

PARIMAL G. PATIL

ON WHAT IT IS THAT BUDDHISTS THINK ABOUT  
—*APOHA* IN THE *RATNAKĪRTI-NIBANDHĀVALI*—

## 0. Introduction

The Buddhist theory of exclusion (*apoha*) has long provided a context within which a broad range of philosophical issues has been discussed. Given its pre-history in the work of the Sanskrit grammarians, the theory has been linked, most closely, with issues in the philosophy of language.<sup>1</sup> It was, however, first developed by Dignāga in response to more epistemological and ontological concerns.<sup>2</sup> What Dignāga noticed was that debates about meaning, reference, and semantic value could be related both to epistemological questions regarding how the awareness of an inferential reason (*hetu*) is supposed to produce knowledge of an inferred object and to ontological questions regarding the existential status and proper description of that object.<sup>3</sup> As a result of Dignāga's work, subsequent Buddhist philosophers developed versions of the theory that reflected their views on a variety of philosophical issues.<sup>4</sup> One of these philosophers was the Buddhist intellectual Ratnakīrti who lived and worked in the monastic and educational complex of Vikramaśīla in the first half of the eleventh century. The purpose of this paper is simply to provide an interpretation of his version of the theory of exclusion (*apoha*) and in so doing to explain why, according to him, all things are ultimately inexpressible (*anabhilāpyatva*).

### 0.1. Ratnakīrti and the theory of exclusion (*apoha*)

In his 'Proof of Exclusion' (*Apoha-siddhi*), Ratnakīrti develops a version of the theory that seeks to explain how and why our words are about what they are about. Although his primary concern is with semantic value, it is clear from his work that his theory is also about much more. On my reading, Ratnakīrti's account of exclusion (*apoha*) provides a general theory of conceptual content; that is, an account of the kind of object about which we speak and think and with respect to which we act.<sup>5</sup> According to Ratnakīrti, this object is best described as 'a positive entity characterised by its exclusion of others' (*anyāpoha-*

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*viśiṣṭa-vidhi*) and is best understood as the content (*viśaya*) of conceptual (or constructing) states of awareness (*vikalpa-buddhi*) such as those produced through inferential reasoning (*anumāna*) or verbal testimony (*śabda*). This ‘positive entity’ (*vidhi*) is also said to be the ‘meaning of words’ (*śabdānām artha*) and what is ‘denoted by the word exclusion’ (*apoha-śabda-vācya*).<sup>6</sup> In what follows, I want to present Ratnakīrti’s analysis of this complex entity by describing each of its analytically separable components, that is, the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) and the positive entity (*vidhi*) that is characterised (*viśiṣṭa*) by it. Before considering what Ratnakīrti takes this object to be, however, it is helpful to consider what he says it is not.

### 1. What exclusion (*apoha*) is not

Ratnakīrti begins his essay by distinguishing his view from what I will call ‘Pure Referentialism,’ ‘Pure Non-Referentialism,’ and ‘Sequentialism.’<sup>7</sup> On my use of these terms, Pure Referentialism is the view that the semantic value of a linguistic expression can be completely specified in terms of some (positive) object *x*. My description of this view is neutral to the ontological status of this object; that is, whether it is an ‘external’ or an ‘internal’ object and whether it is a particular, a universal, or a complex object made up of particulars and universals. There can be, therefore, both realist and ideational versions of Pure Referentialism. A realist version, for example, would be the view that the semantic value of a linguistic expression is the external object for which it stands. The ideational version would be that it is the internal object or, more specifically, facet of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*) for which it stands. Pure Non-Referentialism, in contrast, is the view that the semantic value of a linguistic expression can be completely specified without reference to an object of any sort. As Ratnakīrti presents it, on this view semantic value is supposed to be completely specified by exclusion itself (*vyāvṛtti-mātra*). Here, ‘exclusion’ does not denote an object *x*, but, a process, capacity, or (perhaps) intensional or dispositional property.<sup>8</sup> Unlike Pure Referentialism and Pure Non-Referentialism, Sequentialism asserts that there are two components of semantic value: One component is taken to be the direct or primary semantic value of a term and the other is taken to be its indirect or implied value. Ratnakīrti calls supporters of the view that a positive object (*vidhi*) is the direct semantic value of a term and exclusion (*apoha*) its implied value ‘Positivists’ (*vidhi-vādin*). Supporters

of the view that exclusion (*apoha*) is the direct semantic value of a term and a positive object its implied value are called, ‘Negationists’ (*niṣedha-vādin*).<sup>9</sup> These two views are also supposed to be neutral to the ontological status of the objects.

According to Ratnakīrti, each of these views misrepresents his own position. He explains, for example, that,

‘By the word “exclusion” (*apoha*) we do not mean just a positive entity (*vidhi*) alone (Pure Referentialism) or the mere exclusion of others (*anya-vyāvṛtti-mātra*) (Pure Non-Referentialism) but rather that the meaning (*artha*) of a word (*śabda*) is a positive entity (*vidhi*) characterised by its exclusion of others (*anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa*).’<sup>10</sup>

and

‘... it is neither the case that after becoming aware of a positive entity (*vidhi*) one subsequently (*paścāṅ*) understands exclusion (*apoha*) by implication (*arthāpattiāh*) (“Positivist” interpretation of Sequentialism) nor that after becoming aware of exclusion (*apoha*) [one subsequently understands] that which is excluded from others (*anyāpōdha*) (The “Negationist” interpretation).’<sup>11</sup>

For Ratnakīrti, the semantic value of a linguistic expression is properly described as a ‘positive entity that is characterised by its exclusion of others (*anyāpoha-viśiṣṭa-vidhi*).’ This ‘positive entity’ is taken to be a single complex object (*viśiṣṭa-vidhi*) that is conceptually (and not actually) constituted by two separable components that are non-sequentially and simultaneously brought to awareness.<sup>12</sup> These ‘components’ are the positive entity (*vidhi*) itself and its ‘negative’ characteristic, the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*). What follows is Ratnakīrti’s account of each of them.

## 2.0. Exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*)

According to Ratnakīrti, the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) is a ‘component’ of semantic value in the sense that it is an essential characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) or property (*dharmā*) of it. He says, for example, that,

‘[j]ust as in the awareness “blue lotus” (*nīlōtpalā*) from the word “Indīvara-flower (*indīvara*)”—which is associated with (*niveśita*) a blue lotus (*nīlōtpalā*)—there is simultaneously (*ta-kāla*) the manifestation (*sphuraṇa*) of blue-ness (*nīlīmā*), it is difficult to deny (*anivārya*) that in the awareness “cow” from the word “cow”—which is associated with that which is excluded from non-cows (*agāvāpōdha*)—

there is also simultaneously (*tat-kāla*) the manifestation (*sphurana*) of exclusion (*apoha*), on account of it being a characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*).<sup>7</sup>

More simply, he says that,

‘... what is understood (*avagatī*) from a word has the form of a positive entity (*vidhī-rūpa*) with exclusion (*apoha*) as its *property* (*dharma*), just like from the word “Puṇḍarīka-flower” [what is understood is] a lotus having the characteristic “white” (*śvetīma-viśiṣṭa*).<sup>13</sup>

In order further to explain what sort of a characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) or property (*dharma*) the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) is, Ratnakīrti compares it with a capacity (*śakti*) that sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) has to perceive absence (*abhāva*). What elicits this comparison is a question about how exclusion (*apoha*), which is considered by many to be a kind of absence (*abhāva*) or ‘negative’ object, can be present in states of awareness in which there only seem to be ‘positive’ objects. Ratnakīrti says,

‘[j]ust as perception’s (*pratyakṣa*) [non-]grasping of the non-implicative form (*prasajya-rūpa*) of absence just is [its] capacity (*śakti*) to produce a mental construction of absence (*abhāva-vikalpa*), similarly, even for constructing states of awareness involving a positive entity (*vidhī-vikalpa*), the grasping of [this] absence (*abhāva*, i.e. *exclusion* (*apoha*))’ is just said to be the capacity (*śakti*) to produce (*dāna*) activity (*anuṣṭhāna*) that is consistent with it (*tad-anurūpa*).<sup>14</sup>

An example may help explain what (I think) Ratnakīrti has in mind. Ratnakīrti might analyse the awareness that ‘There is nothing on the floor’ as the awareness that ‘The floor is characterised by the absence of all other things.’<sup>15</sup> In this paraphrase, ‘the floor’ is a ‘positive’ component of what is perceived and ‘the absence of all other things’ is a ‘negative’ component. This ‘non-implicative’ form of absence (*prasajya-rūpa-abhāva*), however, is not itself an object of sense perception; only the floor is. The question, then, is how the ‘absence of all other things’ can be a part of that state of awareness. What we learn from the above passage is that according to Ratnakīrti its presence in awareness is, like the presence of exclusion (*apoha*), due to a capacity (*śakti*) that states of awareness have to construct objects, such as the concept ‘absence of all other things,’ and to produce object-consistent activity, such as not looking for a pot on that part of the floor. While in the earlier passages exclusion (*apoha*) was compared to a characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an object, here, it is compared with a capacity (*śakti*) belonging to the state of awareness itself: The capacity of producing activity that is consistent with the content (or object) of a particular

state of awareness. This raises at least the following two questions: ‘How does exclusion produce (or contribute to) object-consistent activity?’ and ‘What, if anything, does this have to do with its being a characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) or property (*dharma*) of semantic value?’

### 2.1. Question 1:

How does exclusion contribute to object-consistent activity?

It is in thinking of the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) as a capacity of constructing (*vikalpa*) and inferential-verbal states of awareness that its role in Ratnakīrti’s analysis of conceptual content becomes apparent.<sup>16</sup> For Ratnakīrti, exclusion (*apoha*) is linked, very closely, with a capacity that all such states of awareness have to construct objects that are not themselves directly present or manifest (*pratibhāsa*) in that state of awareness. This capacity is called ‘determination (*adhyavasāya*).’<sup>17</sup> Exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) is, more specifically, the process or mechanism through which determination (*adhyavasāya*) constructs these objects. The link between determination (*adhyavasāya*), exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*), and ‘object-consistent activity’ is that determined (*adhyavaseya*) objects are constructed through exclusion to be the objects about which we speak and think and towards which we act. Determined (*adhyavaseya*) objects are, then, the conceptual content (*viśaya*) of all inferential-verbal states of awareness. Semantic value (*vācya*) is just one such determined object. Exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) ‘produces’ (or contributes to) object-consistent activity in the sense that it is the mechanism whereby the objects of conceptual states of awareness are constructed from the objects that are directly present in awareness, that is, from ‘non-conceptual’ content.<sup>18</sup> These constructed objects are often described as ‘universals’ (*sāmānya*), in part, in order to distinguish them from the particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), i.e. the non-conceptual content from which they are constructed.

A series of examples may illustrate what Ratnakīrti has in mind. According to Ratnakīrti, a universal (*sāmānya*) is, most generally, an object that is excluded from those that do not have its form (*atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta*).<sup>19</sup> More specifically, in late Buddhist epistemology, a ‘token’ (*vyakti*) is sometimes described as a vertical universal (*ūrdhva-sāmānya*); that is, as an object that is excluded from those that belong to the same class (*sajātīya-vyāvṛtta*), and a ‘type’ (*sāmānya*) as a horizontal universal (*tīryak-sāmānya*); that is, an object that is excluded from those that belong to a different class (*vijātīya-vyāvṛtta*).<sup>20</sup> In

addition to being defined in terms of an exclusion, each of these universals is also associated with a particular mode of determination (*adhyavasāya*). A vertical universal (*ūrdhva-sāmānya*), for example, is understood to be constructed through the determination of singularity or non-difference (*ekatva-adhyavasāya*) and a horizontal universal (*tiryak-sāmānya*) through the determination of difference (*bheda-avasāya*).<sup>21</sup> It is important to note that particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) are the only objects that can be directly present (*pratibhāsa*) in awareness. According to Ratnakīrti, both types of universals (*sāmānya*) are constructed from these directly present particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) through exclusion (*apoha*) and determination (*adhyavasāya*).<sup>22</sup>

Consider the following: According to Ratnakīrti, what is perceived and directly present in awareness is a particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) *p*. Let us suppose that what individuates and best describes *p* is its unique set of causes and potential effects: Nothing else has *exactly* the same set of causes and potential effects that it does.<sup>23</sup> For simplicity, suppose that the set of all causes and potential effects can be described in terms of the following three sub-sets of causes and potential effects:

- Subset 1: A ‘uniqueness’-class S consisting of those causes and potential effects that belong to this *p* (\**tad*);<sup>24</sup>
- Subset 2: A ‘dissimilarity’-class (\**atulya*) ‘non-S’ consisting of those causes and potential effects that just belong to non-*p*’s (\**atad-rūpa*);<sup>25</sup>
- and
- Subset 3: A ‘similarity’-class ‘like-S’ (\**tulya*) consisting of those causes and potential effects that belong to *p*’s (\**tad-rūpa*).

Notice here that the similarity-class, like-S, can be defined in terms of the dissimilarity-class and a relation of ‘non-intersection’: Like-S is just the class of causes and potential effects that do not intersect with the dissimilarity-class non-S. Notice too that the uniqueness-class S is a subset of the similarity-class like-S. All that is directly grasped (*grāhya*) by awareness, however, is *p*. The exclusion—on the basis of *p*—of the dissimilarity-class non-S results in the construction of a new object of awareness. This ‘object’ is defined by the two remaining subsets of causes and effects that is, the uniqueness-class S, which consists of the causes and effects that belong to this *p*, and the similarity-class like-S, which consists of the causes and effects that belong to *p*’s. This new ‘object’ may also be described as the non-intersection (or complement) of the dissimilarity-class non-S; the object that is constructed by the exclusion of non-*p*’s; the object that has been excluded from those that are non-*p* (*atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta*, where *tad* is *p*); or the similarity-class like-S. What exclusion does, therefore, is

construct a similarity-class like-S from a particular *p*, and a dissimilarity-class non-S. According to Ratnakīrti, it is this sort of a similarity-class that is often taken to be a ‘real’ rather than just a ‘constructed’ universal (*sāmānyā*).

For example, suppose that *p* is a single moment in a continuum of pot-moments. In this case, the object constructed from *p* by excluding non-S would be defined by the causes and potential effects that belong to this particular moment; that is, those that belong to its uniqueness-class S and those that belong to other moments in the pot-continuum; that is, those that belong to its similarity-class like-S. Such an object would be, therefore, the complete continuum (*santāna*) of pot-moments of which the directly grasped object *p* is but a single moment. In other words, the constructed object would be an individual pot. This ‘token’ or vertical universal (*ūrdhva-sāmānyā*) is said to be constructed through a determination of singularity (*ekatva-adhyavasāyā*) among the moments of that pot-continuum. In this context, exclusion results in the construction of a difference (*bhedā*) between moment *p* and all of the momentary objects that are not a part of its continuum and a non-difference (*abheda*) between the directly grasped moment *p* and all of the other moments in its continuum. Importantly, Ratnakīrti also says that by directly grasping one sensible characteristic of an object, it is possible to construct the entire object, in a similar way, through the determination of singularity (*ekatvādhyavasāyā*). He asserts, for example, that by directly perceiving only its unique colour, it is possible to determine the pot of which the sensed colour is a characteristic.<sup>26</sup>

Now suppose that *p* is a single pot, and not a single moment in a pot continuum. In this case, the object constructed from *p* by excluding non-S that is, by excluding non-pots, would be defined by the causes and effects that belong to that particular pot and those that belong to all other pots. Such an object would be, therefore, a similarity-class, i.e. the collection of all pots or a pot-in-general. This ‘type’ or horizontal universal (*tiryak-sāmānyā*) is constructed through a determination of difference (*bhedāvasāyā*) between pots and non-pots. More specifically, in this context, exclusion constructs a difference (*bhedā*) between the directly present pot and all non-pots, and a non-difference (*abheda*) between it and all other pots.

The exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) can now be understood to contribute to object-consistent activity in the sense that it is necessarily implicated in the construction of the objects of that activity; that is, the

similarity-classes that, according to Ratnakīrti, are the objects about which we speak and think and towards which we act.

## 2.2. Question 2:

In what sense is exclusion (still) a characteristic or property?

Why Ratnakīrti insists that exclusion (*apoha*), which has thus far been described primarily as a capacity of a state of awareness, should also be described as a property (*dharma*) or characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) of semantic value becomes apparent from his description of the relationships between a property (*dharma*) and a possessor of a property (*dharmin*), and between a characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) and what is characterised by it (*viśeṣya*). According to Ratnakīrti, ‘... it is well established that the ordinary use (*vyavahāra*) [of the terms] “property” (*dharma*) and “possessor of a property” (*dharmin*) is based upon a constructed difference (*kālpānika-bheda*)<sup>27</sup> and that ‘the relationship between a characteristic and what is characterised by it (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*) is acknowledged after assuming an imagined difference (*parikalpita-bheda*).<sup>28</sup> Ratnakīrti’s point is that although it may be useful to speak of semantic value as having two different components, it is, more precisely, a single object that is only conceptually separable into a positive entity (*vidhi*) and exclusion (*apoha*). Whether one locates the property ‘exclusion of others’ (*anyāpoha*) in states of awareness in which semantic value is present or in semantic value itself becomes, therefore, a matter of conceptual convenience. After all, semantic value is nothing but an object or facet (*ākāra*) that is constructed out of awareness itself. In addition, due to the non-difference between properties (*dharma*) and property-possessors (*dharmin*), the term ‘exclusion’ (*apoha*) can denote either the property (*dharma*), the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) or its possessor (*dharmin*), the excluded object. Given what has been said earlier, Ratnakīrti’s point about these relationships also applies to the other conceptual objects that are constructed through exclusion.

Ratnakīrti’s descriptions of exclusion (*apoha*) as a property (*dharma*), characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*), and capacity (*śakti*) focus on an ‘active’ feature of semantic value, its capacity to construct itself. His descriptions of exclusion (*apoha*) as a positive entity (*vidhi*), however, focus on the more ‘passive’ object that is actively constructed in states of awareness through the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*). As explained earlier, these objects may be thought of as ‘constructed universals’ or

‘similarity-classes’ and, as I read Ratnakīrti, the objects of conceptual states of awareness. It is Ratnakīrti’s account of these objects that is considered in what follows.

### 3.0. Positive entity (*vidhi*)

#### 3.1. A thing-in-general (*vastu-mātrā*)

In his ‘Proof of Exclusion’ (*Apoha-siddhi*), Ratnakīrti focuses his effort on describing the complex positive object (*viśiṣṭa-vidhi*) that he specifically takes semantic value to be. His remarks about this object are also of more general importance, however, since such objects are the paradigmatic examples of the determined objects (*adhyavaseya*) that he also takes conceptual content to be. His account of this complex positive entity (*viśiṣṭa-vidhi*) can be reconstructed from the following four passages:

PASSAGE 1 (RNA 63.10–63.16):

‘From a word such as “cow” in the [sentence] “Cows are grazing on the far bank of a river,” dewlap, horns, and tail are grouped together through the facets of the phonemes [that make up the word “cow”]. And, as a result of not considering differences between those that belong to the same class (*sajātīya-bheda*), they are manifest as if united together (*saṃpiṇḍita-prāyaḥ*). And that is definitely not a [real] universal. ... And even though it is utterly distinct (*atyanta-vilakṣaṇa*) in every individual (*akhila-vyakti*), that very collection of dewlap and horns etc., is associated with (*ekīṅky*) a particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and is said to be a [real] universal (*sāmānya*). Since an external object like that is not found (*aprāpti*), it is definitely erroneous ...’<sup>29</sup>

PASSAGE 2 (RNA 66.08–66.09):

‘Everything that is verbally expressive (*vācaka*) has for its object (*gocara*) a thing-in-general (*vastu-mātrā*) that is determined (*adhyavasita*) and excluded from those that do not have its form (*atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta*) ...’<sup>30</sup>

PASSAGE 3 (RNA 60.06):

‘... [It is] a facet of a constructing state of awareness, that is preceded by the observation of an individual thing (*piṇḍa*) and [then] is made external as if common (*sādhāraṇa*) to every individual ...’<sup>31</sup>

PASSAGE 4 (RNA 63.20–63.21):

‘... from the co-operating cause of remembering a previous observation of an individual (*piṇḍa*), the total causal complex (*sāmagrī*) produces an awareness through which particular characteristics are surpassed, bringing about an objectless (*nirviśaya*) awareness of a universal.’<sup>32</sup>

When taken together, these passages suggest the following: What a competent speaker of English, for example, understands from hearing a token utterance of a term such as ‘cow’ is a ‘thing-in-general’ (*vastu-*

*mātra*) that is ‘determined’ (*adhyavasita*) and ‘excluded from those that do not have its form’ (*atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta*) (PASSAGE 2). This object may also be described as a non-specific collection of components that is constructed through exclusion. It is this ‘thing-in-general’ (*vastu-mātra*), or ‘non-specific collection’ that was described, in Section 2 p. 236, as a ‘constructed universal’ and is identified here as semantic value.<sup>33</sup> In these passages, Ratnakīrti describes how this object is constructed. He suggests, for example, that upon hearing a token utterance of the term ‘cow’ a competent speaker of English may recall an object that was previously and invariably associated with earlier uses of the term (PASSAGE 3 and PASSAGE 4). The recollection of a previously observed individual (*pūrva-piṇḍa-darśana-smaraṇa*) is said to be a co-operating cause (*saha-kāra*) in the total causal complex (*sāmagrī*) that brings about the construction of the object. In so far as a remembered individual is an object or ‘facet of awareness’ (*buddhy-ākāra*), it is a mental particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) that has its own unique causal history, i.e. no other particular has exactly the same set of causes and potential effects. It can function, therefore, as a basis for exclusion. In so far as it is constituted by components, however, it too is a collection. This recalled object may be more specifically described as a specific collection of the components that jointly constitute the object in question. For a recalled cow, for example, the components are a specific set of dewlap, horns, and tail etc. By ignoring the differences between a specific collection of these components and other such collections, a non-specific collection or thing-in-general (*vastu-mātra*) is constructed (PASSAGE 1).<sup>34</sup> Elsewhere, Ratnakīrti describes this process as the exclusion of a specific collection from those that belong to a different class.<sup>35</sup> It is clear, therefore, that the construction in question, the ignoring of differences, is a variety of exclusion. It is this non-specific collection that is (mistakenly) taken by some to be a real universal, and that is unconsciously and erroneously associated (*ekāṅky*) with the particulars in which it is (mistakenly) thought to be instantiated. According to Ratnakīrti, this object is a positive entity (*vidhi*) that is neither a real particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) nor a real universal (*sāmānya*). It is a thing-in-general (*vastu-mātra*) that is constructed through its essential characteristic, exclusion (*apoha*), and is determined to be an object about which we speak and think and towards which we act. According to Ratnakīrti, it is this complex positive entity that best describes what is understood from hearing a token utterance of a term.

An opponent subsequently argues, however, that Ratnakīrti's account of semantic value cannot account for why a token utterance of a term such as 'cow' can refer to all cows and only to cows (and not, for example, to horses).<sup>36</sup> On the opponent's view, real (and not just constructed) universals are necessary. Ratnakīrti responds to this charge, in part, by showing how an awareness of a term's 'specificity'—that the word 'cow' (generally) applies only to cows—and 'generality' (*sāmānya-pratyaya*)—that the word 'cow' can apply to all cows—can be explained in terms of the process through which non-specific collections, i.e. Ratnakīrti's 'universals', are constructed. As mentioned above, according to Ratnakīrti, it is a thing-in-general (*vastu-mātra*) or non-specific collection that is constructed from an individual or specific-collection, through exclusion. The construction of this 'universal' is, therefore, dependent upon this specific individual since, for example, a recalled individual provides the basis for the selective exclusion that generates it.<sup>37</sup> According to Ratnakīrti, these general features of the theory of exclusion are sufficient for explaining the two features of semantic value that are mentioned by the opponent.

Suppose, for example, that someone is told 'Bring a brown cow', i.e. any brown cow. Suppose further that upon hearing this utterance of the term 'brown cow', the object that is recalled is a specific cow that is brown in colour and, like all cows, has its own set of dewlap, horns, and tail. Based on this specific collection of colour, dewlap, horns, and tail, (its uniqueness-class S) it is possible, according to Ratnakīrti, to construct a non-specific collection; that is, a similarity-class of these components (like-S) through the exclusion of its dissimilarity-class (non-S) which, in this case, is the non-specific collection of non-brown, non-dewlaped, non-horned and non-tailed. The result of such an exclusion would be the non-specific collection of brown colour, dewlap, horns, and tail. It is the 'object' defined by this non-specific collection that is understood from hearing the token utterance of the term 'brown cow'. The reason why this utterance of the term cannot be used correctly to refer to horses is that its semantic value is, in part, based upon a specific causal process (which includes its conversational context), a specific individual and an intensionally determined or 'selective' process of exclusion. It is not possible, for example, given the selective exclusion described above to construct correctly a horse-facet of awareness from either the observation of a brown cow or a recalled brown cow. Similarly, neither the observation of a horse nor a recalled horse could, through the selective exclusion described above, correctly lead to the awareness 'brown-cow'. Thus, the 'specificity' in

the correct use of the word ‘cow’ in this context can, according to Ratnakīrti, be explained by his theory. What also needs to be explained, however, is how an exclusion that is based upon a recalled individual can apply to more than the individual on which it is based. Suppose we are told, for example, ‘Bring a cow’, i.e. any cow and not just a brown cow. Suppose further that the recalled object is a specific brown cow. As mentioned above, from its specific collection of colour, dewlap, horns, and tail it is possible to construct a non-specific collection of its characteristics. Such a construction would lead to the awareness ‘brown cow’ and would apply to all brown cows. It is also possible, however, to focus selectively on just its specific collection of dewlap, horns, and tail when defining its dissimilarity-class. In this case, the colour component would not be considered since it is not relevant to the specific needs determined by the context in which the term ‘cow’ is uttered. Given the exclusion of this new dissimilarity-class, what would be constructed is a non-specific collection of dewlap, horns, and tail; that is, an object that ‘applies’ to all cows regardless of their colour. Ratnakīrti argues, therefore, that his account of what is understood from hearing a token utterance of a term can also account for ‘generality’.

### 3.2. Internalism<sup>38</sup> and Externalism

Ratnakīrti’s attention to how semantic value is constructed suggests that his theory might be best classified as an ideational theory of meaning, that is, as a theory according to which meanings are just ‘in the head’. Related to this issue is also the question of whether, according to Ratnakīrti, conceptual content is ‘in the head’. Interestingly, Ratnakīrti argues that the complex positive entity (*vidhi*) that he takes semantic value to be should be described as both an internal (*āntarā*) and an external (*bāhya*) object (*artha*).<sup>39</sup> He explains, for example, that,

‘By the word “positive entity” (*vidhi*) what is meant (*abhimata*) given determination (*yathādhyavasāyā*) is an external object (*bāhyo rthā*) and given manifestation (*yathā-pratibhāsa*), a facet of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*). [Each] is excluded from those that do not have its form (*atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta*).’<sup>40</sup>

What this passage reveals is that the complex positive entity (*vidhi*) that is identified with semantic value can be described as both an internal facet of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*), i.e. an object that we take to be manifest (*pratibhāsa*) or present in our awareness such as a

mental representation, concept, or idea of, for example, a cow, and an external object, i.e. an object that we, as a result of determination (*adhyavasāya*), take to be present in the external world, e.g. a cow. In addition to the two modes of determination discussed earlier, the determination of singularity (*ekatva-adhyavasāya*) and the determination of difference (*bhedāvasāya*), Ratnakīrti's analysis is also dependent upon a 'third mode of determination': the determination of externality. It is through this mode of determination that internal facets of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*) appear as if they are objects in the external world. These determined-to-be-external-objects are the sorts of 'external objects' to which Ratnakīrti refers in this passage.<sup>41</sup> The question of whether an object of awareness is internal (*antara*) or external (*bāhya*) depends, therefore, upon whether we take it to be manifest (*pratibhāsa*) in our awareness or externally determined (*adhyavaseya*) by it. It is, then, the mode through which an object is made present to awareness that determines whether it is properly described as an internal (*antara*) or an external (*bāhya*) one. In a passage near the end of his essay, Ratnakīrti explains the significance of this to the meaning of words and semantic value. He writes,

'So, in this way, a positive entity (*vidhi*) is definitely the meaning of a word (*śabdārtha*). And, it is supposed to be an external object (*bāhyārtha*) and a facet of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*). Among these, it is not the case that either ultimately (*tattvataḥ*) or conventionally (*sāmyajyā*) there are positive or negative assertions (*vidhi-niṣedha*) about a facet of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*). This is because it is known through reflexive awareness (*sva-samvedanā*) and is without determination (*anadhyavasāya*). It is also not the case that ultimately (*tattvataḥ*) there are positive or negative assertions (*vidhi-niṣedha*) about an external object (*bāhyārtha*). This is because it is not manifest in a verbal state of awareness. Thus, since there is either the absence of manifestation (*pratibhāsa*) or determination (*adhyavasāya*), all entities (*sarva-dharmā*) are ultimately (*tattvataḥ*) inexpressible (*anabhilāpyatva*). Therefore, it is of an external object (*bāhyārtha*) alone that there are conventionally true (*sāmyajyā*) positive and negative assertions (*vidhi-niṣedha*). If this were not so there would be the unwanted consequence of the end of all ordinary activity (*samvyavahāra*).<sup>42</sup>

Initially, this passage may appear to contradict the one just discussed since here, Ratnakīrti appears to deny that we can ever make positive or negative existential statements about internal-facets of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*). Ratnakīrti suggests that in so far as they are directly present (*pratibhāsa*) in awareness, facets of awareness (*buddhy-ākāra*) are internal-particulars and are, therefore, perceptible through reflexive awareness (*sva-samvedanā*). Not all internal facets of awareness

(*buddhy-ākāra*) are, however, directly present in states of awareness. This is because, as described earlier, facets of awareness (*ākāra*) can also be indirectly present as a result of being constructed and determined (*adhyavasāya*). What Ratnakīrti is arguing in this passage is that non-determined internal facets of awareness cannot be the objects about which we speak. They cannot be such objects, ultimately (*tattvataḥ*), since they are the momentary objects of reflexive awareness (*sva-samīvedanā*). They cannot be such objects conventionally (*samvṛtyā*) since they are not determined and, it is only through determination (*adhyavasāya*) that semantic value and conceptual content is constructed and so made available to us. In this passage, Ratnakīrti also explains why external objects (*bāhyārtha*) are not, ultimately (*tattvataḥ*), the objects about which we speak. He argues that in so far as they are taken to be ‘external’, such objects cannot be directly present (*pratibhāsa*) in awareness and so cannot themselves be the objects about which we most directly speak or think. Ratnakīrti concludes, therefore, that no non-determined internal or external objects can be the objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness. According to him, ‘all [such] entities are [ultimately] inexpressible.’<sup>43</sup> Conventionally (*samvṛtyā*), however, Ratnakīrti claims that determined external objects can be taken to be the objects about which we speak and think. Without such a view, Ratnakīrti argues that it would be impossible to account for our ability to successfully speak and think about, or interact with, objects in the ‘external’ world. And although it is not made explicit in this passage, Ratnakīrti also believes that, conventionally (*samvṛtyā*), determined internal objects can be objects of inferential-verbal states of awareness. Without such a view, it would not be possible to account for our ability to successfully speak and think about ‘internal’ objects such as mental representations, concepts, or ideas.

#### 4. Conclusion

Related to Ratnakīrti’s remarks about what is ultimately (*tattvataḥ*) and conventionally (*samvṛtyā*) the case, is his version of the ‘misplacement theory’ of error; according to which error (*bhrānti*) is the result of taking something to be an *x* when what is given is non-*x* (*atasmimś tad-grahā*).<sup>44</sup> Since determination (*adhyavasāya*) constructs an object *x* (e.g. a similarity-class, non-specific collection, or ‘universal’) when a non-*x* (e.g. a particular or specific collection) is

given, Ratnakīrti asserts that it is error (*bhrānti*) itself.<sup>45</sup> As a result, all determined objects and, therefore, all conceptual content (including semantic value) are erroneous.<sup>46</sup> Ratnakīrti goes on to explain that determination (*adhyavasāya*) and error (*bhrānti*) directly account for our everyday experiences (*saṁsāra*) and that their elimination is a necessary if not sufficient condition for liberation (*mokṣa*).<sup>47</sup> In concluding his remarks on exclusion with the idea that ‘all entities are inexpressible,’ he gestures, therefore, to the broader (and religious) significance of his theory.

Although it begins with a question about semantic value, Ratnakīrti’s ‘Proof of Exclusion’ (*Apoha-siddhi*) touches on a wide range of issues in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, ontology, and the philosophy of religion. It is clear from Ratnakīrti’s work that Sanskrit intellectuals did not always obey the sub-disciplinary guidelines that shape so much philosophical reflection today. An appreciation of this fact is important since it may eventually help us to better interpret Buddhist philosophy by pointing us to aspects of a philosopher’s work that might not initially seem relevant to a particular philosophical problem. Attention to the theory of exclusion (*apoha*), for example, can help us to see that for Ratnakīrti ‘epistemological objects’ such as the subject of inferences (*pakṣa*), inferential reasons (*hetu*) and properties to be proved (*sādhyā*) can be interpreted as similarity-classes that are constructed through exclusion and that ‘epistemic relations’ such as presence (e.g. *sapakṣe sattvam*) absence (e.g. *vipakṣād vyāvṛtti*) and pervasion (*vyāpti*) can be interpreted in terms of the intersection and non-intersection of such classes. In the case of Ratnakīrti, attention to the broader significance of the theory of exclusion may also make it possible to better appreciate his overall philosophical project which, in my view, is devoted to showing the extent to which mind, language and world interpenetrate mind, language and world.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> BRONKHORST (1999), DESHPANDE (1992), GANERI (1995), GANERI (1996), GANERI (1999a), HATTORI (1968), HATTORI (1977); HATTORI (1980); HAYES (1988: Chapters 1, 3, and 4); HERZBERGER (1986), KATSURA (1991), OGAWA (1999), PIND (1991), PIND (1999), RAJA (1986), SCHARF (1996).

The terms ‘philosophy of language’ and ‘semantics’ have a wide range of meanings. I intend the term ‘philosophy of language’ to be very general. By ‘semantics’ I generally mean ‘descriptive semantics.’

<sup>2</sup> Although the term *apoha* (exclusion) was well known before Dignāga, the ‘theory of exclusion’ seems to have been first developed by him. For pre-Dignāga references to *apoha* (exclusion) see the references in note 1. The close connection between the theory of exclusion and Dignāga’s epistemology (and ontology) is also well known. The specific nature of this connection, however, is not. For references, see note 3. That Dignāga recognises such a connection is clear from PS 5.1:

*na pramāṇāntaram śābdānumānāt tathā hi saḥ |*  
*kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate ||* [HATTORI (2000: 139 n. 3).]

For a translation of PSV ad PS 5.1–12 see: HATTORI (2000: 137–146). For an account of how the theory of exclusion developed in Dignāga’s work, see: FRAUWALLNER (1959), KATSURA (1983), and KATSURA (1991: 139).

<sup>3</sup> BRONKHORST (1999: 20), FRAUWALLNER (1959: 103), GANERI (2001), HAYES (1986), HAYES (1988: Chapters 4 and 5), HATTORI (1968), HATTORI (2000: 137), MATILAL (1990: 38), PIND (1991), PIND (1999: 324).

On my use of the term, ‘semantic value’ is supposed to be neutral to whatever it is that a semantic theory associates with the expressions of the language it interprets. It is, in other words, the ‘object’ that a semantic theory assigns to an expression. A ‘descriptive semantic theory’ is supposed to be a theory that: (1) assigns semantic values to expressions of a language; and (2) explains how the semantic values of complex expressions in that language are a ‘function’ of the semantic values of its components. One such explanation is that the semantic values of complex expressions are just the propositional content or thought expressed by that expression and are not, strictly speaking, a function of its parts. See: STALNAKER (1999: 535); HALE (1999: 684). Many Buddhist philosophers, however, seem to work with what is known as ‘compositional semantics’ that is, a semantic theory in which the semantic values of complex expressions are understood to be a function of their parts. For an interesting discussion of this see: GANERI (1996b), GANERI (2001). In this paper, my focus will be on (1).

<sup>4</sup> For example, Dharmakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti and Mokṣākaragupta all discuss the relationship between exclusion and inferential reasoning. See, for example, the numerous references to the PV and PVS in DUNNE (1999), JNV 201.03–201.04: *apohaḥ śabda-liṅgābhyām prakāśyata iti sthitiḥ ...*, the references to RNA in this paper and KAJIYAMA (1966). KATSURA (1986: 172 n. 8) points out that Dharmakīrti also used the theory of to discuss causation in HB 9\*.13–10\*.04 and MEINDERSMA (1991) has pointed to Dharmakīrti’s discussion of exclusion in PV 2.88–102, in Dharmakīrti’s ‘Proof of Another World’ (*para-loka-siddhi*) section. See also GANERI (1999b) and GILLON (1999) for a discussion of ‘exclusion’ and Dharmakīrti’s account of the semantics of the particle *eva*.

<sup>5</sup> The theory of exclusion (*apoha*) does not, however, directly provide an account of the content of non-conceptual states of awareness, e.g. purely perceptual states of awareness. For Ratnakīrti, the non-conceptual content of such states of awareness is described as a ‘multi-faceted non-duality’. See, for example, RNA (CAPV 129–144). Throughout this paper, the word ‘thought’ will be used to denote conceptual thought. The assertion that ‘conceptual content’ is ‘what our physical activity is directed towards’ may seem unwarranted. According to Ratnakīrti, however, there is sufficient similarity (and in some cases identity) between the objects about which we speak and think and the objects upon which we physically act. This has to do with his understanding of verbal, mental, and bodily activity and the objects of such activity.

<sup>6</sup> Like the word ‘meaning,’ the Sanskrit word *artha* has a broad semantic range and can be translated as ‘meaning’, ‘object’, ‘thing’, ‘function’ or ‘purpose’. In discussions which focus on the philosophy of language, the term is sometimes translated as ‘meaning-relatum’. I will generally translate the term ‘*artha*’ as ‘meaning’ or ‘object.’ On this use of the term, the meaning of a linguistic expression is whatever a competent speaker of a language understands from hearing that expression on a particular occasion of its use. The meaning of this expression will also be described in terms of the content of the state of awareness that is produced in the mind of such a speaker upon hearing it.

Like the early exclusion theorist Dignāga, Ratnakīrti focuses his attention on so-called ‘general nominal terms’ (*jāti-śabda*). General nominal terms (*jāti-śabda*) denote common noun phrases. Common examples used by Ratnakīrti are, ‘cow’, ‘pot’, ‘water’ and ‘flower’. It is in specifying a semantic theory for these sorts of terms that Ratnakīrti and almost all of the early Sanskrit philosophers of language focused their effort. Such terms are, therefore, usually the paradigmatic example of a word (*śabda*) in classical discussions of semantics. GANERI (1999a: 82–3), HATTORI (1968: 85–6 n. 129), HAYES (1988: 203) and MATILAL (1971: 35–7) all make this same point. On this view, even so-called ‘singular terms’ —proper names and definite descriptions—are taken to share the semantic properties of general nominal terms (*jāti-śabda*). Dignāga mentions five sorts of terms at PS 1.3d. See: HAYES (1988: 203), HATTORI (1968: 25 n. 26–28), and MATILAL (1971: 35). Incidentally, MATILAL (1971: 36 n. 19), contra Hattori, suggests that Dignāga’s classification has more to do with Prāsaṅgika’s five-fold classification of predicables (*viśeṣaṇa*) than with Patañjali’s classification of terms. For Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s discussion of this issue see: TSaP 1226–1228 ad TSa 1226.

According to Ratnakīrti, exclusion (*apoha*) also applies to parts of speech such as pronouns, ‘this’ (*ēsa*), nouns, ‘road’ (*panthā*), verbs, ‘leads’ (*upaṅsthā*), and proper names, ‘Śrughna’, and therefore to words (*śabda*) other than general nominal terms (*jāti-śabda*); see RNA 60.11–60.14: *ēsa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhata ity atrāpy apoho gamyata eva. apakṛta-pathāntarāpekṣayā ēsa eva* [.]. *śrughna-pratyānikāniṣṭa-sṭhānāpekṣayā śrughnam eva. araṇya-mārgavad vicchedābhāvād upatiṣṭhata eva. sārtha-dūtādi-vyavacchedena panthā eva iti pratipadam vyavacchedasya sulabhatvāt.* Also see JNV 206.06–14 and KAJIYAMA (1966: 57 n. 132), where KAJIYAMA traces the use of this example to Dharmottara. This passage has also been discussed in RAJA (1986: 186).

<sup>7</sup> RNA 58.01–03. On my reading, the ‘Introductory Discussion’ at RNA 58.01–59.03 is presented in the form of objections and responses by an opponent to the thesis, stated at RNA 58.01, that ‘exclusion is the meaning of words.’ This ‘opponent’ is not necessarily an actual historical opponent or group of opponents, although many of the ideas expressed in these passages can be associated with specific authors. In my view, Ratnakīrti uses previous (and well known) discussions and criticisms of exclusion to create an imagined opponent whose criticism provides the immediate philosophical (and rhetorical) context for his own discussion.

<sup>8</sup> The idea is, as GANERI describes it, that the semantic value of a general term ‘F’ is something like a quantifier-predicate expression such as ( $\forall$ ) ( $-Fy \rightarrow y \neq a$ ) which is, of course, logically equivalent to  $Fa$ . See GANERI (1999a: 118 n. 15).

<sup>9</sup> RNA 59.07–59.09: *yat tu goḥ pratītau na tad-ātmā parātmēti sāmāthyād apohaḥ paścān niścīyata iti vidhi-vādinām matam anyāpoha-pratītau vā sāmāthyād anyāpōdho ’vadhāryate iti pratiṣedha-vādinām matam.*

MOOKERJEE (1935) has famously argued that there are three distinct versions of the theory of exclusion: Negativism, Positivism, and Synthesism. He identifies Dignāga

and Dharmakīrti as ‘Negativists,’ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as ‘Positivists,’ and Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti as ‘Synthetists.’

In support of the possibility that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are ‘Negativists,’ KAJIYAMA (1966: 125 n. 338) quotes the following remark by Śāṅkaramiśra: *kīrti-dignāgādibhir gaur itīyam ity-ādi-vikalpe vidhi-sphuraṇam nāsty evāty uktam. jñānaśrīyā tu vidhi-sphuraṇam adhyupagamyā niśedha-sphuraṇam api tatra bhavantīti svikṛtam. yad āha tatrāpohaś tad-guṇatvena gamyata iti.* The last part of this remark is from JNV 206.

And although HAYES (1988) does not directly support or intend to support this view, there are a few places in his work where this interpretation is suggested. Against this identification, KATSURA (1986: 171 n. 6) quotes PVSV 62.24–63.16: *ayam arthāntara-vyāvṛtīyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate. śabda rthāntara-nivṛtī-viśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha.* The latter half of this verse is identified as PS 5.36d. For a discussion of PS 5.36d and Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of it see: PIND (1999). Also see RAJA (1986: 190 n. 11) who quotes a remark from the *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa. dignāgena viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-samarthanam nilōtpalādi-śabdā arthāntara-nivṛtī-viśiṣṭān arthān āhuḥ ity uktam.*

PIND (1999) has, in my view, shown that Dignāga should not be characterised as a Negativist. In addition to the passages referred to above he quotes fragments from Dinnāga’s Sāmp that are preserved in DNCV (611.21–612) in PIND (1999: 318 n. 3–8, 319); fragments from his Dvāś preserved in DNCV (548.25) quoted in PIND (1999: 321 n. 13); and PS 5.38 quoted in PIND (1999: 322). Interestingly, PIND also cites some passages which suggest that Dignāga is a sort of Sequentialist and more specifically a Negationist. PIND (1999: 324) refers to PS 5.34 quoted at TSa 965 and to PVA (265.23). For a discussion of Dharmakīrti’s position see DUNNE (1999: Chapter 3). In support of the identification of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as ‘Positivists’ see KATSURA (1986: 174). In qualified support of this view see SIDERITS (1986: 196).

<sup>10</sup> RNA 59.04–59.05: *nāsmābhir apoha-śabdena vidhir eva kevalo ‘bhipretaḥ. nāpy anya-vyāvṛtī-mātram. kim tv anyāpoha-viśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām ārthaḥ.*

<sup>11</sup> RNA 59.09–59.11: *prāthāmikasyāpi pratipatti-kramādarśanāt. na hi vidhiḥ pratīpadya kaścid arthāpattitaḥ paścād apoham avagacchati. apoham vā pratīpadyaṅyāpoḍham.*

<sup>12</sup> See next note: *tat-kāla eva* and *tulya-kālam eva.*

<sup>13</sup> RNA 59.13–59.16: *yathā nilōtpale niveśitād indīvara-śabdān nilōtpala-pratītau tat-kāla eva nilīma-sphuraṇam anivāryam tathā go-śabdād apy agavāpoḍhe niveśitād go-pratīpatau tulya-kālam eva viśeṣaṇatvād apoha-sphuraṇam anivāryam.* See also (60.14–60.18): *tasmād apoha-dharmaṇo vidhi-rūpasya śabdād avagatīḥ puṇḍarika-śabdād iva śvetima-viśiṣṭasya padmasya.*

<sup>14</sup> RNA 59.16–59.17: *yathā pratyakṣasya prasajya-rūpābhāvāgrahaṇam\* abhāva-vikalpōtpādāna-śaktir eva tathā vidhi-vikalpānām api tad-anurūpānuṣṭhāna-dāna-śaktir evābhāva-grahaṇam abhidhīyate.*

Note: In this passage the word *abhāva* (absence) is being used in two different senses. In its first two occurrences, *prasajya-rūpābhāva* (non-implicative form of absence) and *abhāva-vikalpa* (mental construction of absence) the term is being used in its more familiar sense. In the compound *abhāva-grahaṇam* (the grasping of absence), however, it is also being used in the sense of exclusion (*apoha*). This use of the term is not uncommon. See, for example, 2.1.2. This same passage is cited, in the same context, in BTBh (see KAJIYAMA (1966: 124)).

\* Note: Instead of *prasajya-rūpābhāvāgrahaṇam*, Mokṣākaragupta reads *prasajya-rūpābhāva-grahaṇam*; see SINGH (1988: 88.23)

<sup>15</sup> For Dharmakīrti’s discussion see HB 4\*.30–28\*.03.

<sup>16</sup> The following account is reconstructed from remarks made by Ratnakīrti in a number of different places in his work. The passages to which I refer in the notes are, therefore, taken out of their original context. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this essay to defend my reconstruction fully. I have, however, tried to indicate the textual basis for it in the notes.

<sup>17</sup> Briefly: Determination (*adhyavasāya*) is a capacity that constructing states of awareness have to determine that an object that is not directly manifest in a state of awareness as 'x' is present in that state of awareness as 'x'. Such an object is said to be the kind of object toward which we act. For a discussion of determination in Dharmakīrti see KATSURA (1993), who also discusses the 'pre-history' of this concept (but not necessarily the term) in *Abhidharma-kośa* 6.4 and 7 (KATSURA (1993: 69)), *Vāda-vidhi* (KATSURA (1993: 68) quotes FRAUWALLNER (1957: 18, 35–36)) and *Nyāya-mukha* (KATSURA (1993: 68)). KATSURA (1993: 37–38) also refers to a number of 'other names' for determination: *eka-pratyavamarsa-jñāna* in PV 1.73, 1.109, 1.119; *abheda-pratyavamarsana* in PV 3.162; *abhinnākāra-parāmarśa-pratyaya* in PVSV 50, *pratyakṣāsanna-vṛtti* in PV 3.289–3.395 and HB 2\*–3\*. See also PVV ad PV 2.3, where Manorathanandin uses expressions such as: *darśanōttara-kālam vikalpa-jñānam, pratyakṣa-prsthajas' ca vikalpo ... pramāna-vyāpārāmukārī, avayavy-ādi-viśaya*. See DUNNE (1999: 140. 180–181), KATSURA (1993), PANDEYA (1989: 3–4).

Determination (*adhyavasāya*) is described, famously, in PVin 2.8 as follows: *sva-pratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter ...*. See also JNV 227.23, PVV 25.10–12 and NBhū 140.25–26: *svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanād ...*; JNV (AP 226.02): *adhyavasāyas tv agrhīte 'pi pravartana-yogyatā-nimittaḥ*, JNV (AP 226.22): *adhyavasāyam ity apratibhāse 'pi pravṛtti-viśayī-kṛtam*, RNA (AS 65.25–65.26): *tad-adhyavasāyam iti ko 'rthaḥ. apratibhāse 'pi pravṛtti-viśayī-kṛtam iti yo 'rthaḥ*, RNA (KSA 73.09–73.18) from WOO (1999: 72): [73.09] *na. adhyavasāya-svarūpāparijñānāt. agrhīte 'pi vastuni mānasādi-pravṛtti-kārakatvaṁ vikalpasādhāyavasāyītvam. apratibhāse 'pi pravṛtti-viśayī-kṛtam adhyavaseyatvam. etac cādhyavaseyatvaṁ sva-lakṣaṇasyāiva yujyate, nānyasya, artha-kriyārthitvād arthi-pravṛtteḥ. [73.12] evaṁ cādhyavasāye sva-lakṣaṇasyāsphuraṇam eva. na ca tasyāsphurāṇe 'pi sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa pravṛtyi-ākṣepa-prasaṅgaḥ, pratiniyata-sāmagrī-prasūtāt pratiniyata-svākārāt pratiniyata-sakti-yogāt, pratiniyata evātat-rūpa-parāvṛtte 'pratīte 'pi pravṛtti-sāmarthyā-darśanāt. yathā sarvasyāsattve 'pi bijād anikurasyāvōpattiḥ, dṛṣṭasya niyata-hetu-phala-bhāvasya parikṣeptum āśakyatvāt. param bhāyēnārthena satī pratibandhe prāmāṇyam. anyathā tv aprāmāṇyam iti viśeṣaḥ.*

For parallel passages to this see: PVV 25.10–25.12; NBhū 140.25–140.26; JNV 226.01–226.07; RNA (CAPV 138.03–138.09); and RNA (AS 65.25–66.05). See also RNA (VyN 109.13–109.23): *yadi pratyakṣam sva-lakṣaṇa-viśayam ity ayoga-vyavacchedenōcyate, tadā siddha-sādhanam. anya-yoga-vyavacchedas tv asiddhaḥ, pratyakṣānumānādi-sarva-jñānānām grāhyāvaseya-bhedena viśaya-dvaividhyānatikramāt. yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate, tad grāhyam. yatra tu yataḥ pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣasya sva-lakṣaṇam grāhyam, adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam, atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta-sva-lakṣaṇa-mātrātmakam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ || tataś ca sāmīvyavahārīka-pramāṇāpekṣayā rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-samudāyātmakasya ghaṭasya rūpa-mātra-grahāṇe 'pi pratyakṣataḥ samudāya-siddhi-vyavasthā. tathāḥkasyātat-rūpa-parāvṛttasya grahāṇe 'pi sādhyasādhanā-sāmānyayor atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta-vastu-mātrātmanor ayoga-vyavacchedena viśaya-bhūtayor vyāpti-graho yukta eva. ata eva vikalpānām avastv eva viśayaḥ. vastu tu teṣām parokṣam evēty api durjñānam, sarva-vikalpānām adhyavaseyāpekṣayā vastu-viśayatvāt, śāstre 'pi tathāiva pratipādanāt ||*

For parallel passages see JNV (VC 12.16; 14.04–14.06; 13.03–13.06; 13.13; 14.01; 14.02); PVin 2.08–2.10; NVTṬ (136.17; 135.09–135.14) and RNA (CAPV 137.09–137.10): *agrhīte 'pi paratra pravṛty-ākṣepo 'dhyavaseyāh.*

From RNA (CAPV 133.24–135.04) Ratnakīrti considers 12 different interpretations of determination (*adhyavasāya*).

<sup>18</sup> On my use of the term, ‘non-conceptual content’ is whatever appears directly in a state of awareness. This usage preserves the possibility that an ‘object’ that appears directly in a state of awareness may have appeared indirectly in a previous state of awareness, e.g. a recalled object.

<sup>19</sup> E.g., RNA (VyN 109.17): *adhyavaseyam tu sāmānyam, atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta-sva-lakṣaṇa-mātrūtmakam.*

<sup>20</sup> For one of the more interesting examples see KAJIYAMA (1966: 58–59). This passage is based on JNV (VC 166.16–166.18). For a discussion of these two universals in Jaina texts, numerous references, and a discussion of JNV (VC 166.16–166.18) and RNA (CAPV 143.12–143.14) see BALCEROWICZ (1999). For Ratnakīrti’s use of *vijātīya-vyāvṛtta* see RNA 66.05–66.06 and RNA 66.13.

<sup>21</sup> RNA (CAPV 143.12–143.14): *... tasmāt, yathōrdhvam indriya-pratyakṣataḥ kṣaṇa-bhede pratīte 'py avidyā-vaśād ekatvādhyavasāyaḥ tathā tiryak sva-samvedana-pratyakṣeṇākākārābhede 'dhigate 'py avidyā-vaśād eva bhedāvasāya ||*

Also quoted in KAJIYAMA (1966: 59 n. 137).

Note: What I have referred to as a token can be perceived by sensory perception (*indriya-pratyakṣa*) while what I have referred to as a type is perceived by reflexive-perception (*sva-samvedana-pratyakṣa*). In contrast to these ‘universals,’ a particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) can be thought of as an object that is excluded both from those that belong to the same class and those that belong to a different class (*sajātīya-vijātīya-vyāvṛtta*). Ratnakīrti does not himself use this expression. It is, however, used by Mokṣakaragupta. See: BTBh (26) and KAJIYAMA (1966: 56).

<sup>22</sup> See previous note.

<sup>23</sup> This is, of course, not the only way to account for the individuation of *p*. One could, for example, individuate *p* by referring to its properties more generally. For Dharmakīrti’s ‘effect-centred’ account of the individuation of particulars see DUNNE (1999) and KATSURA (1991). DUNNE’s (1999: Chapter 4) discussion of ‘property-*svabhāva*’ and ‘nature-*svabhāva*’ also provides references and resources for thinking about Dharmakīrti’s view of this. See especially DUNNE (1999: 181–183, 187 n. 37, 198, 228–231).

\*Although my account makes use of set-theoretic vocabulary, it is not intended to be completely consistent with it. For a useful discussion of set theoretic vocabulary see CHIERCHIA–MCCONNELL–GINET (1990). For a discussion of what he (appropriately) calls a ‘trope-theoretic’ account, see GANERI (2001: Chapter 4).

<sup>24</sup> It is important to note that this set *S* consists of all of the causes and potential effects that belong to this *p* and not *just* those that belong to this *p*.

<sup>25</sup> In discussions of the theory of exclusion, ‘non-*p*’ is sometimes taken to be a term negation of ‘*p*’. In my view, however, ‘non-’ need not be interpreted so strictly. See, for instance, the examples discussed in 3.1 and my discussion in this section where ‘non-*p*’ means something like ‘not like ‘*p*’ in a/the relevant (contextually dependent) way and therefore, ‘other than *p*’. If this phrase defines the objects picked out by the dissimilarity-class non-*S*, the objects picked out by the similarity-class ‘like-*S*’ would be picked out by the phrase ‘like *p* in a/the relevant (contextually dependent) way.’ A precise interpretation of ‘picked out’ cannot be determined from the texts being discussed.

<sup>26</sup> RNA (KSA 73.20–73.24): ... *adhyavaseyo viṣayo bhavaty eva. kṣaṇa-grahaṇe santāna-niścayavat rūpa-mātra-grahaṇe rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparsātmaka-ghaṭa-niścayavac ca ...* See also RNA (KSA 74.07–74.12), PVV ad PV 2.3; KATSURA (1993: 67) briefly mentions Dharmakīrti's use of this example; RNA (KSA 74.07–74.13): *atha teṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ eva viśeṣāṇāṃ adṛśatvāt sadṛśa-sāmagrī-prastūtatvāt sadṛśa-kārya-kāritvād iti pratyaśattyā eka-viśeṣa-grāhakaṃ pratyaśsam atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta-mātre niścayam janayad atad-rūpa-parāvṛtta-viśeṣa-mātrasya vyavasthāpakam. yathāka-sāmagrī-pratibaddha-rūpa-mātra-grāhakaṃ pratyaśsam ghaṭe niścayam janayad ghaṭa-grāhakaṃ vyavasthāpyate. anyathā ghaṭo 'pi ghaṭa-santāno 'pi pratyaśsato na sīdhyet, sarvātmanā grahaṇābhāvāt tad-eka-deśa-grahaṇam tv atad-rūpa-parāvṛtte 'pi aviśiṣṭam. yady evam anenāva krameṇa sarvasya viśeṣasya viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvavad vyāpti-pratīpatir apy astu ||* See also RNA 65.26–66.03, RNA (VN109.18–109.19): *tataś ca sāmnyavahārika-pramāṇāpekṣayā rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparsa-samudāyātmakasya ghaṭasya rūpa-mātra-grahaṇe 'pi pratyaśsataḥ samudāya-siddhi-vyavasthā, and PVSV 7.14–7.15 quoted in Woo (1999:195).*

<sup>27</sup> RNA 62.18: *kālpānika-bhedāśrayas tu dharmā-dharmi-vyavahāra iti prasādhitam śāstre.* See: JNV 212.26–213.01.

<sup>28</sup> RNA 65.10–65.12: {*sva-rūpavān ghaṭa ity-ādivat gotva-jātimān piṇḍa iti*} *parikalpitam bhedam upādāya viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvasyēṣṭatvād {ago-vyāvṛttānubhava-bhāvītvād gaur ayam iti vyavahārasya}*. See: JNV 225.01–225.09.

<sup>29</sup> RNA 63.10–63.16: *saritaḥ pāre gāvaś carantīti gavādi-sabdāt sāsna-sṛṅga-lāṅgūlādāyo 'kṣarākāra-parikaritaḥ sajātīya-bhedāparāmarśanāt sampiṇḍita-prāyāḥ pratibhāsante. na ca tad eva sāmānyam. {varṇākṛty akṣarākāra-sūnyam gotvam hi kathyate.}\* tad eva ca sāsna-sṛṅgādi-mātram akhila-vyaktāv atyanta-vilakṣaṇam api sva-lakṣaṇena ekī-kṛiyamāṇam sāmānyam iti ucyate tādṛśasya bāhyasya aprāpter bhrūntir evāsau keśa-pratibhāsavat.* See JNV 220.02–220.08 and JNV 220.14–220.15. For the passage marked with \* see PV 3.147.

<sup>30</sup> RNA 66.08–66.09: {*atra prayogaḥ.*} *yad vācakaṃ tat sarvam adhyavasitātatad-rūpa-parāvṛtta-vastu-mātra-gocaram. {yathēha kūpe jalām iti vacanam\*. vācakaṃ cēdam gavādi-sabda-rūpam iti svabhāva-hetuḥ.}* Note: For other references to this example see KRASSER (1991: 57).

<sup>31</sup> RNA 60.06: {*tasmāt*} *eka-piṇḍa-darśana-pūrvako yaḥ sarva-vyakti-sādhāraṇa iva bahir-adhyasto vikalpa-buddhy-ākaraḥ {atratyām gaur iti saṃketa-karaṇe na itaretarāśraya-doṣaḥ}.*

<sup>32</sup> RNA 63.20–63.21: {*yataḥ*} *pūrva-piṇḍa-darśana-smaraṇa-sahakāriṇātīricyamāna-viśeṣa-pratyaya-janikā sāmagrī nirviśayam sāmānya-vikalpam upādāyati.* See also JNV 221.11–221.14.

<sup>33</sup> Although the term 'semantic value' (*vācya*) is not explicitly used in these passages, it is clear from context that this is what Ratnakīrti is referring to. Elsewhere, he describes this collection as 'an object that is characterised by its exclusion from others and excluded from those which belong to a different class' (*anyābhāva-viśiṣṭo vijātīya-vyāvṛtto 'rithaḥ*), as 'a thing-in-general that is determined and excluded from those which belong to a different class' (*adhyavasita-vijātīya-vyāvṛtta-vastu-mātra*) and as 'a determined external object' (*adhyavasita-bāhya-viśayatvam*); see RNA 66.05–66.06, RNA 66.13 and RNA 66.20.

A general term such as 'cow' expresses the fact that, in a particular context, a specific conglomeration of components brings about a single set of effects as a result of those components causally supporting each other in virtue of their 'proximity'.

<sup>34</sup> RNA 63.11: *sajātīya-bhedāparāmarśana* from PASSAGE 1.

<sup>35</sup> RNA 66.05–66.06, 66.13.

<sup>36</sup> Strictly speaking there is not a single opponent. I have grouped together objections raised by a variety of opponents for the sake of brevity and clarity. For concerns about ‘generality’ see RNA 63.20–63.22, for ‘specificity’ see RNA 63.26–63.28, for both see RNA 64.07–64.08. To these objections could be added concerns about the awareness of ‘continuity’ or ‘consistency’ (*anuvṛtti-pratyaya*). See, for example, RNA 64.15 ff..

<sup>37</sup> See: RNA 65.26–66.03: *yady api viśvam agrhītam tathāpi vikalpasya niyata-sāmagrī-prastūtatvena niyatākāratayā niyata-saktiṅvāt niyatāiva jalādau pravṛtīḥ dhūmasya parokṣāgni-jñāna-jananavat. niyataviśayā hi bhāvāḥ pramāṇa-pariniṣṭhīta-svabhāvā na śakti-sānkarya-paryanuyoga-bhāḥ. tasmāt tad-adhyavasāyītvam ākāra-viśeṣa-yogāt tat-pravṛtti-janakatvam.* See RNA (KSA 74.07–74.12) quoted earlier and RNA (CAPV 137.09–137.10).

<sup>38</sup> By this term, I simply mean the view that semantic value is itself a mind-dependent internal object.

<sup>39</sup> Ratnakīrti does not use the word *āntara* (internal) to refer to this object. He uses the word *buddhy-ākāra* (facet of awareness) which, in this context, clearly refers to an internal object. The word *āntara* (internal) is, however, used in a similar context by Jñānaśrīmitra.

<sup>40</sup> RNA 60.20–60.21: *vidhi-sabdena ca yathādhyavasāyam atad-rūpa-parāvṛtto bāhyo ’rtho ’bhīmataḥ yathā-pratibhāsam buddhy-ākāras’ ca. {tatra bāhyo ’rtho ’dhyavasāyad eva śabda-vācya vyavasthāpyate. na sva-lakṣaṇa-parisphūrtyā. pratyakṣavad deśa-kālāvasthā-niyata-pravyakta-sva-lakṣaṇāḥ. See also JNV 208.11–202.12.*

<sup>41</sup> RNA 60.06; see PASSAGE 3.

<sup>42</sup> RNA 65.15–65.24: *tad evam vidhir eva śabdārthaḥ. sa ca bāhyo ’rtho buddhy-ākāras’ ca vivakṣitaḥ. tatra na buddhy-ākārasya tattvataḥ samvṛtyā vā vidhi-niṣedhau sva-samvedana-pratyakṣa-gamyatvāt anadhyavasāyāc ca. nāpi tattvato bāhyasyāpi vidhi-niṣedhau tasya śābde pratyaye ’pratibhāsanāt. ata eva sarva-dharmānām tattvato anabhilāpyatvam pratibhāsādhyavasāyābhāvāt. tasmād bāhyasya eva samvṛtau vidhi-niṣedhau. anyathā samvyavahāra-hāni-prasaṅgāt.* See: JNV 230.19–230.27. For an interesting discussion of *samvṛta* at PV 2.3 and *samvṛtīḥ* at PV 1.68–1.69 see: KATSURA (1993: 67). For PVSV ad PV 1.68–1.69 see DUNNE (1999: 394).

<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, this conclusion seems to be much more important to Jñānaśrīmitra’s discussion of *apoha*. See KATSURA (1986: 176) for a discussion of JNV 231.21–231.22 where PVSV 92.23–93.01 is quoted.

<sup>44</sup> For an account of ‘error’ in Dharmakīrti see DUNNE (1999: 86 n. 8; 209 n. 59; 347–350), KATSURA (1984), KATSURA (1993: 71–72).

<sup>45</sup> RNA (CAPV 137.03–137.04): *sāstre ca atasmims tad-grahāt sva-pratibhāse ’narthe ’rthādhyavasāyād drśya-vikalpyayor ekī-karaṇād bhrāntir uktā.* For a parallel passage see PVin 2.1c. See also TILLEMANS (1999: 209–210), where he refers to this as ‘unconscious error’ and cites (with a translation) PVin 2.2 and NBṬ ad NB 1.12.

<sup>46</sup> Importantly, the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), i.e. the non-conceptual content that is the basis for the construction of these objects, is not erroneous. What is erroneous is any construction that is based on it. For cases where non-conceptual content could be considered erroneous see DUNNE (1999: 107–108; 209 n. 59), where he discusses PV 1.58 and PV 3.288.

<sup>47</sup> RNA (CAPV 137.12) *ayam (adhyavasāyāḥ) eva samāsāras tat-kṣayo mokṣa iti.* For related remarks by Dharmakīrti see DUNNE (1999: 351; Chapter 5).

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- PS 5 = Dignāga: *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Chapter 5. See: HAYES (1988).
- PSV = Dignāga: *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti*, Chapter 1. See: HATTORI (1968).
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