Perception (Pratyaksa) in Advaita Vedānta
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In this article the pramāṇa or "means of valid knowledge" of perception (pratyakṣa; or laukika pratyakṣa, empirical or "ordinary" perception) will be analyzed from the point of view of Advaita Vedānta.1

Pratyakṣa is defined by Monier Williams as 'present before the eyes,' hence 'visible,' 'perceptible,' 'direct perception,' 'apprehension by the senses'; and pramāṇa as 'mode of proof.' 2 V.S. Apte, in not dissimilar manner, renders pratyakṣa as 'cognizable by an organ of sense', "apprehension by the sense," "considered as a pramāṇa or mode of proof." 3 The terms of the definitions are, in part, right and, in part, wrong, and could be quite misleading in characterizing the Advaitic conception of perception. The terms 'perceptible', 'direct perception', and 'mode of proof' are strictly the only ones that apply to its definition of perception (pratyakṣa), the rest are in need of qualification as they apply to one aspect of perception only. More precisely, the terms 'given to senses', 'cognized by any organ of sense', 'present before the eye', 'visible' are inadequate depictions of, and grossly limit the scope of pratyakṣa in Advaita. These can be said to more adequately furnish a characterization of the Nyāya theory of perception. Pratyakṣa in Nyāya is defined as the "cognition which is produced through sense-organ coming into relation with an object." 4 While Nyāya makes the sense-object-contact (sannikāraṇa) the central point in its definition of pratyakṣa, Advaita differs in that it does not consider sense contact as the chief characteristic of pratyakṣa. Vedānta Paribhāṣā cites instances of perceptual experience where no sense contact is involved, such as pleasure, pain, other internal perceptions where modes of mind are directly apprehended. Further, it clearly states that the fact of the sense organ (contact) is not the criterion of perception. 5 In light of these considerations pratyakṣa, in Advaita Vedānta, calls for a redefinition. What is characteristic of pratyakṣa in Advaita is the directness of the knowledge acquired through the perceptual process.7 Clearly then, pratyakṣa or perception as a pramāṇa may, in part, involve activity of the sense organs, and the contact of the sense with objects, but there are other attendant features and functions of perception that are not brought out by the narrow characterization of pratyakṣa in Nyāya. To give a more adequate and epistemologically complete account of the perceptual process, Vedānta Paribhāṣā divides the process into two phases and formulates two criteria (prayojaka), 8 corresponding to the two phases of the process, namely:

(i) the determination of the perceptual character of cognition (jñāna-pratyakṣatva)
(ii) the determination of the perceptual character of the object (viṣaya-pratyakṣatva).

Before proceeding to give an account of the modus operandi of pratyakṣa on the basis of the preceding phases, some remarks need to be made about the psychological aspects of the process which are unique to the Advaitic theory of perception.

First, manas, which can be more or less rendered as ‘mind’, is an important faculty postulated in Advaitic theory. Manas is not a sense organ (indriya). The reason for this denial is that such internal states as pleasure are completely mind-produced and are apprehended directly. These are immediately perceived without the need of mind to mediate in the manner of a sense organ. And further, inferential knowledge is not regarded as sense-produced; it is definitely mind-produced. Manas is not an independent reality existing outside the subjective whole. Advaita regards manas to be part of a complex, unified inner-organ which is termed antahkarana, literally, ‘inner vehicle.’ Manas and antahkarana are sometimes used interchangeably. Antahkarana is described by Madhusudana Saraswati as being composed of five subtle elements (tan-matras), namely, the subtle essences of earth, water, air, fire, ether [ākāśa] with the predominance of the latter over the former. (The subtle elements are not to be equated with the gross manifestations which bear the same name.) Antahkarana is of light nature and ‘having therein at the time the predominance of the sattva-guna (lightness tendency), being extremely clear like a mirror, etc., (the antahkarana) is capable of flowing out through the sense, and like the solar light it is capable of speedily contracting and expanding.’

The antahkarana, unlike the ‘mind’ of Locke, is not a passive recipient of data, it is an active instrument in the process of perception. Advaita maintains that the antahkarana ‘goes out’ through the respective sense-organs, say the eye, pervades the object of attention and transforms itself in the form of the object. The transformation or modification of the antahkarana is technically termed vṛtti, often rendered as “mental state.” The specific ‘transformation’ or mode-ification (antahkarana vṛtti) is the apprehending mental mode which makes known the object.

Whether antahkarana “goes out” to receive the impressions of the object of apprehension, need not be a problem if, for the moment, we take the “going out” in a figurative sense; but we must not overlook the purpose for which the “outgoing” is stressed, and that is to maintain the directness of the presentation of data to the mind for its immediate apprehension (even though it may or may not be through the senses).

Indeed the postulation of antahkarana, and the properties attributed to it raise a host of empirical problems: Is there such an organ? Does it have the properties attributed to it? Does it exist independently of the body? Is it not just another term for “brain” or “brain state”? These and other questions, however, are beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, the sense attributed
to *antahkarana* is a functional one, and, as such, it can be conveniently adopted to describe the nature of the perceptual process in Advaita. The account may not be precise and acceptable to a scientific view, but our concern is not with the precision with which the psychological account of perception, per se, is given, but to show how Advaita views *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa*. Thus, it must be deemed safe to regard *antahkarana*, the inner organ, as the instrument through which the subject acquires perceptual knowledge. We may also note that the different aspects or functions of *antahkarana* are: *buddhi* (intellect), *ahamkāra* (I notion), *citta* (memory).\textsuperscript{18}

Another presupposition in Advaitic theory needs to be briefly stated. It is that the ground of all objects, contents, and details of both the objective and the subjective components of a knowledge situation is a luminous continuum of the nature of consciousness (*cit*), or intelligence, which Advaita terms *Brahman-caitanya*.\textsuperscript{19} It is this consciousness that accounts for the data that reaches the subject, and out of which the perceptual content is configured, and which on the subjective side illumines the perceptual content that results in a cognition. Whether there is such a consciousness underlying both the objective phenomena and the subjective component, is an issue which cannot be taken up here. For now, we need not assume *Brahman-caitanya* to be anything more than simply light which the objects reflect, or rather have the potentiality to reflect in normal conditions, and which presumably persists were the objective phenomena to disappear. The *Brahman-caitanya* in the subjective aspect may be assumed to be the flood of light analogous to that used in a studio to illumine the objects to be photographed. And the *antahkarana* can be compared to the negative or film in the camera, which transforms as light enters through the lens and accordingly registers the shape, color, and so forth of the object focused upon. This transformation (mode-ification) of *antahkarana*, we said earlier, is termed *vṛtti*, which corresponds to the form of the object in attention.

Now, we have three major components in a knowledge situation, each of which is associated with ‘light’ in some way or another. Again, they are the subject, object, and mode of *antahkarana* as the instrument of cognition. Granted that there is the association of the components with light-consciousness or intelligence and granted that the *antahkarana* in its various transformations is instrumental in effecting cognitions, we can, after designating the appropriate terms to these components, proceed to describe how perceptual knowledge arises. Therefore, the subject-consciousness can be termed *pramāṇa-caitanya*; the object-consciousness, *prameya*, or *viśaya-caitanya*; and the instrument of knowledge (or *antahkarana*), *pramāṇa-caitanya*.

The process may be briefly described as follows. In the initial stages when the mind is not directed toward an object, there is no movement or transformation within the *antahkarana*, and the consciousness underlying “lightens up” and overcomes the veil (that is, the seeming state of unconsciousness, or better,
nonattentiveness). The antahkarana, like a lamp, serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness which, projecting it on the object, removes the veil (the ignorance, the ‘unknownness’, ajñāna) of the object that has come within the purview of the respective sense-organ. A contact—
samyoga—is established between the antahkarana that streams out through the respective sense-organ and the object attended to. The light associated with the object presents itself, in the form of the object, hence as data, to the receptive antahkarana; the latter accordingly transforms into a vṛtti-mental state—determined by the data. As soon as the data is presented to antahkarana, there is an identification of consciousness associated with antahkarana-vṛtti with the consciousness associated with the object. The cidābhāsa, which streams out with the antahkarana and transforms upon being impressed by the presentative data, becomes identified with the data; but the data is nothing other than Brahmān-caitanya—consciousness, or light as we assumed it to be, which envelops the object and is reflected by it. Cidābhāsa is also nothing but the reflection of Brahmān-caitanya associated with the antahkarana. And so, when it is said that the vṛtti and the data are identified, what is meant is that the light in the mental state corresponds, if all goes well, one-to-one with the light of the object, or simply that there is nondifference between the mental state and the object contacted in their epistemic relation.

ghata' deh tad-ākār-vṛttiḥ ca bahir-ekatra deśe-samvadhānāt tad-ubhayā ava-chinnam caitanyam-ekameva, vibhājaka-yoh-pūya antahkarana-vṛtti ghatāvivaśaya-yoh eka-deśasthatvena bheda-ajanakatvāt.23

“The jar (object) and the mental state (antahkarana-vṛtti) in the form of jar are brought together in one and the same place outside, hence the consciousness associated (limited) by them (object and the respective mental states) are one and the same (vṛtti-light = data or viśaya-caitanya), even though the object and the mental state wrought division of consciousness.” And as a consequence of this identification of the mental state with the object, there results the vṛtti-jñāna or cognition of the form “This is a jar.” This completes the account of the first of the two phases of pratyakṣa demarcated earlier. If the criteria for the perceptual character of cognition, on the other hand, is said to be the identification of the reflected light of the mental state with that of the object, one may ask, what of the qualities of objects; are they cognized together with the object or separately? Vedānta Paribhāṣā, in describing the first phase, remarks that “there is perception so far as the jar is concerned,” which means that the qualities of the jar are cognized by mental states corresponding to those particular forms of qualities. When color of an object is cognized, its relation to the object is also cognized. This relation is known as samyukta-tādātmya, which brings a cohesion among the three into a complex perceptual judgment.25

If the size or weight of a jar, for instance, fails to impress the antahkarana, then there arises no information concerning the size of the jar though it may be
indirectly inferred. However, such an inference would not be an instance of immediate apprehension, and thus cannot be regarded as an instance of perceptual cognition.

Another point regarding the successful arising of perception is that the object toward which the mind is directed has to be an appropriate object for perception. This property of the object is called yogyatā,56 or fitness, or competency for perception. This condition rules out such ideas as dharma, right conduct, natural laws, and a host of other salient features of reality which are not directly presentable to the mind as objects of perception. The implication is that the scope of pratyakṣa may not be as wide as would be desirable, for this is the only method of common sense which makes the objects of the search directly presentable to the mind, and hence gives rise to an immediate apprehension of the object concerned. Again, the fire that is inferred at the sight of smoke is a cognition which lacks perceptual character because it is mediately and not immediately made presentative to the mind. If the need for reconfirmation arises it would be easier to effect a test in the case of smoke, being perceptual, than in the case of fire, being nonperceptual in this instance.

However, before raising the question of validity of cognition, the second phase of pratyakṣa needs to be discussed.

The second phase of pratyakṣa comes about when the consciousness associated with the subject, pramāṇa-caitanya, and the consciousness associated with the object, viṣayacaitanya, coincide in mutual identification.27


ghatā’deḥ-viṣayasya pratyakṣatvam tu pramāṇa abhinnavavam

“The perceptuality of the object such as jar and so on consists in the non-difference of the object from the subject.” What is meant is that when the subject, through the instrumentality of the antahkarana-vṛtti, is informed of the vṛtti-jhāna, or cognition, he immediately relates to it, and thereby to the object corresponding to the content of vṛtti-jhāna, as his cognition. When this identification, that is, of the subject’s reflexive awareness of his mental state, occurs, he predicates the object to his being aware of something. He thus reports “I see a jar.” Another way of putting it would be to say that the light of Brahman-caitanya associated with the subjective self (as distinct from the light reflected on the antahkarana, which was termed cidābhāsa) further illumines the mental state which is identified with the object, as seen earlier in the first phase. The mental state subsides, and the subject becomes aware of the object itself. The object is all the more clearly presented to the subject in virtue of the double reflection it receives, the first from cidābhāsa that streamed out with the antahkarana, and, second, from Brahman-caitanya that the subject sheds. When the cognition is direct and immediate, as it is if the first phase holds true, then the perception of object that results in the second phase, is direct and immediate too. The cognition is self-evident to the subject; it is as self-evident as the cognition of pleasure, of pain, and so on. And through
the instrumentality of the cognitive, the object is brought to the immediate awareness of the subject, and a "unity" of subject and object is effected. In this reflective stage, there is assimilation of the mental contents corresponding to the configuration of the object, its qualities, the relation between the two and with familiar or recognized percepts. With the completion of this assimilative function of *antaḥkaraṇa*, perception of the totality of the object presented occurs. The perception of the object by the subject marks the effective role of the second phase of *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*.

The difficulty with accepting the account just given is that if there is a "unity" or integration of the subjective and objective components (*visaya-caitanya-pramāṇa-caitanya abhīnna*) what prevents the emergence of a cognition such as, say, "I am the jar," "I am the book"? *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* considers such an objection, and answers that what is implied in the criteria is *not* the 'identification' or 'unity' as such, but the non-difference of the objective reality from the subjective reality.28 This, however, is no answer to the problem, for if this were true, that is, that this stage marks the non-difference of the objective reality from the subjective reality, and the underlying reality of both components being ex hypothesis non-different according to Advaita, as discussed earlier, then all that can be present at this stage would be *Brahman-caitanya*; thus, there would simply be no cognitive configuration. To free its account from this objection, Advaita would have to reinstate the constant presence of the cognitive—*vr̥tti-jñāna* as the mode or condition which marks the difference with reference to the subject and the object. The subjective self is not apprehended, in the reflective act at least, immediately as *Brahman-caitanya*, because its own self-apprehension or self-illumination in the form of "I" is also marked by a specific mental state or mode of *antaḥkaraṇa*29 of that form, which results in the reflexive ego-sense (*ahaṁkāra*, literally, "I-maker"). This mode must also be given at the second phase and thus the difference between the subject and object is marked by the difference of the 'transformation' (that is, the *mode* and *vr̥tti*, respectively) to which the two components give rise. But because they arise in immediate succession to one another, their illumination, or awareness, is immediate in their cognitive manifestations; their qualitative difference in respect of the respective transformations the *antaḥkaraṇa* assumes, and the moment that separates them, may well be missed in an introspective analysis, as the author of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* most probably did. But the important point that *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* attempted to make remains central to the Advaita theory, that through the operation of *vr̥tti* in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, as its agent, the subject and object are brought into a direct relation, and thus in virtue of a mutual identification and not the identity, of their respective cognitive effects—*mode* and *vr̥tti*—an immediate perception of the object is acquired.

One other difficulty with the second criteria is: What marks the finality of the 'coming together' of the (subjective) *mode* and the (objective) *vr̥tti* in
revealing the object? Is it inconceivable that another cognition may be necessary for the apprehension of the relation between the subjective and the objective? And if a second cognition is admitted, then another would be necessary to apprehend this, and yet another for this? The answer to this was hinted at a little earlier, when it was said that the content such as pain, and so on, is immediately apprehended. However, the need for another cognition to apprehend the mental state of pain is not necessarily obviated by this answer. But if another cognition is admitted, then this leaves open the possibility of an infinite series of cognitions needed to reveal ones preceding the other. If the regressus ad infinitum is to be avoided, and any theory of perception has to meet this challenge, then there has to be admitted one cognition which is self-illumined and is not in need of being illuminated by another cognition. Unless a basic self-evident cognition is admissible, there can be no solution to this problem. The Advaita bases its solution on the introspective evidence of the reflexive "I-notion." Even if one could remove all mental states (vṛtti-jñāna) that may be thought to illumine the "I-notion," nevertheless an 'awareness' of the self-illumined mode of the subjective reality would remain. And it is by virtue of the mutual conjunction (sannikāraṇa) of the subjective mode and the vṛtti-jñāna that the cognition too becomes illumined. The vṛtti in the form of the object impresses itself as if it were the mode of the subject itself, and thereby comes to be apprehended, but as a predicate—and not as the pure subject-content which is the "I-notion"—in the subject's apperception. And hence the perceptual judgment: "I see the jar; it is big and blue." But is it veridical perception? Advaita would answer in the affirmative on the grounds that, given that the appropriate instrument of pramāṇa, in this case the antahkarāṇa operating through the sense organs, is present and is not defective, or diseased, and given that the external environ is free from befogging obstacles, such as dimness of light, smoke in the air (and so forth), and given that the object is clearly presented, then it logically follows that the perception is veridical; in other words, a valid cognition-pramāṇa is the result (phala) of pratyakṣa. It may be asked whether the ground for the claim to validity still holds true if the antahkarāṇa was not assumed to “go out.” That is to say, would the presentation of the object to a sense-organ or sense-organs give rise to the same vṛtti in the antahkarāṇa as is supposed to occur when the antahkarāṇa “goes out” to establish contact with the object? For if the 'outgoing' of antahkarāṇa is denied, then the instrumentality of the sense-organs would be required to effect contact with the object, as it is in Nyāya theory. And once the mediacy of the sense-organs is admitted, a further objection may be raised that then the data received by the antahkarāṇa cannot be regarded as immediate, with the consequence that cognitive content loses its 'presentative' character. Thus, the veracity of the cognition becomes doubtful.

The objection is a reasonable one, and it does leave Advaita with a problem which may not easily resolved. The 'outgoing' of antahkarāṇa runs into difficulty
when we take the instance of the sight of a very distant object, such as the solar star. The anatāhkarāṇa would travel to and back very quickly only if it could travel at almost the speed of light to cover the distance instantaneously. Advaita maintains that the antahkarāṇa is composed of the sattva-guna, of the subtle essence of the physical elements, and that when it streams out through the eyes it streams out as light—tejas—which is the essence of the eye, and thus travels at a great speed as light does. Still, however, difficulties arise with the problem of traversing time for which Advaita gives no adequate solution. Science tells us that some stars are so far away that their light takes some light years to reach us. And moreover, though we may see a star now, there is no way we can be sure of the existence of the star at the same place and time—it may have moved away or may have even disappeared altogether! In view of this evidence, or the lack of it, how can it be maintained that when we see the star, our antahkarana reaches out to the star? The difficulty can be avoided, and with due respect to parsimony, it may be simpler to assume that light from the star travels to the antahkarana. Similarly, in the case of other cognitive acts, such as hearing, touching, and so on, it would be more reasonable to maintain that impulses or data—‘sense data’ (as is called in most present-day analysis)—from different parts of the object and environ reaches the antahkarana. But it is not inconsistent to maintain that the antahkarana determines which object, or features thereof, the sense organs are to focus upon, and that it selects only such data as may be necessary for the specific cognitive act to arise, being characteristic of the object and its features. And now, Advaita would argue there is a clear case for veridical perception to arise for the data, though it may be admitted to reach the antahkarana through the sense organs, need not therefore become nonpresentative. Let us take a simple particular instance from everyday experience to see if Advaita’s position holds true.

I see a blue pen on the table; I pick it up in my hand and begin to write with it. Under normal circumstances, the perception of the pen is veridical, according to Advaita. It explains in the present perceptual situation the mind is receiving visual datum A, call this characteristic of the pen. There is thus an immediate awareness of the pen. Since I have got it in my hand I am also receiving impulses of tactile datum B. I can change the position of the pen in my hand, pass it on to the other hand, handle it in a few different ways, throw it up and catch it, and press its tip along the page. As I do these things with the pen, I am also receiving a series of data, call these C, D, E, and so on. And I might say, ‘now I am certain I have a pen in my hand’. But does this mean that the veridity of my perception of a pen is acquired through the confirmation that B, C, D, E constitute, or does the veridity lie with A itself? Most present-day theories would contend that on the basis of A, B, C, D, E, and so on. I make the inference that I perceive a pen. Another, Nyāya, for example, would contend that A gives me a vague picture of a pen, but A, B, C, D, E, and so on gives me a better picture of the pen.31 And if I add on other possible data of the relevant kind,
then my picture becomes clearer. Veridity in most views, is a quantative measure, while for Advaita it is a qualitative measure.

Advaita would point out that the two views stated previously do not make sufficient distinction between (a) A’s presenting the pen; (b) my being sure that A is presenting the pen.\(^{32}\)

First there is the presentation of the pen by A, then follows my conviction, feeling of certainty, that A is presenting a pen. But for A to present the pen, it is not necessary that B, C, D, and so on are presented as well. A is, no doubt, a presentative in its own right; B, C, D, E, and so on do not in any way constitute A’s presentative character. If I am awake, and if no obstacles befog my vision, then it is reasonable to maintain that I am seeing a pen presented by A. There is no inference here, according to Advaita, it is a case of direct presentation of the pen by A. But if for any reason I happen to doubt whether A is presentative, then B is resorted to, to remove my doubt; and if I still wish to ensure against further doubts, I would seek corroboration from C, D, E, and so on. Such doubts, however, need not and do not always arise.

Hence what is given as direct presentation is the veridical content of my perception. It is not usual that I want to be absolutely certain about the veridity of my perception; I do not have to go through a long process of checking against possible slips and errors if I take care to employ my perceptual faculty adequately, and have a proper epistemological attitude at first counter. Occasional errors there will be, still however, the fact of exceptions do not undermine the veridity of those large numbers of perceptions which are errorless. If the preceding argument is correct, then Advaita is justified in maintaining that the proper employment of \(pratyakṣa\) leads to veridical perception; and so long as it remains so, it is a \(pramā\).

NOTES

1. It may be noted that in looking for an account of perception in Advaita, we do not get much help from the earliest fathers and founders of the school. Śaṅkarāchārya, for instance, though he maintained a realist position regarding the phenomenal world, did not give a detailed account of the process through which experience, and validation of the knowledge of the external world are had. Padmapāda (820 A.D.), his immediate disciple, in the opinion of S.N. Das Gupta (see his *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II [Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975], p. 105), was perhaps the first to attempt a Vedantic explanation of the process of perception. Padmapāda’s cursory attempts were taken over and developed by Prakāśātman (thirteenth century) and later writers in that era. The views of the later Advaita writers on \(pratyakṣa\), as on other \(pramāṇas\), were collected and systematized in the brilliant exposition of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra (Seventeenth century).


6. Ibid. I. 61.
8. Ibid. I. 15.

11. Pañcadasī VI 70 (hereafter cited as P.C.) of Vidyaranya.


14. V.P. I. 18, p. 15. The antakashānyā’s function of ‘going out’ is compared to water from a tank flowing out through a channel to a number of adjoining fields and assuming the respective form, whether rectangular or any other shape.

16. Ibid. T. M. P. Mahadevan in his Philosophy of Advaita (New Delhi: Arnold Heinemann, 1976), p. 13, translates vṛtti as ‘psychosis’; but this has strong psychological and not epistemic denotation.

17. The term ‘mode-ification’ is a rendering by Ian Kesarcodi-Watson in “Citta-vṛtti”, an unpublished paper.

18. Vedāntasūtra of Sādānanda Swāmi. II. 67.

19. V.P. 6 Brahmansātvatya is identified with Brahmansākṣāt and Sākṣāt-parokṣāt-Brahman in ibid., I. 2, p. 7 and 8 respectively; also in P.C. VIII-4.

20. P.C. VIII-6. Vidyāranya calls this light ciddabhāsa (reflected light): “vṛtti tipped with ciddabhāsā like the steel-head of a spear pierces its (object’s) cover of dullness”. In Yogasūtra this aspect is the “citta” I. 2.

21. V.P. I. 57, p. 31.
22. V.P. I., p. 21.
23. Ibid. I. 21, also see Summary of points I. 40. p. 24.
24. Ibid. I. 20. The datum of jar in the form of vṛtti corresponding to jar is the content of cognition, for there is no difference between datum and vṛtti.


27. Ibid., p. 25, I. 41.

29. Vedānta Paribhāṣā, as said earlier, does not deny the “1-notion” to be a mental state, but it denies it to be a vṛtti-transformation, for there is no extraneous data that impinges on the antakashānya that gives rise to the “1-notion”; V.P. I. 45, p. 29.

30. Ibid. I. 50, p. 28–57, especially pp. 51 and 57. Other terms for sannikara are: pratyāsati, and, samāpatti.

31. “Ansavyavāsaya” is a Nyāya theory, in V.P. I. 31, p. 20, where it is refuted.
32. I have adopted this formulation from N. Mishra; “The Role of Sense-Data in Perception”, Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner), Vol. 7, p. 47.