Dr. Andrew Wood Office: HGH 210; Phone: (408) 924-5378 Email: wooda@email.sjsu.edu Web: http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/wooda

Reading: Barwick, D. (2001). Marge's moral motivation. In W. Irwin, M.T. Conard, and A. Skoble's The Simpsons and philosophy: The d'oh of Homer. Chicago: Open Court.

Note: These comments are not designed to "summarize" the reading. Rather, they are available to highlight key ideas that will emerge in our classroom discussion. As always, it's best to read the original text to gain full value from the course.

In their chapter, "Marge's Moral Motivation" (pp. 46-58), Erion and Zeccardi illustrate Aristotelian ethics as practiced by the Simpsons' matriarch. Here, they note a key distinction between this paradigm of classical Greek virtue and that of many modern ethical theorists: goodness does not lie in actions but in traits properly balanced. This is not to say that a person may merely be good. Rather, goodness consists of traits located between extremes. As an example, courage lies between the trait of being brave and that of being foolhardy while kindness resides between generosity and extravagant giving. Morality demands moderation.

As an extension of this concept, "doing well" in life, eudaimonia, calls for a combination of long-term thinking and concern for the implications of our actions on the lives of other people. How do we live virtuous lives? Aristotle responds that we must simply perform virtuous acts until they become naturalized within us and learn from those who have practiced virtue longer than we. The authors conclude the chapter by comparing this kind of virtue, one emerging from practice and reflection, to that of "divine command" that stems solely from slavish devotion to external morality.

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