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## **THE BALTIMORE RIOTS OF 1812 AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MOB TRADITION**

The nature of rioting — what rioters did — was undergoing a transformation in the half century after the American Revolution. A close examination of the extensive rioting in Baltimore during the summer of 1812 suggests what those changes were. Telescoped into a month and a half of rioting was a range of activity revealing the breakdown of the Anglo-American mob tradition.<sup>1</sup> This tradition allowed for a certain amount of limited popular disorder. The tumultuous crowd was viewed as a “quasi-legitimate” or “extra-institutional” part of the political system and was to be tolerated in certain situations as long as its action was circumscribed to an immediate goal with a minimum of violence to persons and property. The idea was predicated on the assumption that the normal process of government was imperfect and that it was occasionally necessary to resort to “politics out-of-doors” to meet the needs of the community. Just enough force was to be provided by the crowd to rectify an obvious injustice which official channels were incapable of handling.<sup>2</sup>

This Anglo-American mob tradition can be seen operating in the English bread riots E.P. Thompson describes; crowds acted to re-establish the “just price,” set by custom and ancient law, and violated by profiteering grain merchants.<sup>3</sup> So too, colonial American mobs in the 1760’s and 1770’s moved to oppose British imperial measures in actions which were generally confined to limited attacks on symbols of that imperial authority, as in the Boston Tea Party. Occasionally a mob might get carried away in the passions of the moment, such as in the destruction of Governor Thomas Hutchinson’s house in 1765, but even when it did, it rarely acted in a brutish manner against persons — rages were limited to attacks against property.<sup>4</sup>

Yet there always remained in each riot situation the potential for excessive disorder.<sup>5</sup> This created a tension between the elite, who would reluctantly condone rioting in only the most extreme circumstances, and the lower and middling ranks of society, who were far more willing to countenance collective violence.<sup>6</sup> That tension, which was evident in the attempt of American Whig leaders to bridle the pre-Revolutionary mob activity of the 1760’s and 1770’s, was resolved through informal means of social control. If the riot did not appear to threaten the prevailing social system unduly, then a kind of temporary license was granted to the mob. When the mob had finished with its attack on its immediate and proscribed object, or when its actions began seriously to challenge the social system, then it was time for the elite to pull in its reins and reassert its authority. No elaborate police powers were thought necessary for this. The Anglo-American mob tradition thrived in small scale pre-industrial communities where contacts between all levels of society were fluid and where social relations were marked by deference and personal recognition.

Thus, informal mechanisms, combining the personal and public prestige of local magistrates and members of the elite, were the mainstays of riot control. Very often the magistrate would simply address the members of the mob, inform them that they were acting in an overly tumultuous manner, and tell them it was time to disperse. The riot acts of both England and America were merely a legalization of this practice; the magistrate would read the act to the disorderly crowd and then wait for a stipulated time, ordinarily an hour, allowing the mob ample opportunity to disband.<sup>8</sup> The *posse comitatus* can also be viewed as a regularization of these informal means of social control. Members of the *posse* were temporary deputies of the magistrate recruited from the community at large. Theoretically anyone and everyone could be sworn in as part of the *posse*. More often than not, however, the *posse* was recruited from men the magistrate knew would support him and these were usually men of prominence and standing in the local community whose real value lay in their further bolstering the moral weight of the magistrate. The militia, too, might be called upon to help suppress a riot. But the militia, which tended to include all able-bodied men in a community, was likely to be overly sympathetic with the mob and could hardly be expected to turn out and protect an unpopular cause. More importantly, in both England and America there was a deeply ingrained fear of the military, inhibiting the use of both the militia and the regular army, as well as limiting the size and power of the ordinary police forces of constables and night watch.<sup>9</sup>

Of course, implicit in every one of the magistrate's possible avenues of action, be he asserting his authority alone, reading the riot act, with a *posse comitatus*, or with a detachment of the military at his side, there was always the threat of coercion. But few magistrates really wanted to be taken up on that threat. They did not want to be responsible for spilling the blood of men they knew all their lives and with whom they must continue to deal with long after the riot was over and whatever force that was mustered had been dismissed.<sup>10</sup> In fact, many magistrates knew that any force, and especially the army, put an extra burden on local resources and hurt everyone in the community.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, as E.P. Thompson has reminded us, "the credibility of the gentry and magistracy" had to be maintained and this was most effectively done through the "reassertion of paternalist authority" rather than the use of troops or force.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, the preferred means of riot control was to "talk the mob down" after the community's needs had been served by "politics out-of-doors."

The Baltimore riots of 1812 began in the spirit of this deep-seated tradition.<sup>13</sup> The vast majority of Baltimore's citizens were Republicans and the publication in their city of the Federalist partisan news sheet, the *Federal-Republican*, was a constant irritant to their Jeffersonian sympathies. Threats had long been mouthed by the Republican papers warning the *Federal-Republican* that its persistent attacks on Madison's administration and on local Republicans were bound to rouse the wrath of the citizenry.<sup>14</sup> With the declaration of war against Great Britain in June 1812 the *Federal-Republican* only became more vehement in its assertions. On the night of June 22 the people of Baltimore acted, as a group of thirty or forty men dismantled the Gay Street printing office of the *Federal-Republican*. One Republican paper reported, "Last night between 9 and 10 o'clock, a party of men and boys began, with great sang froid to demolish the printing office of the Federal Republican . . . and perservered till they accomplished their purpose. The business went on as regularly as if they contracted to perform the job for pay."<sup>15</sup> Demolishing or "pulling down" buildings was a widespread practice of both

English and American mobs in the eighteenth century, while the destruction of the printing press was an activity reminiscent of several American Revolutionary mobs. Obviously this was not a raging, overly destructive mob; rather it was orderly, workmanlike and restricted in its goal.

Little effort was made by the Republican city officials to stop the mob that night. Mayor Edward Johnson, a staunch Republican brewer, made a half-hearted appearance at the scene of the riot.<sup>16</sup> His entreaties to halt the rioting, however, were respectfully declined as one ringleader told the mayor, "Mr. Johnson, I know you very well, no body wants to hurt you; but the laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of nature and reason prevail; that house is the temple of Infamy, it is supported with English gold, and it must and shall come down to the ground!"<sup>17</sup> This one statement sums up the very essence of the Anglo-American mob tradition. First, the rioter knew Johnson personally. Both men were members of the larger Republican community. Political office in Baltimore was still mainly the province of the elite. Edward Johnson was a member of that elite whose base of political power was his close connection with the mechanics and laborers of "Old Town," where he lived and worked, and Fell's Point. On election day the Republican leadership expected Johnson to deliver the workingman's vote.<sup>18</sup> Thus it is not surprising that the rioter knew Johnson and treated him with deference and respect. Secondly, and more importantly, was the declaration that the "laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of nature and reason prevail." This short phrase epitomizes the theoretical justification of the Anglo-American mob tradition. The underlying assumption was that there was a gap between the "laws of the land" and the "laws of nature and reason." It was the people's right, no, it was the people's duty, to assert themselves in unison to bridge that gap even in the most reasoned of governments. Finally, there was the identification of the *Federal-Republican* with the national enemy, for war had been declared, and the implication was that the destruction of the "temple of Infamy" was a patriotic duty.

No doubt Mayor Johnson found it difficult to argue with this statement and was probably not too disturbed by the banishment of this maligning tool of his political opponents. In any case, he did not press the point and, as might be expected in good Anglo-American mob tradition, he retreated for the time being, allowing the people their moment of riot.

The tumult lasted until the early hours of the morning as the mob scoured the streets in pursuit of one of the Federalist editors, Jacob Wagner, who had wisely left town. Wagner's own house and the house of his father-in-law, where his family was staying, were both searched by select members of the mob. In doing this no violence was offered to anyone nor was any private property threatened. Had Wagner been captured he would probably have received some rough treatment, for it had been rumored during the day that he was to be clothed with a terrapin shell and a sheepskin with a pair of horns, but it is unlikely, considering the overall self-control the mob exercised, that they would carry out their threat of putting a bullet through his heart.<sup>19</sup>

So far, then, all the criteria for the traditional Anglo-American mob had been fulfilled: the attack was limited to only the odious object of the *Federal-Republican* printing office; opportunity for doing further violence was declined when the mob had Wagner's house and family at its mercy; and the community apparently gave its tacit approval to the riot — over five hundred persons witnessed the evening's activity, including the mayor who made no arrests. With the "laws of nature and reason" satisfied, and the Federalist newspaper driven from the city, it was time

for the "laws of the land," in the guise of the local authorities, to reassert control. There was no anticipated difficulty here and on the next day Mayor Johnson and the city magistrates issued a statement urging "all citizens who were so disposed to preserve the order and peace of the community" to discountenance "all irregular and tumultuous meetings" and aid the civil officers in suppressing them. If the riot were to be true to the form of the Anglo-American mob tradition this public statement, combined with the personal surveillance of the mayor, would be sufficient to prevent any further disturbances.<sup>20</sup>

Mayor Johnson soon had a chance to test his informal tools of riot control. On the evening after the destruction of the Federalist newspaper office a mob threatened a Mr. Hutchins for having spoken out against the war effort. Before the 40 or 50 angry Republicans could break any law Mayor Johnson arrived at the scene and persuaded the would-be rioters to leave Hutchins alone. Johnson personally led them away from Hutchins' home to the Market house, several streets away, where he made sure they all dispersed. However, no sooner did the mayor return to his vigil at Hutchins' house, joined by several gentlemen friends, than another and larger mob appeared. Standing in the doorway Johnson was forced to give in and allow an inspection of the premises. But first he made sure that Hutchins escaped out a back door. With Hutchins safely out of the way, Johnson escorted a committee of the mob on its search. Satisfied that Hutchins was not to be found, and leaving his property unmolested, the mob began to disband. Again Mayor Johnson could congratulate himself on his handling of the unruly populace. Yet he was to experience one more scare that night. As the last of the crowd was breaking up Johnson got word "that a few gentlemen, having heard of the riot, had armed themselves, and were probably on the way" to support him. Fearing that such a show of force would antagonize the lingering mob, Johnson "privately withdrew" and went off to intercept his would-be saviors. He met with Samuel Hollingsworth, a Federalist, and two other horsemen, all armed to the hilt, and, after assuring them that he had everything under control, he managed to get them to return home.<sup>21</sup>

In all, Mayor Johnson could view his night's work as success; he had gone face to face with two mobs and prevented both from committing any serious violence. However, Johnson was upset by the efforts of the three armed Federalists and was afraid that bloodshed, and possibly civil war, might be the result of any further popular political disturbances. Definitely committed against the use of force, and rather than simply relying on another public statement, the mayor and city magistrates decided that a more symbolic gesture was needed. Within a few days all of the city's officials and constables were massed together and paraded through the streets in a deliberate attempt to match the theater of the mob with the counter-theater of the elite and to exhibit before the entire Baltimore community their united stand against any further public disorder.<sup>22</sup> In a still largely oral society this physical and dramatic demonstration was calculated to impress the mechanic and laborer as no high sounding proclamation could — for it was with "body language" and the "oral-dramaturgical process" that the elite communicated most effectively with the lower section of society.<sup>23</sup>

Somehow the people of Baltimore were unimpressed with this show of counter-theater and the mob continued to be active. The Anglo-American mob tradition flourished in simple, generally unified communities. Baltimore, however, was no longer this kind of unified community. In the half century before 1812 the city has experienced phenomenal growth and was transformed from a few clusters of

houses to a thriving metropolis of fifty thousand. It was a commercial boom town with many different kinds of people — rich and rising merchants on the make, middling tradesmen, native-born and immigrant laborers, and both slave and free blacks.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, the city's work force was undergoing a significant transition as artisans became increasingly reliant on a pool of unskilled laborers; apprentices, slaves, and even women were replacing the journeyman at the work place, creating additional resentment between employer and employee.<sup>25</sup> In such a city there were a great number of diverse interests and some of these were starkly exposed in the following wave of rioting.

Racial antagonism, for instance, was revealed in the tearing down of two houses owned by James Briscoe, a free black. Briscoe had been quoted as saying that "if all the blacks were of his opinion, they would soon put down the whites," and this, combined with a widespread fear of a British-inspired slave conspiracy, was quite enough to provoke the ire of the mob. The action, which was not very violent, seems to have been limited in its goals and might therefore easily be considered as being in the spirit of the Anglo-American riot tradition. However, a more careful examination suggests another conclusion. A magistrate was at the scene of the riot and attempted to prevent the destruction of any property. Not only did he fail to stop the mob from pulling down Briscoe's home, but he was equally powerless when the mob decided that they would "visit the sins of the father upon his generation" and, dragging Briscoe's daughter out of her bed, levelled her house to the ground as well. Harassment of blacks continued thereafter and even the African church was threatened.<sup>26</sup>

Other divisions in society can be seen in the street fighting which erupted between Protestant and Catholic Irish. Mayor Edward Johnson reported "A number of inferior disturbances took place, confined to the Irish alone, who were persecuting each other as orangemen." Alexander Wiley, who was apparently a Protestant Irishman, was twice threatened with tar and feathering and was finally temporarily forced to leave town. The mob claimed he had ridden express for Wagner, but Wiley believed that he was attacked "to gratify private revenge, and that the enmity to him partook of religious animosity." Neither Wiley nor his persecutors knew very much about politics, although they did use "a cant term, 'Tory', which was the signal for insult and violence."<sup>27</sup>

More directly connected to the war effort was the dismantling of several ships bound for the Iberian peninsula and the Spanish possessions in the West Indies. One ship, the schooner *Josepha*, was regularly cleared at the Customs House and set sail on July 7, but was "brought back by armed men, who dismantled her and cut off her rudder." The next morning the Collector put the ship under the protection of the revenue cutter; however, since no carpenter had the "hardihood to make a new rudder" it was thought unlikely she would be able to set sail. The reason given for these depredations was that the Spanish and Portuguese were Britain's allies against Napoleon and that a number of these ships were loaded with grain and were bound to supply Wellington's army in Spain. Just as important, however, was longstanding prejudice against hispanics and resentment against profiteering merchants who seemed willing to trade with the enemy.<sup>28</sup>

Nearly every night, then, after the destruction of the *Federal-Republican* office in late June until late July the mob roamed the streets of Baltimore, striking at a variety of targets. As it did so, the mob's activity ceased to represent the interests of the majority of the Baltimore community and began more and more to represent special and private interests which often reflected the growing animosities in an increasingly heterogeneous community. Screened behind a plea

of patriotism the mob could begin to vent its pent up anger and frustration over racial, ethnic, and class issues. To almost all of this the mayor and magistrates continued to use their “gentle” methods of persuasion in dispersing mobs and minimizing violence despite the appearance of some evidence that the elite could not always “talk the mob down.”<sup>29</sup>

It was against this background of constant mob activity that the other editor of the *Federal-Republican*, the aristocratic Alexander Contee Hanson, decided to re-establish his paper in Baltimore.<sup>30</sup> The paper, which was being printed in the less volatile Georgetown, was to be distributed from a Baltimore address. Asserting that the “empire of the laws” had been “overthrown” and that society had become “unhinged” and “degraded to a state of nature,” Hanson planned to do what he felt Mayor Johnson and the other city officials were failing to do — guarantee the freedom of the press. He had no intention of facing the Baltimore mob alone and at least fifty ardent Federalists were recruited from both the Maryland countryside and Baltimore to help defend Hanson’s “natural and constitutional rights.”<sup>31</sup>

On Sunday, July 27, the Federalist host quietly collected at No. 45 Charles Street. Although Hanson and company attempted to attract as little attention as was possible, they made no secret of their location — the Charles Street address was defiantly placed on the masthead of the paper. By Monday, the twenty-eighth, everyone in Baltimore knew that Hanson and his *Federal-Republican* were back in town, and the Federalists on Charles Street prepared themselves to meet the onslaught of the mob. Being well armed and committed to stand their ground the Federalists were confident that the cowardly mob would not dare risk a prolonged attack.<sup>32</sup>

That night proved them wrong. A large crowd collected outside the Federalist fortress and a riot broke out as men and boys pelted stones and shouted insults at the Federalist defenders. Warnings to the crowd only intensified the shower of stones and after some debate inside the Federalist fortress a blank volley was fired in the hope of intimidating the mob. The loud blast from the Federalist guns had the desired effect as the street was quickly cleared of the crowd of people. But finding that no harm was done, and angered by the temerity of this new Federalist affront, the mob soon returned and re-commenced its taunting activities. Becoming bolder and bolder, Dr. Gale, a crackpot apothecary, led a rush upon the house. As Gale entered through the battered door the Federalists leveled another, this time lethal, volley. More shots followed and the dying Gale was carried away. Others were hit as they retired to cover. The firing continued intermittently from the house and the mob, which now began to arm itself.<sup>33</sup>

Official reaction to the riot was slow. Mayor Johnson left Baltimore that day for his country residence. Further up Charles Street lived General John Stricker, the commander of the city’s militia. He obviously knew something was going on as much of the crowd had to file past his house on their way to the Federalist stronghold. Perhaps he hoped that the events of the night of June 22 would be repeated and once again the Federalist news organ would be expelled from Baltimore. In any case, he and several friends, who were at his house that night, became increasingly alarmed by the constant stream of reports of the intensifying conflict and by the first shots. Finally, after many appeals by Federalists and others, Stricker set the complicated machinery for calling the militia into motion. Before any troops could be mustered he needed the signature of two of the city’s magistrates. Unfortunately, magistrates were an extremely rare commodity that

night and those who could be found, even Federalists, were reluctant to sign the order for fear of mob retaliation. Four different magistrates were brought to Stricker's house and each managed to disappear before their signatures were secured.<sup>34</sup>

After much delay the proper orders were signed and delivered to Major William Barney around midnight. Two more hours passed before the thirty militia men, out of the two companies called, were ready to move down Charles Street. Both Major Barney and General Stricker were apprehensive of the crowd's reaction to the appearance of the militia. On Stricker's advice Barney removed the proud aristocratic eagle and ribbon of the Order of Cincinnati from his uniform, believing that if Barney wore this insignia he would be attacked by the mob as a "foreigner." By the same token, Barney ignored military etiquette and allowed the more robust and lower class red-feathered Chasseurs to lead ahead of his own white-feathered Hussars because, so he later claimed, the red feathers made less obvious targets.<sup>35</sup> No doubt he also felt that the mob would be less willing to attack the innkeepers, peddlers, butchers, carpenters, and ship joiners of the Chasseurs than the merchants in the Hussars.<sup>36</sup> Barney, who was to lead this expedition, removed his own white feather from his hat. He did not want to wear anything that might antagonize the mob.

Meanwhile the situation was becoming increasingly serious. A cannon had been brought up by the mob and placed opposite the building occupied by the Federalists. It remained unused, but the exchange of musket fire continued. At this critical juncture Barney and his small band of militia arrived. Considering the size of the mob, which some estimates put as large as a thousand persons, and the fortitude of an undetermined number of Federalists defending No. 45 Charles Street, Barney's predicament was extremely delicate. Rather than attempting to use brute force (which he did not have) Barney, stripped of his white feather and emblem of the Cincinnati, resorted to the time-tested method of personal appeal. He pleaded with the mob, declaring himself their "*political friend*," and gave assurances that those inside would not escape. The moment was precarious; hostilities had ceased upon the arrival of the mounted uniformed militia and the mob even temporarily withdrew. But the cannon remained poised to fire upon the Federalists, and the mob, seeing how small Barney's force really was, quickly regathered. Barney stalled for time, believing that reinforcements were bound to come and that the impending dawn would disperse the mob as its members would fear recognition in the growing daylight. He placed his militia between the mob and the defenders with orders to guard every window and door of the building to prevent anyone from entering or leaving. A tense cease-fire was established.<sup>37</sup>

With the mob incensed over the murder of Gale, the wounds of its friends, and the presence of the Federalists, there was nothing for Barney to do but negotiate. Finally, aided by Mayor Johnson, who arrived from the country, General Stricker, and a number of other gentlemen, a compromise was worked out. The Federalist defenders surrendered to the authorities for protection. Since they were to be placed in the jail for safe keeping the mob could be assured that the "murderers" of Gale would not go free.

As daylight arrived one last insult was offered to the people of Baltimore. The Federalists wanted to call for carriages to convey them to the jailhouse. Stricker thought it best to submit this proposal to the sovereignty of the people and asked the mob if they would allow this. The idea of these "murderers" riding to prison in a symbol of wealth and prestige was unacceptable to the crowd. Instead of carriages they shouted that the Federalists should be taken in carts — the

common mode of conveyance for criminals and victims of the mob.<sup>38</sup> It was decided that the procession would walk and at about seven o'clock the Federalists filed out of the house they had defended all night. The mob surrounded the twenty-three fearless Federalists and their meager guard.<sup>39</sup> Insults were heaped upon the defenders all the way to the jail house and some stones were thrown at both the guard and their charge. A fife and drum serenaded this odd assemblage with the "Rogue's March."<sup>40</sup>

All in all, the Republican leadership could heave a sigh of relief that Tuesday morning. The situation had been on the brink of disaster, yet somehow that disaster had been averted. The mob appeared satisfied to see the Federalists put into jail. The militia had to be called upon but it had proved unnecessary for them to use force. Ultimately, it was the persuasive powers of the city's leadership which held sway. Furthermore, the Republican politicians, and the populace they represented, were once again assured that the insidious Federalist tabloid was silenced in Baltimore. Two men lay dead — one was only a spectator — but still the Anglo-American mob tradition was left somewhat intact. Had the mob been unrestrained in their attack on the Charles Street fortress and had Major Barney and company failed in quelling the disturbance that night that tradition would have been wholly abandoned.

By no means, however, was the Charles Street disturbance cast completely in the traditional mold of the Anglo-American mob. First of all, the rioters, both the Federalist defenders and the Republicans in the street, were much too violent and preoccupied with inflicting physical damage on one another. Normally, riots in the Anglo-American mob tradition focused on property, not persons. Second, had the informal methods of social control been fully operative, the mob, seeing so many of the city's elite attempting to restrain them, would have feared recognition in the growing daylight and dispersed as Major Barney expected. Instead their numbers doubled after dawn. General Stricker did recognize many of the rioters as being members of his militia brigade but they almost uniformly ignored his entreaties that morning to join the military escort and protect the Federalists. They preferred to remain within the ranks of the mob rather than being recruited for such an obnoxious duty.<sup>41</sup> Finally, the traditional bonds of deference and respect were sorely tested a number of times that night. Before marching down Charles Street, Barney saw a group of men with muskets and a drum heading towards the riot. He ran to intercept them and in the ensuing scrap he was almost bayoneted. In the midst of the fight one lad, 15 or 16 years old, shouted to the man Barney was wrestling with "give me the gun and I'll shoot the son of a bitch in a minute."<sup>42</sup> Neither Barney's social position nor his uniform intimidated this young man. Major Barney was aware of this — hence his removal of the Order of Cincinnati insignia and his aristocratic white feather. These symbols of wealth and prestige, which should have been assets in gaining the deference of the mob, were now considered liabilities which were best discarded. In short, the Baltimore mob appeared ready to transcend the boundaries of accepted riot behavior.

During the day, despite the mob's promises to the contrary, the building at No. 45 Charles Street was destroyed. In marked contrast to the workmanlike demolition of the *Federal-Republican* office in June, this activity was carried on in an unorganized fashion by looters and scavengers who grabbed what they could, down to the bricks and lumber, and then scurried off into the side streets of Baltimore. Talk and rumor were everywhere. Close to one thousand militia men were called for; only about forty reported for duty and since General Stricker felt that the uniforms might anger the Baltimore citizenry they were dismissed

without even going near the jailhouse. Crowds milled in and about the jail and gazed at the Federalist prisoners to assure themselves that the “murderers” had not been bailed out.<sup>43</sup>

That evening, after the militia was dismissed, the crowd outside the jail became more hostile and threatened a general assault. Mayor Johnson stood in the front of the door as the mob began to press towards it. Once again he hoped to curb the furor of the mob. As he was being swept aside he declared: “I am the mayor of your city; they are my prisoners, and I must protect them.” Johnson received several answers, but the one he remembered as the most vicious was “you damn’d scoundrel don’t we feed you, and is it not your duty to head and lead us on to take vengeance for the murders committed.”<sup>44</sup> For the first time that summer Mayor Johnson completely failed in a face to face confrontation with the mob. His personal authority meant little to the rioters and in a perverse sense of democracy they viewed him as a mere hireling, dependent upon them for his very sustenance and duty bound to lead them in their wild depredations. This separation of personal and political authority left the mayor helpless and with the protection of a few gentlemen friends Johnson beat a hasty retreat.

The mob, with the possible connivance of the turnkey, was instantly inside the jailhouse. Confusion reigned and some of the Federalist prisoners escaped through the crowd unscathed. Others, including Alexander Contee Hanson and the Revolutionary War generals Light Horse Harry Lee and James Maccuban Lingan, did not. All told, eight or nine of these Federalist prisoners fell into the hands of the mob and received a ferocious beating from fists, clubs, and whatever else was handy: penknives were stuck into their faces and hot candle grease dropped into their eyes. General Lingan attempted to address the mob and remind them of his past services to the country, but the mob could not care less about his personal stature and proven patriotism and they turned upon him with renewed vigor. Lingan was beaten until he stopped moving — by then he was dead.<sup>45</sup>

John Hall, one of the Federalist prisoners, vividly described the scene. As Hall tried to run out of the jail he was caught by “two rough looking men” who promised to take “care” of him. “They held me by the wrist for about ten minutes, during which I saw several of my friends knocked down and their blood scattered all over the pavement . . . they either cut off or tore off my coat, leaving none of it on me but the cape and the sleeves. Having thus *secured my pockets*, they tore my shirt leaving my bosom bare.” He feared extra torture because he was a resident of Baltimore. “I made another effort but just as I escaped their hands, I received a blow on my head which brought me senseless to the floor. I was revived by some one jumping on my arm . . .” Hall made yet another attempt to escape with the same results — more and harsher beating. Finally he realized that every time he moved he attracted attention to himself as being alive and decided just to lie there, playing dead. He was then thrown in a heap with the others who had fallen victim to the mob.<sup>46</sup>

Although it may appear that this torture was senseless brutality, all of the mob’s actions were symbolically important.<sup>47</sup> Hall may have felt that his coat was torn off him to secure his pockets, but in that moment of riotous excitement, the “rough looking men” who attacked him were probably more concerned with stripping him of that important symbol of Hall’s wealth and standing — his clothing. Each of the Federalist victims had their clothes ripped off them and after the “massacre” the jailhouse was strewn with “foreign clothing,” “Montgomery coats,” and “Virginia Boots.”<sup>48</sup> So too, Hall’s final realization that the only way for him to survive the ordeal was to play dead is significant. Others among the

victims related how they came to the same conclusion;<sup>49</sup> in each case the mob seemed to be demanding that these members of the Federalist elite surrender, at last, to the forceful will of the people. General Lingan alone steadfastly refused to submit and his appeal, based upon his stature as an aged patrician and war hero, was rewarded with the mob's beating the very life out of him.

After piling up their victims in front of the jailhouse the mob searched for Hanson's body, planning special cruelties. But amidst the darkness, blood and gore it was impossible for them to find Hanson in the stack of nearly naked "corpses."<sup>50</sup> In a society where personal recognition was crucial the mob's inability to identify Hanson, who was no stranger to Baltimoreans, is curious. It was almost as if the distinguishing characteristics were purposefully beaten off of the faces of the Federalist victims. For the moment Hanson, Lingan, Lee, Hall, and the others were no longer land owners, Revolutionary War heroes, lawyers, or merchants; they were mere criminals, stripped of clothes and rank, fit only to be surrendered to the city's medical doctors as cadavers for dissection.<sup>51</sup>

Reaction to the "massacre" was terrific. Federalists, with their families, began to leave Baltimore and it was feared that there would be a run on the banks. Newspapers across the country carried accounts of witnesses and some of the victims. Even Republicans were shocked. A few of the party leaders expressed sympathy with the aim of punishing the Federalist "murderers" but almost all were displeased over the way this was done.<sup>52</sup> The mob meanwhile seemed to rule triumphant in Baltimore.

In early August the relentless and intrepid editors of the *Federal-Republican* mailed their paper to subscribers in Baltimore. What Alexander Contee Hanson failed to do was now left to the United States government. Again the mob threatened. This time, however, the authorities moved quickly and exhibited a new willingness to use force. On August 4, without even pausing to get the requisite magistrates' signatures, General Stricker ordered out the militia, which reported in strength. Contrary to the fears of the Republican leaders, there was no mutiny of the militia that night and a charge by two members of a troop of horse was enough to send the mob on its heels. For six nights thereafter the militia was called out to guard the Post Office. Baltimore had had enough of mobs and on one of those nights as many as seven hundred men were in uniform.<sup>53</sup> That the old techniques of riot control, using personal appeal and conciliation, were now abandoned was further indicated when several ringleaders of the "massacre" were arrested a few weeks later. Once again the mob seemed ready to strike, only now with the aim of setting the prisoners free. Several companies of the militia were ordered out and artillery was placed in the hall of the prison.<sup>54</sup> The barrel of a cannon proved to be a far more effective deterrent to mob action than the entreaties of an unarmed mayor. The mob yielded under the show of force and its power waned.

Although the viciousness of the Baltimore riots burnt a deep mark of infamy on the conscience of America, so deep that twenty years later Alexis de Tocqueville would hear of the riots on his visit to America and for generations Baltimore would be known as a "mobtown," the summer of 1812 marks no irreversible break with the past.<sup>55</sup> Mobs would still occasionally be raised in the spirit of the Anglo-American riot tradition as whole communities attempted to purge themselves of undesirables, be they abolitionists, grain hoarders, or criminals.<sup>56</sup> Yet the Baltimore riots of 1812 are an important benchmark in the history of American popular disorder because they suggest the outlines of a new trend of

rioting in which the larger community was divided into warring factions of competing sub-communities and because they presage the intense racial, ethnic, and class conflicts of Jacksonian America.<sup>57</sup> Compressed in the shift from the organized and workmanlike destruction of the office of the *Federal-Republican* in June to the near anarchic and brutal "massacre" at the jailhouse is an example of the disintegration of the traditional Anglo-American mob behavior and the emergence of a new form of rioting representative of the heterogeneous and confused democratic society. As the mob moved from objects which were disapproved by the entire community to objects detested by only one segment of the community new tensions within society were exposed — in Baltimore this was shown by the attacks on blacks, Irishmen, and grain ships. Furthermore, these same tensions could be expressed with an added vehemence and savagery, as in the "massacre" at the jailhouse, which was unlike anything ever experienced under the old norms of the Anglo-American mob tradition. Yet even at its most violent the mob retained a purposefulness in its action, revealed in the demand that the Federalists symbolically surrender their lives, wealth, and prestige or suffer death at the hands of the mob. The Republican elite did not recognize this purposefulness; they only saw a bloodthirsty mob severing its unwritten contract with the elite and offering an unprecedented challenge to the social order. All that the elite city officials could do was to slowly react to this challenge, hesitating because they were loath to give up the deferential perquisites they had enjoyed for so long.

With this failure of the old informal means of social control the mob denied all paternalistic authority and asserted a new, purely democratic order of society.<sup>58</sup> In response the elite had to turn to its one remaining tool to control social disorder — the use of force. But no longer did that force act as a mere bulwark to the personal authority of the magistrate. Nor did that force represent the coercion of some outside power — as did the use of the military in the Shays', Whiskey, and Fries Rebellions. Rather the force used represented divisions within the community. Most adult males in Baltimore in 1812 were in the militia and the failure of that militia to report for duty until after the "massacre," as well as the presence of some militia men in the crowd on Charles Street, indicates that there was a broad level of support for the mob's activities up to the fateful night at the jailhouse. However, after the "massacre" that support was no longer so widespread. By mustering to defend the Post Office in August one segment of Baltimore showed that the consensus behind the mob had ended. Battle lines were drawn, loyalties tested, and luckily for Baltimore, the mob was sufficiently cowed by men in uniform that further bloodshed was avoided.

Under the old Anglo-American mob tradition it was assumed that the entire community shared certain basic values and could agree on when the "laws of the land must sleep." Now, however, the bloodstained halls of the Baltimore jailhouse stood as a gruesome testament to the variety of meaning a diverse and complicated society could have for the "laws of nature and reason." As a result, the mob lost whatever legitimacy it may have once had in the eyes of the elite. The trend towards condemnation of "politics out of doors" became even more evident as the nineteenth century wore on. Rioting, which occurred more often in the early national period than is generally realized, became a major social problem by the Jacksonian era and was an important impetus behind the formation of urban police forces.<sup>59</sup> As the elite's attitude towards the mob hardened there was an increased willingness to use force to suppress any disturbance, and the history of the nineteenth century is marred by a continual chronicle of bloody head-to-head combat between the military and the mob.<sup>60</sup>

In the wake of the Baltimore rioting in 1812 a few observers recognized that there had been some great changes in society. George Washington Parke Custis, a Federalist spokesman, gave the funeral oration for the martyred General Lingan. In the "good old Federalist times," declared Custis, no one would have dared touch Lingan, and his venerable presence along would have been enough to hold back the mob. Those halcyon days were now gone, and Custis cautioned, soon every city would have its own Baltimore mob.<sup>61</sup>

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#### FOOTNOTES

1. Some historians reject the term "mob" and prefer the less perjorative "crowd." However, "mob" has been used here because it is what is found in the sources. "Crowd" seldom appears in the primary material and when it does it ordinarily refers to spectators watching riot activity. "Mobs," on the other hand, were the perpetrators of the riot. Furthermore, "mob" was also used as a general slur and tag word for the lower classes. This ambiguity suggests that the elite not only mistrusted the lower classes but feared them as well. For interesting discussions on the definition of "mob" see: William Anders Smith, "Anglo-American Society and the Mob" (Ph.D. diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1965), 10-12; and George Rudé, "The London 'Mob' of the Eighteenth Century," in *Paris and London in the Eighteenth Century: Studies in Popular Protest* (New York, 1971), 293-318.
2. This is but a brief summary of a complex body of literature. The main works include: E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd," *Past and Present*, 51 (1971), 76-136; Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebian Culture," *Journal of Social History*, 7 (1974), 382-405; Thompson, "Eighteenth-century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class," *Social History*, 3 (1978), 133-165; George Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study in France and England, 1730-1848* (New York, 1964); R.B. Rose, "Eighteenth Century Price Riots and Public Policy in England," *International Review of Social History*, 6 (1961), 277-292; John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (Cambridge, 1976), Part III; Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776* (New York, 1972), 3-48; Gordon S. Wood, "A Note on the Mobs in the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., 23 (1966), 635-642; John Philip Reid, "In a Defensive Rage: The Use of the Mob, the Justification in Law and the Coming of the American Revolution," *New York University Law Review*, 49 (1974), 1043-1091; Smith, "Anglo-American Society and the Mob;" and Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (New York, 1969), 4-45.
3. Thompson, "Moral Economy," 76-136.
4. Maier, *Resistance*, passim.
5. The elite viewed riot as a "calamity to be avoided if at all possible." Thompson, "Moral Economy," 98, 120-126.
6. E.P. Thompson emphasizes the differences between what he calls patrician society and plebian culture in two recent articles on eighteenth century England. Although he falls short of calling this a class alignment, he does assert "The mob may not have been noted for an impeccable consciousness of class; but the rulers of England were in no doubt at all that it [the mob] was a horizontal sort of beast." Thompson also points out that the gentry tolerated mobs as a part of the price they paid for a limited monarchy and weak state. "Patrician Society, Plebian Culture," 397; and "Eighteenth-century English Society," 145.

7. Some historians have stressed the differences between the aims of the elite and the aims of the people in the riots leading up to the American Revolution. Jesse Lemisch, "The American Revolution Seen From the Bottom Up," in Barton Bernstein, ed., *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (New York, 1968), 3-45; Lemisch, "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., 25 (1968), 371-407; Dirk Hoerder, *People and Mobs: Crowd Action in Massachusetts During the American Revolution, 1765-1780* (Berlin, 1971); Hoerder, "Boston Leaders and Boston Crowds, 1765-1776," in Alfred Young, ed., *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism* (DeKalb, Ill., 1976), 233-271; Hoerder, "'Mobs, A Sort of Them at Least, Are Constitutional;': The American Revolution, Popular Participation, and Social Charge," *Amerikastudien/American Studies*, 21 (1976), 289-306.

8. Of course the original English Riot Act of 1715 was intended to strengthen the magistrate's hand by making riot a felony and allowing the use of coercion without liability. Yet English sensibilities dictated restraining the use of force with the odd result of giving the mob an hour of unmolested freedom after the Riot Act was read. The justice, however, could use that hour to persuade the mob to disperse, that is if he wanted to limit the mob's activity, with the Riot Act and threat of force acting only as an added rationale for his influence over the mob. On the origins of the Riot Act see Max Beloff, *Public Order and Popular Disturbance, 1660-1714* (London, 1938), 136-137.

9. Maier, *Resistance*, 16-20; Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebian Culture," 403-405; David R. Johnson, *Policing the Urban Underworld: The Impact of Crime on the Development of the American Police, 1800-1887* (Philadelphia, 1979), 13-14.

10. Furthermore, a magistrate, or anyone who would support him, might himself be liable to a suit or criminal charges if excess force were used. Maier, *Resistance*, 19.

11. Thompson, "Moral Economy," 121-126.

12. Thompson, "Patrician Society, Plebian Culture," 404-405.

13. Two articles on the Baltimore riots have recently appeared. Frank A. Cassell, "The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 70 (1975), 241-258, concentrates on the political conflict and the apparent breakdown of democracy. Donald R. Hickey, "The Darker Side of Democracy: The Baltimore Riots of 1812," *Maryland Historian*, 7 (1976), 1-20, is more concerned with the threat posed to the liberty of the press. Both echo earlier interpretations. Alexis de Tocqueville used the riots as a "striking example of the excesses to which despotism of the majority may lead," J.P. Mayer, ed., *Democracy in America* (Garden City, N.Y., 1969), 252 fn. Henry Adams emphasized the political conflict in his *History of the United States of America: During the First Administration of James Madison*, VI (New York, 1931), 405-408. Gelnn Tucker, *Poltroons and Patriots: A Popular Account of the War of 1812* (New York, 1954), 136-144, focuses on the freedom of the press issue. See also Richard Buel, Jr., *Securing the Revolution: Ideology in American Politics, 1789-1815* (Ithaca, 1972), 286-288; and David Hackett Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy* (New York, 1965), 156-158.

14. *Report of the Committee of Grievances . . . on the Subject of the Recent Riots in the City of Baltimore, Together with the Depositions taken for the Committee* (Annapolis, 1813), 1-2.

15. *Annapolis Maryland Republican*, July 1, 1812. William Gwyn, an eye witness confirms this impression, "The work of the destruction was performed with great regularity and but little noise." *Report . . .*, 21. See also *Annapolis Maryland Gazette*, July 2, 1812; and John Howard Payne to Virgil Maxcy, June 24, 1812, Vol. 31, Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Mss., Library of Congress.

16. Johnson seldom confronted a mob alone. He was almost always accompanied by a group of "gentlemen" friends who acted as an informal *posse comitatus* and bolstered both his official and unofficial position. The mayor recognized this and told an acquaintance, before attempting to stop a later disturbance, that "if he could be supported by only a few friends at the commencement . . . [of a riot] he might be able to prevent mischief." *Report* . . . , 161.
17. *Report* . . . , 242, 160-161, 199, 336, 344-345. Judge John Scott also made a futile attempt to influence the mob. *Report* . . . , 119-120, 153-154.
18. For Johnson's role in Baltimore politics see William B. Wheeler, "Urban Politics in Nature's Republic: The Development of Political Parties in the Seaport Cities in the Federalist Era" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1967), 168-169; and Wilbur H. Hunter, "Baltimore's War: Its Gallant Defence produced America's National Anthem," *American Heritage* 3 (1952), 31. For the general structure of Baltimore's politics see Wheeler, "Urban Politics," 144-120; Dorothy Marie Brown, "Party Battles and Beginnings in Maryland" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1961); Lee Lovely Verstandig, "The Emergence of the Two Party System in Maryland" (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1970); J.R. Pole, "Constitutional Reform and Election Statistics in Maryland, 1790-1812," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 55 (1960) 275-292; Frank A. Cassell, "The Structure of Baltimore's Politics in the Age of Jefferson, 1795-1812," in Aubrey C. Land, *et al.*, eds., *Law, Society, and Politics in Early Maryland* (Baltimore, 1977), 277-296; L. Marx Renzulli, Jr., *Maryland, The Federalist Years* (Rutherford, N.J., 1972); Whitman H. Ridgeway, "Community Leadership: Baltimore During the First and Second Party System," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 71 (1976), 334-349; and Victor Sapio, "Maryland's Federalist Revival, 1808-1812," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 64 (1969), 1-17.
19. The terrapin shell was to be used because Maryland had strict laws imposing heavy penalties for tar and feathering. *Report* . . . , 174, 292-296, 321-324; and *New York Evening Post*, July 13, 1812.
20. *Report* . . . , 161, 326-327.
21. *Report* . . . , 3, 63-65, 161-164, 222; and Payne to Maxcy, June 24, 1812, Vol. 31, Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Mss., Library of Congress.
22. E.P. Thompson examines the role of theater and counter-theater between the elite (patricians) and the mob (plebs). "Patrician Society, Plebian Culture," 382-405; and "Eighteenth-century English Society," 133-165. *Report* . . . , 161-164, 300-320.
23. The term "oral dramaturgical process" is from Rhys Isaac, "Dramatizing the Ideology of Revolution: Popular Mobilization in Virginia, 1774 to 1776," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., 32 (1976), 357-385.
24. Denis Rankin Clark, "Baltimore, 1729-1829: The Genesis of a Community" (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1976); Clarence P. Gould, "Economic Causes of the Rise of Baltimore," in *Essays in Colonial History Presented to Charles Mclean Andrews by his Students* (New Haven, 1931), 225-231; Richard M. Bernard, "A Portrait of Baltimore: Economic and Occupational Pattern in an Early American City," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 69 (1974), 341-361; Jane N. Garret, "Philadelphia and Baltimore, 1790-1840: A Study of Intra-Regional Unity," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 55 (1960), 1-13; James S. Van Ness, "Economic Development, Social and Cultural Changes, 1800-1850," in Richard Walsh, *et al.*, eds., *Maryland, A History 1632-1974* (Baltimore, 1974), 156-238.
25. Charles G. Steffen, "Changes in the Organization of Artisan Production in Baltimore, 1790 to 1820," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., 36 (1979), 101-117.

26. *Report* . . . , 3, 149, 160-163, 23; David Hoffman to Maxcy, July 11, 1812, Vol. 31, Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Mss., Library of Congress.
27. *Report* . . . , 169, 177, 200, 203.
28. *New York Evening Post*, July 13, 1812; *New York Spectator*, July 15, 1812; *Report* . . . , 50-51, 243, 254, 346-347.
29. *Report* . . . , 22-24, 97, 160-162, 337. The militia was called out to protect the African church, but there was no recorded clash or confrontation with the mob. *Report* . . . , 3, 149.
30. For Hanson's background see Joseph Herman Schauinger, "Alexander Contee Hanson, Federalist Partisan," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 35 (1940), 354-364.
31. *Report* . . . , 3-4; *Niles' Weekly Register* (Baltimore), Aug. 8, 1812; *Georgetown Federal-Republican*, July 27, 1812.
32. *Report* . . . , 5; A.C. Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, July 24, 1812, Harper-Pennington Collection, Maryland Historical Society; *An Exact and Authentic Narrative of the Events Which Took Place In Baltimore, on the 27th and 28th of July Last, Carefully Collected From Some of the Sufferers and Eyewitnesses* . . . (n.p., 1812); Grace Overmyer, "The Baltimore Mobs and John Howard Payne," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 58 (1963), 54-61.
33. *Report* . . . , 56, 282-284, 303-306; Henry Lee, *Correct Account of the Baltimore Mob* (Winchester, 1814), 6-8; *An Exact and Authentic Narrative* . . . , 6-10; *Niles' Weekly Register* (Baltimore) Aug. 8, 1812.
34. *Report* . . . , 25, 230-232, 257-260, 279-280, 308; Jacob Wagner to Alexander C. Magruder, Dec. 3, 1812, from Executive Archives, printed in "Baltimore Riot of 1812," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 5 (1910), 191.
35. *Report* . . . , 260.
36. A list of the Hussars and Chasseurs of the Baltimore militia for 1814 was examined and the names there checked for occupations in the city directory. Of the 81 Hussars only 32 were not listed. Of the 49 names in the directory, 27 were listed as merchants. A number of others had positions like "cashier of the city," "masonic lottery office," "atty-at-law," "President of the Levy Court and a J.P.," etc. Some had only their address listed, suggesting that they were men of means without an occupation. There were very few tradesmen. In contrast, the 47 Chasseurs were less likely to be listed — only 23 were found in the directory. Other than the officers, a few of whom were merchants, the company had more mundane occupations like those listed in the text. A list of the Baltimore militia by company can be found in *The Citizen Soldiers at North Point and Fort McHenry, September 12 & 13* (Baltimore, 1889); the directory used was John Lakin, *The Baltimore Directory and Register for 1814-1815: Containing the Names, Residence and Occupations of the Citizens* . . . (Baltimore, 1814).
37. *Report* . . . , 27, 150-151, 192-197, 211-213, 235-236, 260-272, 316, 320, 339-343; Lee, *Correct Account* . . . , 8-12; *An Exact and Authentic Narrative* . . . , 10-13; *Niles' Weekly Register* (Baltimore), Aug. 8, 1812.
38. *Report* . . . , 288-289, 312-313. Criminals at this time were executed from a cart. Thomas W. Griffith, *Annals of Baltimore* (Baltimore, 1829?), 227.

39. Twenty-three Federalists were taken into custody. Many others had been in the Charles Street fortress that night but either escaped some time during the night or had been sent out to contact city officials or reconnoiter. Overmyer, "The Baltimore Mobs," 191; *Report* . . . , 16-18, 259, 282-284.
40. *Report* . . . , 118, 191, 211-212, 224-225, 305, 317; *An Exact and Authentic Narrative* . . . , 14-16.
41. *Report* . . . , 79, 165-166.
42. *Report* . . . , 259-260.
43. *Report* . . . , 132, 135, 227-228, 290; *Niles' Weekly Register* (Baltimore), Aug. 8, 1812; *Philadelphia Poulson's American Daily Advertiser*, July 30, 1812.
44. *Report* . . . , 170, 48, 190.
45. *Report* . . . , 7-8, 28, 171; *An Exact and Authentic Narrative* . . . , 27-35, 60-62; *Niles' Weekly Register* (Baltimore), Aug. 8, 1812.
46. *Interesting Papers Illustrative of the Recent Riots at Baltimore* (Philadelphia, 1812), 55-59.
47. Natalie Zemon Davis reminds us that even in the most extreme cases, as in the religious violence she has studied, "crowds do not act in a mindless way." There is symbolic meaning behind the form and occasion of that violence. "The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France," *Past and Present* 59 (1973), 51-91, especially 91.
48. Montgomery county was an important Federalist center in Maryland known for its aristocratic gentry. It was also the county Hanson lived in. *Report* . . . , 275, 295.
49. John Thomson, who was taken from the jailhouse, tarred and feathered, as well as tortured, claimed to have feigned death to escape further maltreatment. After the "massacre" Henry Nelson, Peregrine Warfield, Charles Kilgour, Hall, and Hanson all signed a joint statement in which they asserted that they "perfectly retained their senses" throughout the ordeal and that "they sustained without betraying any signs of life. or gratifying their butchers with a groan or murmer, all the tortures that were inflicted on them." *Interesting Papers* . . . , 45; *An Exact and Authentic Narrative* . . . , 29-30.
50. At least one member of the mob said he knew Hanson personally but could not recognize him among the "corpses." *An Exact and Authentic Narrative* . . . , 30.
51. *Report* . . . , 7-8, 294-295; *An Exact and Authentic Narrative* . . . , 28.
52. *Report* . . . , 29, 251; William Lansdale to Maxcy, Aug. 3, 1812, Vol. 31, Galloway-Maxy-Markoe Mss., Library of Congress; *Philadelphia Poulson's American Daily Advertiser*, July 30, 1812, *New York Evening Post*, July 31, and Aug. 1, 1812. Meetings against the Baltimore mob were held in several Maryland counties, New York City, Boston, and other places. *Interesting Papers* . . . , 66-80. For typical Republic reaction, castigating Hanson *et al.* for provoking the mob while deploring the mob's brutality, see *Annapolis Maryland Republican*, July 29, Aug. 5, 12, 1812.
53. *Report* . . . , 8-9, 155-159, 171, 177, 200-201; Mark Pringle to Robert Smith, Aug. 5, 1812, Letterbook of Mark Pringle, Maryland Historical Society.
54. *Report* . . . , 9, 216-217.

55. De Tocqueville, Mayer, ed., *Democracy in America*, 252 fn. Of course Baltimore would have plenty of other riots in the nineteenth century to reinforce the epithet of "mobtown," but as J. Thomas Scharf points out, the riots in 1812 were "the chief cause of the evil repute into which Baltimore fell." *History of Baltimore City and County From the Earliest Period to the Present Day: Including Biographical Sketches of their Representative Men* (Philadelphia, 1881), 780-781; see also Francis F. Bierne, *The Amiable Baltimoreans* (New York, 1951), 142-155.

56. A number of anti-abolitionist riots were apparently in the spirit of this tradition. The flour riots of New York City in 1837 and the 1863 bread riot in Richmond, Virginia also seem to fit this model, while the long vigilante tradition in America is probably derived from the Anglo-American mob tradition. Leonard Richards, "*Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Anti-Abolition Mobs in Jacksonian America*" (New York, 1970); Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, eds., *American Violence: A Documentary History* (New York, 1970), 126-129; William J. Kimball, "The Bread Riot in Richmond, 1863," *Civil War History* 7 (1961), 149-154; Richard Maxwell Brown, *Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism* (New York, 1975).

57. The bulk of rioting in the nineteenth century appears to be of this type. Recent works on Jacksonian rioting which emphasize racial, ethnic, and class divisions include: Michael Feldberg, "Urbanization as a Cause of Violence: Philadelphia as a Test Case," in Allen F. Davis and Mark H. Haller, eds., *The Peoples of Philadelphia: A History of Ethnic Groups and Lower Class Life, 1790-1940* (Philadelphia, 1973), 53-69; Feldberg, "The Crowd in Philadelphia History: A Comparative Perspective," *Labor History* 15 (1974), 323-336; Feldberg, *The Philadelphia Riots of 1844: A Study in Ethnic Conflict* (Westport, Conn., 1975); David Grimsted, "Rioting in its Jacksonian Setting," *American Historical Review* 77 (1972), 361-397; Theodore K. Hammet, "Two Mobs of Jacksonian Boston: Ideology and Interest," *Journal of American History* 62 (1976), 845-868; Vincent P. Lannie and Bernard C. Diethorn, "For the Honor and Glory of God: The Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1840," *History of Education Quarterly* 8 (1968), 44-106; Bruce Laurie, "Fire Companies and Gangs in Southwark: the 1840's" in Davis and Haller, eds., *Peoples of Philadelphia*, 71-87; David Montgomery, "The Shuttle and the Cross: Weavers and Artisans in the Kennsington Riots of 1844," *Journal of Social History*, 5 (1972), 187-218; John Charles Schneider, "Mob Violence and Public Order in the American City, 1830-1865" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1971); Schneider, "Urbanization and the Maintenance of Order: Detroit, 1824-1847," *Michigan History* 60 (1976), 260-281; Paul Weinbaum, "Temperance, Politics, and the New York City Riots of 1857," *New York Historical Society Quarterly* 59 (1975), 246-270.

58. There is some evidence suggesting that even the membership of the mob was changed over the course of the summer. The men arrested in the fall of 1812 for participating in the destruction of the *Federal-Republican* office (N=11) were recruited from a wide spectrum of society, including a keeper of baths worth over \$1000, a grocer worth \$133, three artisans, an unpropertied druggist and his son, some journeymen, a drummer in the army, a sailor from a privateer, and a number of unidentified others. The men tried with the Charles Street riot (N=16) included a few less men of middling property and a number of journeymen. At the "massacre," however, none of those charged with the murder of General Lingan (N=16) seem to have been artisans or men with property. Those charged with the tar and feathering of John Thomson (N=12), which occurred the night of the "massacre," included a few men who had some property: the same keeper of baths listed above, a grocer worth \$255, and a cooper worth \$90. There were also a number of unpropertied and unidentified individuals. Thus, despite the overlapping of one or two persons, there seems to be a general shift toward a mob composed of journeymen and the unpropertied.

In each phase of the riot only about half of the men named in the court dockets could be reasonably identified using directories. A tradesman was considered a journeyman if he had less than \$100 of taxable property or if he was not listed in the tax records at all. There were others arrested for various intermediate disturbances between the destruction of the *Federal-Republican* office and the "massacre." See Baltimore Court of Oyer and Terminer Dockets,

July and September Terms, 1812, Maryland Hall of Records, Annapolis; William Fry, *The Baltimore Directory for 1810* . . . (Baltimore, 1810), Fry, *Fry's Baltimore Director For the Year 1812* . . . (Baltimore, 1812); James Lakin, *The Baltimore Directory and Register, for 1814-1815* . . . (Baltimore, 1814); Baltimore City Assessment Records, 1813, Baltimore Bureau of Archives.

59. My research on popular disorder in the early national period has revealed nearly 200 instances of riot between 1793 and 1829 in New York City alone. Paul A. Gilje, "Mobocracy: Popular Disturbances in Post-Revolutionary New York City, 1783-1829" (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, forthcoming). For the development of American police see: Roger Lane, *Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); James F. Richardson, *The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901* (New York, 1970); Wilbur R. Miller, *Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in New York and London, 1830-1870* (Chicago, 1977); Johnson, *Policing the Urban Underworld*.

60. Frederick T. Wilson, *Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, 1787-1903* (Washington, D.C., 1903); Robert Rheinders, "Militia and Public Order in Nineteenth Century America," *Journal of American Studies* 11 (1977), 81-101. Ultimately the trend implied in the last stages of the Baltimore riots is seen most starkly in the great draft riots of New York City, 1863, in which the rioters and the military fought pitched battles in the streets. For a nineteenth-century view of that and other disturbances see Joel Tyler Headley, *The Great Riots of New York, 1712-1873*. Introduction by Thomas Rose and James Rodgers (New York, 1970; originally published 1873). The best modern account of the draft riots is Adrian Cook, *The Armies of the Streets: The New York City Draft Riots of 1863* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1974).

61. George Washington Parke Custis, *Oration by Custis . . . with an Account of the Funeral Solemnities in honor of . . . Lingan* (Washington, D.C., 1812), 13, 18-20.