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n218. John Markoff, Computer Code Plan Challenged, N.Y. Times, May

29, 1993; John Markoff, Panel Sees Flaws in Plan for Encoding, N.Y.

Times, June 5, 1993; John Schwartz, U.S. Data Decoding Plan Delayed,

Wash. Post, June 8, 1993, at A12.

 

n219. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Restrictions on Exports Aid German

Software Maker, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1997, at D1.

 

n220. See Abelson et al., supra note 208.

 

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Yet the market alone will not address all of the privacy issues

posed by encryption. While it seems clear that most businesses and

individuals will not trust the government or government-dictated

private structures to hold their keys, it also seems clear that

under some encryption applications, particularly those involving

stored data, some users are interested in securing a means to

recover their encrypted data if they lose their own key. (There is

less incentive for development of key escrow for transmissions.)

Market-based efforts to address this problem - responses to user

needs - are resulting in a range of key escrow, key recovery, or

"trusted third party" systems for decryption assistance. n221 These

are quite different from the systems proposed by the Administration

under its legislative proposal, which is voluntary in name only.

n222 These user-driven, user-controlled data-recovery or key escrow

arrangements will offer law enforcement an opportunity to satisfy

many of its basic access needs for stored data. n223

 

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n221. See id.

 

n222. Id.

 

n223. In many cases (e.g., suspects communicating with their banks

or engaging in credit card transactions or other on-line commercial

transactions), there will be plaintext of messages and data readily

available to the government by subpoena or other legal process.

 

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As the market develops key recovery arrangements, government

agencies will be seeking access to those keys for law enforcement

and national security purposes, to decrypt seized files and

communications intercepted under the wiretap laws. Government

efforts to access stored keys will pose obvious privacy concerns.

Given the centrality of encryption to privacy and security in the

digital age, there is a strong argument that escrowed encryption

keys and key recovery assistance should be entitled to greater

protection than that traditionally accorded to so-called "third

party records." In the past, as noted above in Section IV, the

courts have accorded little Fourth Amendment protection to business

records like checks or credit card records created in the course of

commercial transactions and knowingly revealed to banks and other

third parties. n224 The Fourth Amendment, however, may have stronger

application to especially sensitive information such as a decryption

key entrusted to a third party under an escrow arrangement. n225

Disclosure of keys, even escrowed keys, also raises serious

questions under the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled

self incrimination. n226

 

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n224. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Fisher v. United

States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).

 

n225. The compelled disclosure of decryption information poses

concerns quite different from those normally applied to business

records under Miller and Fisher. Current Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence suggests that the government cannot always use a mere

subpoena to compel even from a third party production of a person's

private, personal documents. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 n. 7; 1 Sara S.

Beale et al., Grand Jury Law and Practice, 6.27 (1986 & 1996 Cum.

Supp.).

 

n226. Generally, the courts have held that a voluntarily created

document does not contain compelled testimonial evidence. Almost all

these cases, however, have arisen in the context of business

records. The leading case, Fisher v. United States, supra, involved

a subpoena of accountants' workpapers relating to two taxpayers,

which were in the possession of the taxpayers' attorney. The Fisher

Court itself recognized that there may be some category of private

papers that are protected under the privilege against

self-incrimination. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. The federal Circuit

Courts of Appeals are split. Two federal Appeals Courts have held

that the Fifth Amendment bars compelled disclosure of private,

non-business papers. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); In re Grand Jury

Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).

 

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Encryption will play a central enabling role in the protection of

privacy in the digital age. Government attempts to access keys or

decryption assistance will raise important privacy interests.

Reliance on the courts to sort out the issues will produce a

possibly long period of uncertainty and conflicting decisions.

Legislative action setting clear privacy standards for government

access to keys and decryption assistance held by second or third

parties would be far preferable. Such legislation should include

standards that prohibit escrow agents from providing keys or decryp

tion assistance except in conformity with a court order issued upon

a finding of probable cause and a showing that there is no feasible

alternative of obtaining the plaintext, and should require

minimization in the use of the key or assistance. n227

 

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n227. Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) introduced legislation in the

105th Congress, S. 376, with elements of such a privacy protection

scheme.

 

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VII. Protecting Wireless Communications

 

In the network of networks that comprises the telecommunications

"system" of today and the future, it is no longer appropriate to

look at wireless telephone systems as distinct from wireline systems

or to look at the telephone system as separate from the Internet.

The increasing use of wireless communications services, the seamless

integration of wireless and wireline networks, and the importance of

wireless data links heighten the urgency of ensuring the privacy and

security of wireless communications. In this context of a global

communications network increasingly dependent on wireless links, it

is a serious invasion of privacy to eavesdrop on wireless telephone

conversations. n228 Wireless eavesdroppers are invading the privacy

not only of the person who is using a wireless phone, but also of

anybody else who is in the conversation using an ordinary landline

telephone. As wireless telephones become more ubiquitous, scanning

threatens the privacy of all telephone users. n229

 

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n228. Cellular Privacy Hearing, supra note 2, at 10-11 (testimony of

Jerry Berman).

 

n229. Id.

 

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Encryption will play an essential role here too, for securing

over-the-air links. But it is clear that there is a need for

legislative improvements clarifying both the prohibitions against

unauthorized private interception and the legal standards for

governmental access to wireless transmissions.

 

Location information. As noted already, wireless telephone systems

are developing the capability to provide more refined location

information on wireless phone users. Nonconsensual government

monitoring of location through a wireless phone implicates privacy

interests. n230 Since wireless telephones are regularly carried into

places where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy,

Congress should clarify the law by requiring a warrant based on a

showing of probable cause for nonconsensual governmental access to

real-time wireless telephone location information.

 

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n230. In United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court held that the

monitoring of a beeper in a private location is a search subject to

the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984).

The Court distinguished this from the use of a beeper to follow an

object being transported on the public roads, or to monitor the

general vicinity of an object, both of which had been held not to

implicate the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.

276 (1983). Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-716. Obviously, wireless phones

are carried by their users into places where there is a legitimate

expectation of privacy. Wireless phone location tracking through the

facilities of service providers is becoming more precise, as a

result of the E-911 requirements imposed by the FCC E-911 Order, and

as a result of technical developments that are producing smaller and

smaller cell sites and cell sectors. FCC E-911 Order, supra note 85.

If anything, monitoring the location of wireless phones is more

intrusive than the use of a beeper. The beeper cases usually involve

the attachment of the beeper to an object (often contraband or

precursor chemicals for illegal drug manufacture). Unlike drums of

precursor chemicals, cellular phones are often directly associated

with an individual user. They implicate movements of the person

going about his or her daily life and entering a variety of

locations (homes, offices) where there is a legitimate expectation

of privacy. The ongoing nature of such monitoring (as opposed to the

tracking of a barrel of precursor chemicals from the manufacturer to

the clandestine laboratory in the typical beeper case) raises much

more serious privacy interests. These interests merit full Fourth

Amendment protection.

 

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Wireless data transfers. At a time when wireless local area networks

are proliferating and when wireless data transmissions could be used

for everything from proprietary data to medical records, it is not

clear that wireless data transfers are protected to the same extent

as wireless voice communications. The status of legal protection for

wireless data transfers has a confused history, leaving it unclear

whether they are currently protected by ECPA. An industry and

privacy task force concluded in 1991 that wireless transfers of data

might not be covered by ECPA, and recommended that coverage be

extended. n231 In 1994, in CALEA and with the support of the

Administration, Congress passed a provision making it clear that the

privacy of wireless data transfers was protected by ECPA. n232 But

less than two years later, in the anti-terrorism act of 1996,

Congress repealed the provision on the basis of the Justice

Department's claim that the 1994 amendment was inappropriately

overbroad. n233

 

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n231. See Digital Telephony Hearings, supra note 9, at 179, 183

(Final Report of the Privacy and Technology Task Force Submitted to

Senator Patrick J. Leahy).

 

n232. See Pub. L. No. 103-414, 203, 108 Stat. at 4291 (1994)

(amending 18 U.S.C. 2510(16)).

 

n233. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 731 (1996). The repeal came at the behest

of the Justice Department, which argued that the privacy provision

was inappropriately overbroad, and included ham radio and CB radio

broadcasts, which should not be privacy-protected. The Justice

Department, reversing the Administration's earlier provision, argued

that wireless data transfers were already protected. Rather than

propose narrower language to make that clear, the Administration

successfully argued for repeal of the entire provision. In the

context of the many issues in the terrorism bill, this one received

little attention.

 

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This confusion should be resolved by appropriate legislative

language extending the privacy protections of ECPA unambiguously to

wireless data transfers.

 

Interception devices. ECPA made it a crime to manufacture, sell,

assemble, possess or advertise any device that is "primarily useful"

for the interception of wireless telephone conversations. n234

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of this provision is quite limited,

since it is difficult to prove that a device capable of intercepting

cellular and a range of other frequencies is "primarily useful" for

prohibited interceptions. Congress should delete the word

"primarily," at least as it affects manufacture, sale, assembly, and

advertisement.

 

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n234. See 18 U.S.C. 2512 (1996).

 

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The manufacture and import of scanners equipped or readily alterable

to receive transmissions in frequencies assigned to the "domestic

cellular radio telecommunications service" are prohibited under

section 302(d) of the Communications Act. n235 However, since the

enactment of this provision, a new category of services called

"commercial mobile radio services" has been created, into which

cellular, as well as additional mobile services at different

frequency ranges, such as personal communications systems (PCS),

have been added. The law does not appear to prohibit manufacture and

import of devices equipped to scan these frequencies. Congress

should extend the section 302 prohibition to the parts of the

spectrum used for PCS and other wireless telephone communications.

 

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n235. 47 U.S.C. 302(a)(d) (1996).

 

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VIII. Strengthening the Wiretap Laws to Reestablish the Principles

of Katz and Berger

 

The balance among the interests of law enforcement, privacy and

technological innovation has come under challenge in recent years.

Steadily growing numbers of wiretaps, longer and longer

surveillances intercepting more and more communications suggest that

the wiretapping laws are not working as originally intended to

constrain the use of this highly intrusive technique. These

developments point to the need for amendments to the law to

reestablish the balance Congress originally sought. Until such

corrective amendments are enacted, it would be premature to con

sider proposals to further expand the scope of, or weaken the

privacy protection standards in, the wiretap laws.

 

Unfortunately, the focus of the legislative debate recently has been

in the opposite direction, on proposals to give the government

greater latitude in wiretapping. As noted above in Section VII, the

Justice Department sought and obtained repeal of one of the privacy

protections that were adopted in CALEA. Further, the President

sought in his terrorism legislation a series of other changes in the

wiretap laws that would have weakened the sanctions against illegal

government wiretapping; weakened the standards for so-called "roving

taps;" and expanded the availability of warrantless taps in

"emergency" situations. n236 While these other changes were

ultimately rejected, they were considered and debated without

attention to counterbalancing proposals to enhance privacy.

 

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n236. Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 896 (1995); S. 390

(1995). See also Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 1710

(1995) (Republican terrorism bill).

 

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The Clinton Administration has continued to support these and other

changes in the wiretap laws. In July 1996, the Department of Justice

submitted to Congress a report recommending eight amendments to the

federal electronic surveillance laws, including the change in the

statute's exclusionary rule, the loosening of the standard for

"roving taps," and additional authority for emergency wiretaps

without judicial approval. n237 The report stated that "several

other proposed amendments are under consideration by the Department,

... [which] are expected to be submitted to Congress at a later

time." n238

 

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n237. See July 1996 Electronic Surveillance Report to Congress,

supra note 6.

 

n238. Id. Significantly, the Justice Department report was able to

identify only one revision to the wiretap laws that would have

enabled law enforcement authorities to better fulfill their

responsibilities. This was the addition of an additional predicate

offense for the use of wiretapping, namely, 18 U.S.C. 842, involving

manufacturing, dealing in, and importing explosive materials without

a license and the unlawful distribution of explosive materials.

 

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By far, the most dangerous change the Administration proposed was an

amendment to Title III to allow courts to receive evidence obtained

in violation of the wiretap law. When Title III was adopted,

Congress included a statutory exclusion rule, calling it "an

integral part of the system of limitations designed to protect

privacy." n239 The Administration proposal, although sometimes

described as a good faith exception, would require a person to prove

"bad faith" on the part of the government, before evidence will be

excluded for violation of the law - an almost impossible

undertaking. The Administration's 1995 proposal was not limited to

situations where law enforcement officers relied on a technically

defective warrant. n240 The Supreme Court has already held that the

statutory suppression or exclusion rule in Title III is not to be

applied to technical violations. n241 The Administration proposal

would apply to all provisions of the wiretap law, including those

governing the conduct of the government after the warrant is issued.

Thus, it would remove the only real incentive against violating such

central protections as the minimization and evidence preservation

rules. The Administration argued that the proposed change would

merely apply to wiretaps the same standard applicable to other

searches. However, the constitutional presupposition of Title III is

that special, heightened standards are necessary for electronic

surveillance because of its unique nature. n242

 

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n239. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968).

 

n240. S. 390, at 105 (1995) (Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995).

 

n241. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527-28 (1974) ("We

think Congress intended to require suppression where there is

failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly

and substantially implement [the intended limitations on the use of

wiretapping]" (emphasis added)).

 

n242. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 96 (1968).

 

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If amendments to the wiretap laws are to be considered, then it must

be in the context that gives equal weight to an examination of

issues from a privacy perspective. It should be clear from the

discussion in Section II (B) that amendments are necessary to repair

the damage done by judicial interpretation. Specifically, it is time

to strengthen the minimization rule and to clarify the requirement

that law enforcement exhaust other techniques before seeking an

interception order. Other changes are necessary as well:

 

Transactional data. Advanced signaling systems for voice

communications have blurred the distinction between call identifying

information and call content. Currently, the standards for

governmental access to signaling data under what are known as "pen

registers" and "trap and trace devices" require a court order, but

the statute puts the judge in a purely ministerial role: the sole

function of the judge is to determine whether the signature of an

Assistant United States Attorney is on the application. n243 One

improvement would be an amendment requiring that the judge exercise

discretion and only approve the request upon finding, based on a

showing by the government, that the information sought is relevant

and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. As argued in

Section VII, above, one type of transactional data, namely real-time

location information generated in wireless telephone systems,

implicates such serious privacy interests that Congress should

clarify the law by requiring a warrant based on a showing of

probable cause for nonconsensual governmental access to such

information when obtained on a real-time, tracking basis. In light

of the growing significance of transactional and signaling data, it

is time for Congress to examine more generally the implications of

government access to and analysis of all forms of such information

for subscriber profiling purposes.

 

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n243. See 18 U.S.C. 3123(a) (1996).

 

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Roving wiretaps. The Justice Department has proposed loosening the

standard for so-called roving or multi-point wiretaps. n244 Roving

taps (taps placed on a phone line other than the line subscribed to

by the target of a surveillance order) are considered especially

sensitive because they often entail tapping the phone of someone who

is not the subject of an investigation and not suspected of any

involvement in criminal conduct. n245 The Justice Department argues

that the current statute requires the government to show the

subjective intent of the subject to evade interception. n246 The

Department argues that it should be enough that the subject's

actions have the objective result of thwarting interception. n247 If

Congress changes the standard for roving taps, it should add to the

law an explicit prohibition against interception of the

conversations of innocent third parties, so that such conversations

would be outside the scope of the warrant. While this conforms to

stated Justice Department policy and the few lower court decisions,

n248 it would be desirable to write the principle into the Title III

statute.

 

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n244. See 18 U.S.C. 2518(11) (1996); S. 390, at 108 (1995).

 

n245. See e.g. United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1122-24 (1st

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1644 (1994). See generally,

Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The Legality of Roving

Surveillance, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 401 (1987).

 

n246. See July 1996 Electronic Surveillance Report to Congress,

supra note 6, at 33-34.

 

n247. See id. See also H.R. Rep. 104-383 (1995) (Comprehensive

Antiterrorism Act) (citing "today's rapidly changing

telecommunications technology" and the widespread use of "cellular

telephones, pagers, portable fax machines and portable computers" as

justification for the roving tap changes).

 

n248. See United States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266, 1318 (D.

Mass. 1991); United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1062 (S.

D. Cal. 1990).

 

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Emergency wiretaps. Title III allows the use of wiretapping without

court approval in emergency situations involving immediate danger of

death or serious physical injury, threats to the national security,

or organized crime. In such cases, an application for a court order

must be filed within forty-eight hours. n249 The Administration has

recommended expanding this emergency authority to include terrorism

cases that do not involve an immediate danger of injury or threat to

the national security. n250

 

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n249. 18 U.S.C. 2518(7) (1996).

 

n250. See S. 390, at 107 (1995).

 

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More appropriate than the Administration's proposed change would be

a careful reexamination of the Title III emergency exception itself.

The emergency exception was enacted in 1968. Now, given the

pervasiveness of faxes, wireless telephones, and e-mail, it is hard

to understand why it would ever be impossible or even difficult to

reach a federal judge to obtain prior approval for electronic

surveillance. It should be noted that in 1977 the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure were amended to allow for telephonic submission

of search warrant applications and affidavits in emergency

situations, with procedures for contemporaneous recording of the

oral testimony supporting probable cause. n251 This seems to be a

far more appropriate model for updating the emergency tap authority

of Title III. n252

 

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n251. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(2) (1997).

 

n252. In addition, it would be appropriate to update the emergency

procedures under FISA, 50 U.S.C. 1805(e), written in 1979, which

allow emergency taps for twenty-four hours.

 

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Limiting use of FISA in criminal cases. In most FISA cases, since

the target is never notified of the existence of the surveillance,

there is never an opportunity for after-the-fact adversarial review

of the legality of the taps. n253 Even if there is a criminal

investigation and notice is provided, the adversarial hearing is

inadequate because the target is not allowed to see the affidavit

that provided the basis for the order. The increasing use of FISA

intercepts in criminal cases suggests that FISA is turning out to be

a bigger than expected exception to ordinary wiretap procedures.

n254 In espionage cases involving U.S. persons, long after it is

clear that the subject is suspected of engaging in espionage, and

long after there is adequate basis to open a criminal case and

obtain a wiretap order under Title III, the FBI continues to proceed

under a FISA order, maintaining that the investigation serves a dual

purpose of counterintelligence and criminal investigation. n255 This

is directly contrary to the intent of FISA. n256 FISA should be

amended to exclude from any criminal trial evidence obtained from a

FISA surveillance after there was probable cause to believe that a

crime was being committed. This will require the FBI to obtain a

Title III order at the appropriate time, making the wiretap subject

to the higher standards applicable to Title III intercepts.

 

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n253. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings before the

Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of

Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., at 27-35

(1983) (testimony of Mark H. Lynch, American Civil Liberties Union).

 

 

n254. See McGee & Duffy, supra note 78, at 13.

 

n255. Id.

 

n256. S. Rep. No. 95-604 (1978).

 

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IX. International Issues

 

The Internet is a global medium. One of its great strengths is the

ease with which it spans the globe: information flows as

effortlessly from New York to Nairobi as from one building to

another in Washington, D.C. Moreover, a communication from New York

to Nairobi might travel through the United Kingdom and five other

countries one day, but through France and five different countries

the next. In this global context, it has been said, the U.S. Bill of

Rights is a local ordinance, meaning that the U.S. constitutional

guarantees (and the procedures of the U.S. wiretap laws) offer no

privacy protection against foreign government interception of the

communications of U.S. citizens that cross national borders.

 

As U.S. law enforcement agencies become more active abroad, and as

they engage in more joint operations with foreign police

organizations, the line blurs between intelligence agencies and law

enforcement agencies. Greater attention will have to be paid to the

rules governing electronic surveillance abroad. For both the

Internet and traditional telephony, new rules need to be developed

to govern U.S. surveillance abroad and the increasing extent of

joint international operations, which currently take place in a

legal no-man's-land. It has been held that the U.S. wiretap statutes

have no extraterritorial application. n257 Congress should address

this gap by extending the court order requirements of Title III and

FISA to interceptions of communications by the U.S. government

abroad for use in U.S. criminal cases.

 

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n257. See United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

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U.S. government agencies, particularly the FBI, have been promoting

the adoption of CALEA-type standards on an international scale. In

1994, the "Barrett Commission" in Australia, crediting the FBI's

leadership, supported the development of "international user

requirements" as the most effective means of "international

cooperation to ensure that law enforcement's needs are taken into

account in the development of new technology." n258 In 1995, the

Council of the European Union adopted a set of interception

requirements for telecommunications systems, similar to the

requirements developed by the FBI, and urged member states to

implement the requirements with respect to systems and service

providers in their own countries. n259 Efforts were also undertaken

to urge non-EU countries to adopt the requirements. In 1997, the

Telecommunications Standardization Sector of the International

Telecommunication Union, upon a motion by Australia, adopted a

resolution directing all its standards groups to consider the EU

surveillance requirements in their standards development. n260

 

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n258. P.J. Barrett, Review of the Long Term Cost Effectiveness of

Telecommunications Interception (Mar. 1994).

 

n259. Council of European Union Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the

Lawful Interception of Telecommunications, (96/C329/01).

 

n260. ITU, Document C97/58-E (May 9, 1997).

 

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If the U.S. government is promoting surveillance standards for

systems abroad, it should be U.S. policy to also promote world-wide

adoption of privacy protections at least as strong as those in the

United States.

 

The U.S. government has been less successful in promoting

international adoption of key recovery for encryption. Despite the

Administration's best efforts, international bodies have not

endorsed key escrow solutions. n261 The OECD Cryptography Policy

Guidelines specifically do not endorse key escrow; rather, they

cautiously propose that "national cryptography policies may allow

lawful access to plaintext or cryptographic keys" n262 (emphasis

added).

 

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n261. John Markoff, U.S. Fails to Win Global Accord on Police

Internet Eavesdropping, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1997, at D1. See

Jennifer L. Schenker, EU Is Expected to Reject U.S. Proposal for

Monitoring Internet Communications, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1997, at

B9.

 

n262. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,

Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines for Cryptography

Policy (Mar. 27, 1997).

 

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Nonetheless, as market-driven key escrow arrangements emerge, Fourth

and Fifth Amendment concerns about what standards will govern access

to keys take on international implica tions, because governments

will be seeking access to keys escrowed outside their territory. If

commercial key escrow systems achieve acceptance in the United

States, foreign governments are likely to seek access to escrowed

keys and decryption assistance, raising the question of standards to

be applied when a foreign government seeks cooperation of U.S.

authorities. To regulate any assistance provided to foreign

governments seeking access to escrowed keys or decryption assistance

in the United States, and to prevent the disclosure of decryption

keys or decryption assistance to foreign governments that do not

respect privacy and other human rights or provide due process,

Congress should adopt statutory rules that include strict court

order standards. The rules for a foreign request should have to

satisfy three basic criteria: 1) the foreign government should

comply with the treaty and other standards normally governing the

provision of U.S. legal assistance to that government; 2) the

foreign request should have to meet a standard at least as high as

U.S. law enforcement agencies; and 3) standards should be in place

that prohibit the disclosure of keys or decryption assistance for

political offenses or other activity that would be protected under

the U.S. First Amendment, or to foreign governments that do not

adhere to minimum standards of due process and privacy protection.

 

X. Conclusion

 

Communications privacy is a bedrock constitutional principle, and

electronic communications must be protected through strong privacy

legislation implementing the Fourth Amendment's requirements. For

the past quarter century, the law of this nation regarding

electronic surveillance has sought to balance the interests of

privacy and law enforcement. The uses of new technologies, however,

are always outpacing the law, often in ways that threaten privacy,

and also in ways that limit law enforcement's effectiveness. Other

changes in technology offer the possibility of enhancing privacy.

Still other changes increase surveillance capabilities.

Consequently, Congress has been required periodically to examine the

legal framework for protecting privacy while ensuring that law

enforcement has the necessary and appropriate capabilities. It did

so in 1968 when it responded to widespread eavesdropping by

prohibiting wiretapping without a court order. n263 It did so in

1986 with the adoption of ECPA, which extended the protections and

authorities of Title III to e-mail and cellular telephone

communications. n264 It did so again in 1994 when it responded to

law enforcement concerns about the impact of new technologies by

enacting CALEA, which required telecommunications carriers to ensure

that their systems could accommodate government surveillance. I have

argued here that it must do so again, to protect privacy.

 

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n263. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III,

Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 2510 et.

seq.).

 

n264. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.

99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in sections of 18 U.S.C. 2510-21,

2701-10, 3121-26).

 

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As exemplified by the Internet, the digital communications

technologies are flexible, decentralized, networked, open and

interactive. They merge voice, data, and images. They eliminate

distinctions between what is kept in the home and what is stored

with third parties. They generate large quantities of easily

captured transactional data, combine wireless and wireline systems

seamlessly, and place choices and control in the hands of users.

Their economics are characterized by competition and innovation.

They are global in reach. The explosion in the amount of information

transmitted and stored electronically and the emergence of a form of

online existence for both businesses and individuals have produced a

qualitative change in the nature of communications and, accordingly,

in the amount and nature of the information that is exposed to

intrusion, interception and misuse. A re-examination of the wiretap

laws must take into account these defining features of the digital

revolution.

 

Such a review should also consider the overall balance between the

technical and legal capabilities of government and the technical and

legal status of privacy protections. Piecemeal amendments to the

surveillance laws in response only to government concerns will

inappropriately upset the balance. Any amendments to the wiretap

laws must be narrowly crafted to ensure that they do not erode

privacy protections, and must be balanced by other,

privacy-enhancing amendments. New technologies enhance the ability

of law enforcement to intercept and analyze communications and track

individuals. Many of these enhancements are coming about without

government intervention, as the unintended consequences of

market-driven changes in technology. Existing law allows law

enforcement to take advantage of these developments. As technology

enhances surveillance capabilities, the legal standards for

government use of these new technologies must be increased to

adequately protect privacy. I have recommended here a number of

amendments that respond to technological changes to protect against

abuse without curtailing legitimate law enforcement access.

 

Government efforts to control the development of technology to

preserve its communications surveillance capability must be

carefully circumscribed. Merely as a practical matter, the rapid and

decentralized changes occurring in technology are likely to outstrip

government efforts at control. The most notable case in point is

encryption: there seems to be no way to limit the spread of

virtually unbreakable encryption. Changes in technology since 1994

when Congress adopted the CALEA legislation pose equally difficult

problems, while also creating opportunities for enhancing privacy.

Congress and the FCC should restrain FBI efforts to use this

legislation to obtain surveillance capacities that go beyond the

status quo.

 

The legislature must continually strive to develop rules that keep

pace with technological developments. The process never reaches a

point of final repose, but there are clear steps that should be

taken now to reestablish the balance between privacy and government

surveillance powers.