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PREPARING TO BECOME ROMAN — THE 'ROMANIZATION' OF DEIOTARUS IN CICERO

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It is a great honour to be invited to contribute to a *Festschrift* for Professor Naudé. Many years ago I had the privilege of being one of his students in the University of the Witwatersrand and will always remember his meticulous analysis of the sources and his judicious assessment of modern opinion as he guided us through problems in ancient history. In 1960 he delivered a lecture on 'The Romanization of the Less-Advanced Peoples in the Roman Empire'.¹ I hope that this small contribution to the theme will be of interest to him.

Sir Ronald Syme² once remarked on the irony of 'a man of Pergamum leading the armies of the Roman people four generations after the vaunted victory of the West at Actium'. He had a cousin with the innocuous Latin name of C. Julius Severus³ (although the element *C. Julius* points to an ancestor receiving citizenship from Caesar or Augustus). However, suspicion is aroused when we are told that Severus had a cousin called King Alexander⁴ and that his brother was Julius Amyntianus: Amyntas was a famous name in Galatia. In fact Julius Severus, a consul at Rome and a governor of Lower Germany under Antoninus Pius, used the title 'first of the Greeks' and specified that he was a descendant of King Deiotarus and of two tetrarchs, both named Amyntas.

Who these were appears not to have been established. But the son of a King Brigatus (whose name has not survived) and a certain Pylaemenes, son of King Amyntas, are recorded as participating in the imperial cult a century earlier under Tiberius in Ancyra (Ankara) in Galatia.⁵

Members of Galatian royal families were among the chief officiants at the Augusteum in Ancyra at the beginning of the imperial period: their descendants are the equals of Westerners or Italians in the upper echelons of the empire a century later. Little survives about such families apart from lists of offices and honours on inscriptions. The family of the Herods in Judaea affords an exception, due to the survival of Josephus (although

it does not appear to have featured significantly in the second century A.D.). But for the beginnings of the rise of royal families into the Roman hierarchy there is a unique document, Cicero's speech for Julius Severus' ancestor, Deiotarus: it was delivered nearly a century before members of the Galatian royal families are recorded as officiating at the Sebasteum in Ancyra.

The trial of Deiotarus has not been regarded as of any great importance in the context of Rome's civil wars and has not received much attention in standard histories of the fall of the republic. Even Cicero referred to his speech in defence of the Galatian client king rather disparagingly; he described it as a small gift, homespun, rather like the presents the king used to give himself.⁶ However, the great interest of the speech to modern ears is that it shows how a prominent Roman in the closing years of the first century B.C. regarded a foreign king enjoying a client relationship with Rome. In this article the way in which Cicero refers to the king in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* will be studied as an early example of the Roman attitude to certain foreign rulers which made their inclusion in the Roman *res publica* as regular as it became in the early imperial period. Before Cicero's actual descriptions of Deiotarus are analysed it is necessary to understand the precise issue at stake in the trial so that it can be placed in its proper historical perspective.

When Caesar left Alexandria in 47 B.C. he went to Asia Minor, where Mithridates' son, Pharnaces, had defeated his legate, Domitius Calvinus, who was supported by Deiotarus, tetrarch in Galatia and king of Armenia Minor. In the civil war Deiotarus had fought for Pompey, but after Pharsalus he had returned to his kingdom and actively assisted the cause of Caesar. He had lent Calvinus two legions (*BAlex.* 34. 4), but was afraid that Caesar might take reprisals for his loyalty to Pompeius when he arrived from Egypt. Accordingly, when Caesar reached the border of Galatia, Deiotarus met him there in the garb of a suppliant (67. 1). Caesar pardoned him, hurrying on to deal with Pharnaces, taking a legion of the king's and all his cavalry with him (68. 2). After his famous victory over Pharnaces at Zela in August 47, Caesar returned through Galatia where he accepted hospitality from Deiotarus. This was when Deiotarus was alleged to have attempted the murder of Caesar. And it was at this time that Caesar made a redistribution of some of the kingdoms of Asia Minor, depriving Deiotarus of some territory in the process (78. 3).

The trial of Deiotarus did not take place till two years later. Its immediate occasion can be found in dynastic disputes between the tetrarchs of Galatia. But why should Caesar have consented to try the case? In 45 he was engaged in an exceedingly heavy postwar programme, and it would have been easy for him to have brushed the whole affair aside. The defence, too, was handled by Cicero, the acknowledged chief orator of the day. Var-

ious proposals have been put forward. Heitland⁷ suggests that Deiotarus was suspected of disloyal intentions during the war in Africa. 'This was probably the reason why the present charge was brought to a hearing. The real danger of Deiotarus was that Caesar wanted an excuse to get rid of a chieftain whom he mistrusted.' Niese⁸ proposed the view that in 45 Caesar was less favourably disposed to Deiotarus than before. Petersson⁹ states that 'the real difficulty for the defence consisted in Caesar's well-known hostility to the old Pompeian and in the fact that Deiotarus could hardly have been expected to love the man who had shorn him of power'.

In the conditions of 45 Heitland's suggestion of revenge for disloyalty does not carry much conviction. It is not so much that Caesar was above such considerations, as that there was no advantage to be gained from indulging them. Niese's proposal is similarly personal and does not explain much. Even Petersson advances a personal factor, the hatred the two men felt for each other. No doubt this element in the situation must be taken into account,¹⁰ but if it is to be regarded as the main motive behind the trial, the only outcome which could have satisfied Caesar would have been the condemnation of Deiotarus. Should the king have been condemned and put to death Galatia would have been left in a very unsettled position. Internal dissension among minor tetrarchs would have broken out in an important eastern region at the very time that Caesar was planning an expedition against Parthia.¹¹

It is in fact in the situation in Galatia and in the East as a whole that the explanation for the holding of the trial is to be found. Cicero¹² had experienced the value of Deiotarus' assistance during his governorship of Cilicia when there was a threat of a Parthian invasion. The king's domains formed a vital link in the chain of Rome's defence of the East. His power had spread — by what means it is unnecessary to inquire — until he was virtually in sole control of Galatia.¹³

Caesar's intentions towards Deiotarus in 45 and the object of the trial can be further illuminated by the way in which Caesar had dealt with the king in 47. At their interview before Zela¹⁴ Caesar had censured Deiotarus' support for Pompey at Pharsalus.¹⁵ Deiotarus replied with an ingenious plea of humility. Who was he to decide in the civil dissensions of the Roman people?¹⁵ Caesar made a typical answer. Deiotarus was in the wrong, but he was prepared to forgive him. Caesar's magnanimity was rarely displayed without producing material advantage to himself. At this particular juncture Pharnaces and a difficult battle lay ahead. 'Clementia' would gain a much-needed and a useful auxiliary in a situation calling for speed and military resourcefulness. It was in this way that Caesar saw fit to handle Deiotarus when the king was in his power and revenge would have been easy. Policy prevailed, and Deiotarus had been cowed into loyalty. The situation in 45 was not entirely dissimilar. Heitland indeed refers to it: 'The

real danger of Deiotarus was that Caesar wanted an excuse to get rid of a chieftain whom he mistrusted and (we may add) whose dominions might form the centre of a rebellion while he was himself engaged in the Parthian War'.¹⁷ While Caesar had been making preparations for his expedition against Dacia and Parthia, a report of a revolt against Caesar in Syria had reached Rome. The Pompeian Q. Caecilius Bassus had taken control of the province and was even said to have invited Parthian intervention.¹⁸ Cicero informs us that one of the charges laid against Deiotarus at his trial was that he had sent assistance to Bassus.¹⁹ Cicero played this allegation down and attempted to brush it aside. But Caesar could well have believed that Deiotarus was assisting Bassus.²⁰ What happened to the king personally was of far less importance than the securing of a settled Galatia and Armenia Minor before the expedition. The trial in 45 was being used to deal with this threat to Caesar's interest in the East.

Further light on the matter would have been provided by the verdict. Unfortunately this is not known. The possibility of condemnation cannot be ruled out. However, most scholars have felt that judgement was deferred. The inference is based on a passage in the *Second Philippic*, where Antony is being alleged to have forged 'acta' of Caesar's. In it Cicero accused Antony of having accepted a bribe from Deiotarus to produce an enactment of Caesar confirming Deiotarus' possession of the territories which Caesar had taken from him in 47, but which the king had later reoccupied.²¹ Cicero pointed out how very unlikely such an enactment on the part of Caesar was. Caesar had never considered any request made on behalf of Deiotarus fair.²² If this particular statement and the whole tenor of the context can be taken to include a reference to the trial of 45, it is clear that Deiotarus was not fully rehabilitated. At the least Caesar must have expressed strong disapproval of the king.²³ The best solution is that Caesar postponed his decision. He would have done this in such terms as to make it clear to Deiotarus that the slightest cause for suspicion would immediately result in his downfall. Caesar would then be able to assess the situation on the spot as he passed through to Parthia, and make his arrangements as best suited him.

These were the main considerations which Cicero would have to bear in mind as he spoke for the defence — the suspicion of disloyalty to Caesar and the pro-republican leanings being exhibited by Deiotarus. A further factor requiring discussion before Cicero's presentation of the king can be examined is Cicero's alleged use of 'rex' as a criticism of Caesar. Petersson²⁴ is of the opinion that many passages in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* 'read like an indictment of the great dictator'. The introduction 'by implication condemns Caesar both for conducting the trial under the circumstances described and for holding the trial at all'. Cicero does indeed state that he is disturbed by the holding of the trial in the dictator's house (2. 5). But the real point

of his criticism is that his oratory could not soar in such circumstances: it needed the enthusiasm of the crowds of the forum. Now everything depended upon Caesar's impartiality (2. 7). No doubt Cicero was inwardly angry at the humiliation of having to plead in Caesar's house, but his words do not show this. On the contrary he uses the circumstance to flatter Caesar by declaring that he knew that he would be a fair judge, even in his own cause (2. 4). Cicero's 'implicit condemnation' of Caesar becomes a compliment placing the dictator in a morally superior position. In discussing 3. 8-10, Petersson states that 'Cicero's criticism of the dictator's rule is again visible through the compliments of the pleader'. The compliments concern Caesar's 'fidem et constantiam et clementiam', and there is high praise of his military achievements (4. 12). These compliments can be paralleled in Cicero's other Caesarian speeches,²⁵ and in fact there is scant relevance to 'the dictator's rule'. Referring to 12. 33-34, Petersson argues that the contents of the reports concerning Caesar's unpopularity at Rome which Blesamius, a member of the king's embassy, was sending to Galatia could not be charged to Deiotarus, and might readily have been omitted by Cicero. They contain in a few lines a description of the very circumstances that caused the assassination of Caesar. The fact is that Cicero not only repeats the reports but professes in an exceedingly weak manner to explain away their disparaging character. It must be admitted that Caesar's unpopularity was a very delicate topic to discuss before Caesar himself. Cicero brushes the charges²⁶ aside as malicious town gossip.²⁷ He then demolishes the charge that Caesar was a tyrant with great energy. It is true that Cicero evades the real point concerning the statue, that it pointed to regal pretensions on the part of Caesar. But what else could he have done? We do indeed know from other sources that Cicero was greatly delighted by these signs of Caesar's unpopularity.²⁸ But this must not be taken to interpret the discussion in the speech. In it Caesar is justified completely once again.

Petersson regards the stress on the term 'rex' throughout the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* as the final criticism of Caesar. 'King.' The word permeates the speech, contrasting Caesar and Deiotarus, to be sure, and yet Caesar was publicly addressed as king, regal intentions were attributed to him, and it was because of them, whether genuine or not, that he was to die.' Again this reference to the circumstances of Caesar's murder must not be allowed to interpret Cicero's present language in an unwarranted sense. It must be understood within the context of the trial itself. Cicero was defending a client prince. It was a primary object of such dependants upon the Roman state to become legally recognized as kings. The title of 'rex' gave them increased standing among their neighbours, and was in itself regarded as a great honour.²⁹ It was at Rome that the name of king was hated, but not elsewhere.³⁰ The emphasis on Deiotarus' regal status

was intended to underline his honourable position, not to criticize Caesar indirectly. Caesar and Cicero knew each other well, and Caesar would have been the first to detect such innuendos. They would have aroused a resentment unfavourable to the cause Cicero was pleading, a risk Cicero was hardly likely to take in the face of Caesar's known dislike of Deiotarus. 'Rex' in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* is to be understood in its technical, non-Roman associations.

The political background of the trial is now clear. Cicero was defending Deiotarus before a judge who was personally hostile to him and who had strong reason to suspect that he was engaged in subversive activities in an important war area. Cicero had to establish his client's innocence on the last charge, and attempt to persuade Caesar that Deiotarus would be loyal to him. Accordingly he presents the king in the best possible light to win over Caesar's sympathy.³¹ It is the way in which he does this that is so significant. In himself Deiotarus was certainly not a sympathetic character, nor could he be plausibly credited with laudable qualities. As ruler of a not completely Hellenized area of central Asia Minor he had extended his influence by the methods of naked aggression, not even scrupling to murder his own daughter and son-in-law. Niese is kind to Deiotarus' record when he states that he was superior to the surrounding tetrarchs only in energy and cunning.³²

Yet in spite of all this Cicero praises Deiotarus as if he were a true Roman. 'Nota tibi est hominis probitas, C. Caesar, noti mores, nota constantia. Cui porro, qui modo populi Romani nomen audiuit, Deiotari integritas, gravitas, uirtus, fides non audita est?' (6. 16). Cato could easily be substituted for the client prince. Deiotarus was incapable of thinking barbarously (9. 25). The king is a model of all the virtues, even one not normally associated with kings, but with ordinary citizens: 'omnes sunt in illo rege uirtutes, quod te, Caesar, ignorare non arbitror, sed praecipue singularis et admiranda frugalitas: etsi hoc uerbo scio laudari regem non solere' (9. 26).³³ Deiotarus exhibits the proper pride of a Roman nobleman.³⁴ His character is such that it merits approval from even the philosophically minded Roman: 'Quid de uirtute eius dicam, de magnitudine animi, grauitate, constantia? quae omnes docti atque sapientes summa, quidam etiam bona sola esse dixerunt ...' (13. 37).

Deiotarus is the thorough Roman not only on account of his excellent character. His way of life is Roman. Due allowance must be made for the Roman habit of describing foreign institutions in Roman terms, but the effect in this instance is cumulative. A Roman legal phrase appears right at the beginning of the speech: 'Dico pro capite fortunisque regis' (1. 1; cf. *Lig.* 11. 33). Deiotarus' home is made to sound very Roman.³⁵ It was unthinkable that he could commit so un-Roman an act as dance naked at a banquet.³⁶ In fact the Romans living in Asia Minor regarded him as a

typical Roman householder: 'sed tamen quicquid a bellis populi Romani uacabat, cum hominibus nostris consuetudines, amicitias, res rationesque iungebat, ut non solum tetrarches nobilis, sed etiam optimus pater familias et diligentissimus agricola et pecuarius haberetur' (9. 27).

Deiotarus' friendship with many prominent Romans is stressed throughout the speech. His lavish hospitality is an aspect of this. Cicero can appeal to Caesar as Deiotarus' 'hospes':³⁷ in this respect Caesar and Deiotarus are placed on equal terms. The king's connection with Pompey is described as most intimate,³⁸ and Cicero shows no restraint when listing the grounds of his friendship with him. 'Laboro equidem regis Deiotari causa, quocum mihi amicitiam res publica conciliauit, hospitium uoluntas utriusque coniunxit, familiaritatem consuetudo attulit, summam uero necessitudinem magna eius officia in me et in exercitum meum effecerunt' (14. 39). Cicero finds it quite natural to accept Deiotarus as a friend of the great at Rome.³⁹ There is no suggestion of apology for a pardonable fondness for an inferior foreigner.

Most revealing is Cicero's handling of the political side of Deiotarus' actions. The king, if no less, is no more guilty than the Pompeians at Rome. 'Errore communi lapsus est' (3. 10).⁴⁰ 'Error' is the word which Cicero applies to Ligarius.⁴¹ Cicero quotes a letter which Caesar had sent to Deiotarus to reassure him of his goodwill after the civil war (14. 38). He then hastens to add that he had also received one in almost identical language: 'Memini enim isdem fere uerbis ad me te scribere meque tuis litteris bene sperare non frustra esse iussum'.⁴² In fact Deiotarus' choice of side in the civil war is classed with that of the most prominent Romans of his day. It is not regarded as a misjudgement on the part of a foreign adherent, who had sent aid to the wrong master. It is important to note that Deiotarus' foreign nationality is alluded to only once in this connection, to show that his action was actually even less reprehensible from Caesar's point of view than that of the Roman Pompeians. The king could at least plead faulty information. 'Is rex ... isdem rebus est perturbatus, homo longinquus et alienigena, quibus nos in media re publica nati semperque uersati' (3. 10). It is in this connection, as has already been shown,⁴³ that the stress on Deiotarus' title of 'rex' is to be understood as a mark of Roman approval and favour for the king. The title had been ratified both by the senate and by Caesar,⁴⁴ and Cicero regards this as an important element in a correct estimate of the king's worth.

All these aspects give an overwhelming impression of Deiotarus as a Roman. Cicero endows him not merely with Roman qualities, but even with those of the best type of Roman.⁴⁵ Due allowance must be made for exaggeration and rhetoric. But Cicero's characterization of Deiotarus in the *Pro Rege Deiotaro* cannot be dismissed as a mere oratorical device. Far from contradicting it, Cicero's references to Deiotarus in other works

greatly enforce it. The terminology used in other speeches probably reflects current 'officialese', as *Har. Resp.* 13. 29: 'quem unum habemus in orbe terrarum fidelissimum huic imperio atque amantissimum nostri nominis'.⁴⁶ This official style of address appears in a letter to the senate,⁴⁷ and notably in one to Cato: 'Deiotarus, cui non sine causa plurimum semper et meo et tuo et senatus iudicio tributum est, uir cum benevolentia et fide erga populum Romanum singulari tum praesenti magnitudine et animi et consilii ...' (*Fam.* 15. 4. 5). How natural it was for Cicero to accept Deiotarus' friendship is seen especially in certain letters to Atticus (*Att.* 5. 17. 3; 18. 4; 20. 9). From these we learn that Cicero had left his son and nephew in Deiotarus' care during his governorship of Cilicia when there was a threat of a Parthian invasion. We also find Deiotarus caring for a certain Pinarius, who was ill, and whom Atticus had commended to Cicero (6. 1. 23). The note of extravagant praise is absent from these letters, but the reality of the friendship is no less apparent. A most revealing incident in Cicero's friendship with Deiotarus is reported in *Div.* 2. 37. 78-79, where Cicero and his brother are talking about augury. At this particular point they argue about Deiotarus' views. They must obviously have discussed the subject with the king at some time or other. Cicero cannot be accused of having an axe to grind here: the incident shows that his friendship with the king embraced their intellectual interests and that he accepted his views as being of equal value with his own.⁴⁸

These references from Cicero's other works, though naturally quieter than the language of the *Pro Rege Deiotaro*, strengthen the impression which the speech makes on the modern reader. Unfortunately no other work of Cicero's is closely parallel to this one. The *Pro Archia* and the *Pro Balbo* do not fall into quite the same category. Works by other Romans would have been instructive. How, for example, did Brutus describe Deiotarus in his speech on the king's behalf before Caesar?⁴⁹ Only its oratorical qualities have been noted by the ancients.⁵⁰ Cicero's speech is the only surviving one of its kind. Whether it gives a correct or objective portrait of the king is not the point at issue here. What is of interest is that a notable Roman could so describe a foreign princeling at all. As described by a modern statesman Deiotarus would have appeared in quite different dress. But at Rome things were otherwise. Under the empire client kings were drawn into close contact with Roman imperial circles.⁵¹ Many received Roman citizenship, and some even sat in the senate, becoming virtually indistinguishable from Italians and provincials. The interest of Cicero's *Pro Rege Deiotaro* is that it shows the beginning of this process under the late republic and provides evidence of the extent to which an 'alienigena' could be regarded as a Roman even then.

NOTES

1. Published in *Kulturelle Kontaktsituasies* (Communications of the University of South Africa B 11 [1980]), 5-17.
2. *Greeks Invading the Roman Government, 7th Brademas Lecture* [1982], 19 = *Roman Papers* 4 (1988), 11. Cf. Tacitus (1958), 510ff. He was referring to C. Julius Quadratus Bassus (*AE* '34, 176; *PIR*² I 508) commanding an army in Dacia under Trajan.
3. *IGR* 3, 173ff.; *ILS* 8826; *PIR*² I 573.
4. *PIR*² A 500 = I 136. R.D. Sullivan, *ANRW* 2, 8 (1977), 937, suggests that he was a king in Cilicia.
5. *OGIS* 533.
6. 'Sed ego hospiti ueteri et amico munusculum mittere uolui leuidense crasso filo, cuius modi ipsius solent esse munera.' Although, as M. Gelzer (*RE* 7A [1939], 1026), points out, the depreciation may not have been entirely unintentional, since the letter (*Fam.* 9. 12) was written to a noted Caesarian — Dolabella.
7. W.E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic* 3 (1909), 361.
8. *RE* 4 (1903), 2401ff.
9. T. Petersson, *Cicero: A Biography* (1920), 508.
10. Even Cicero admits Caesar's anger with Deiotarus (cf. *Deiot.* 3. 8).
11. Suet. *Jul.* 44. 3.
12. Cf. e.g. *Fam.* 15. 1. 6; *Att.* 5. 18. 2; *Deiot.* 14. 39.
13. *BAlex.* 67. 1. Strabo 12. 5. 1, par. 567 refers to the period after Caesar's death, but is still relevant. For the earlier period and Deiotarus' acquisition of Lesser Armenia, cf. F.E. Adcock, *JRS* 27 (1937) 12 ff. Cf. generally D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (1950), 373f; 1237; 413; 1267; H.-W. Ritter, *Historia* 19 (1970) 124ff.; A.N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (1984), 228; 299ff.
14. Cf. above, page 88.
15. On Deiotarus' legal obligations, cf. P.C. Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic* (1908), 18f. There was no binding alliance — the senate 'requested' assistance from the king (*Cic. Phil.* 11. 12. 31) in 43 against Antony. At Pharsalus Deiotarus had acted as an 'amicus' (*Deiot.* 5. 13), and was not under compulsion.
16. *BAlex.* 67. 2.
17. o.c. (n.7), 361.
18. *Cic. Att.* 14. 9. 3.
19. 'At misit ad Caeciliam nescio quem; sed eos, quos misit, quod ire noluerunt, in uincla coniecit' (*Deiot.* 8. 23).
20. Deiotarus' client relationships with individual Romans fall outside the scope of this article. He had established connections with nearly all the generals sent to the East from Sulla onwards (*Cic. Phil.* 11. 13. 33). Naturally the most important of these was Pompey, but other figures like Cicero and Brutus (Magie, o.c. [n.13], 396; 413; 1267) must not be disregarded. Deiotarus was also prepared to act the client to Caesar at times, a fact which Cicero emphasises in *Deiot.* 5. 13f. Nothing definite is known of his connections with Bassus, though the latter may have been able to persuade the King that the old 'Pompeian' cause had re-asserted itself in the East, and that Caesar's power was on the wane. One might even ask whether the juxtaposition of the names of Bassus and Deiotarus in *Phil.* 11. 13. 32-3 is entirely accidental. *Phil.* 2. 37. 94 may also be noted, where Cicero includes Deiotarus among the 'republican' foes of Caesar like the Massiliots and others 'quibus rem publicam

- populi Romani caram esse'. But this is conjecture. Obviously the situation was very complex.
21. Cic. *Phil.* 2. 37. 94. Cf. Magie, *o.c.* (n.13), 425-6; 1275f.
 22. Cic. *ibid.* 95: 'At ille' (Caesar) 'numquam — semper enim absenti adfui Deiotaro — quicquam sibi, quod nos pro illo' (D.) 'postularemus, aequum dixit uideri.'
 23. *BAlex.* 68. 1 may be compared for Caesar's censure of Deiotarus in 47 B.C. Cf. further on the trial, D. Braund, *Rome and the Friendly King* (1984), 166; K. Bringmann, *Hermes* 114 (1986) 72ff.
 24. This and the following quotations are taken from Petersson, *o.c.* (n.9), 507ff. The theme of the criticism of Caesar's position in Rome as tyrannical is explored with subtlety by E. Olshausen, 'Die Zielsetzung der Deiotariana', in *Monumentum Chilonense ... Festschrift für E. Burck*, ed. E. Léfevre (1975) 115ff.
 25. Cf. e.g. *Marc.* 2. 4; *Lig.* 3. 6ff.
 26. *Deiot.* 12. 33: 'te ... statua posita animos hominum uehementer offensos, plauditi tibi non solere.' cf. Gelzer, *l.c.* (n.6), 1027. H. Boterman, *Gymnasium* 99 (1992) 340ff., lays great weight on Cicero's references to Caesar's unpopularity in Rome and to his tyrannical tendencies.
 27. 'ex urbanis maleolorum sermunculis haec ... esse collecta'.
 28. *Att.* 12. 47. 3; 45, 2; 13. 37. 2; 44. 1.
 29. *Deiot.* 3. 10: 'is rex, quem senatus hoc nomine saepe honorificentissimis decretis appellauisset ...' Cf. 14. 40; Sands, *o.c.* (n.15), 140ff.
 30. The distinction is drawn by Scipio in *Livy* 27. 19. 5; cf. A. Erskine, *CQ* 41 (1991) 106ff.
 31. Cf. Cic. *Deiot.* 13. 35.
 32. *l.c.* (n.8), 2401.
 33. Cicero goes on to define it as a form of self-control: 'ego tamen frugalitatem, id est modestiam et temperantiam, uirtutem maximam iudico' (*ibid.*). Boterman, *l.c.* (n.26), 331, has shown that Cicero's emphasis on Deiotarus' 'frugalitas' and other virtues is influenced by his philosophical interest in defining the Roman *sapiens*.
 34. 'Magno animo et erecto est, nec unquam succumbet inimicis, ne fortunae quidem' (13. 36).
 35. 'Te eius di penates acceperunt, te amicum et placatum Deiotari regis arae focique uiderunt' (3. 8).
 36. 9. 26; cf. 10. 28, where Deiotarus had had the right kind of military education, so useful in a client prince. In this connection naturally Cicero makes no reference to Deiotarus' Greek education (Niese, *l.c.* [n.8], 2401; cf. Magie, *o.c.* [n.13], 1238). With 10. 28 *BAlex.* (34. 4) should be compared, where the author notes the Roman character of the king's army. Is it pressing 6. 18 too far to suggest that by his reference to 'Iouis illius hospitalis' Cicero implies that Deiotarus was Roman enough to feel a deep Roman scruple?
 37. 'Per dexteram istam te oro, quam regi Deiotaro hospes hospiti porrexisti ...' (3. 8).
 38. 'quocum erat non hospitio solum uerum etiam familiaritate coniunctus' (5. 13).
 39. Of course these 'friendships' were not disinterested. Services were rendered on both sides. In the speech we learn that Deiotarus had long served the interests of Rome (9. 27; cf. 1. 2; 2. 6; 8. 22), as well as those of individual Romans like Pompey (5. 13) and Cicero (14. 39) and especially Caesar (5. 13-14). Much is made of the last point — cf. above p. 95, n. 20.
 40. Note 'error' in 13. 36 and *Phil.* 11. 13. 34.
 41. *Lig.* 6. 17.
 42. Cicero refers to the letter in *Lig.* 3. 7.

43. Cf. above, p. 91f.
44. Note the tone of 3. 10; 5. 14. There is nothing discreditable in the phrase 'regio animo et more' of 7. 19.
45. Cf. Fausset's comment on 9. 27: 'Observe that Deiotarus is invested with the national virtues of the old Roman'.
46. Similar phraseology occurs in *Phil.* 2. 37. 93; 11. 13. 33-34, a glowing account of Deiotarus' many services to Rome.
47. *Fam.* 15. 2. 2. Cf. 15. 1. 6.
48. Cicero's censure of Caesar's treatment of Deiotarus may be noted in passing: 'Caesarem eodem tempore hostem et hospitem uidit — quid hoc tristius? ... spoliatum reliquit (Caesar) et hospitem et regem'. Cf. too the description in 1. 15. 26.
49. *Att.* 14. 1. 2.
50. Cicero, *Brut.* 5. 21; Tac. *Dial.* 21.
51. Cf. e.g. Suet. *Aug.* 48; Sands, *o.c.* (n.15), 142.