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THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS IN THE BUDDHIST
EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION

1. INTRODUCTION

Do minds other than one's own exist? This is a serious problem especially for the Vijñānavādins, Buddhist idealist, for they deny the existence of the external objects. If other minds were admitted, their theory would be inconsistent. If other minds were denied, it would be meaningless to preach to others.

Dharmakīrti, in the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, the first independent treatise on this problem, explains that the existence of other minds can be inferred even from the viewpoint of the Vijñānavādins. According to him, the existence of other minds is inferred from the appearance of other persons' speeches and actions. However, Ratnakīrti, in *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa*, another independent treatise on this problem, from the viewpoint of the Vijñānavādins, explains in detail that other minds cannot be inferred at all and denies their existence. His view seemingly contradicts Dharmakīrti's view. The purpose of this paper is to analyze their views and to consider how the problem of other minds is dealt with in the Buddhist epistemological tradition.¹

2. DHARMAKĪRTI'S *SANTĀNĀNTARASIDDHI*

2.1. Dharmakīrti, when he takes the Sautrāntika standpoint, of course admits the existence of other minds. As is well known, in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, he argues against the Cārvākas that inference is a means of valid cognition by pointing out that we can know other minds only through inference. For the Sautrāntikas, the existence of other minds as well as of external objects is known by inference.²

2.2. In the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, on the other hand, Dharmakīrti consistently adopts the Vijñānavāda standpoint. Dharmakīrti as a Vijñānavādin discusses the problem of other minds with the Sautrāntikas there.

First of all, Dharmakīrti states the view of the Sautrāntikas as follows:

Observing in our own bodies that [our bodily and verbal] actions are preceded by [our] mental [actions], we infer [the existence of other] minds from the fact that the [bodily and verbal actions] are grasped in other [bodies as well].³

After that, Dharmakīrti maintains that the existence of other minds can be inferred even from the viewpoint of the Vijñānavādins in the same manner. But the Vijñānavādins do not admit that actions exist outside of minds. For them, therefore, the existence of other minds is inferred from the appearance of other persons' actions. The Vijñānavādin's process of inference can be stated as follows:

Observing that the appearance of our bodily and verbal actions is preceded by our minds, we infer the existence of other minds from the appearance of other persons' bodily and verbal actions.⁴

This can be regarded as the inference based on the probans as effect (*kāryahetu*). By observing our own minds and the appearance of our actions, we establish the causal relation between mind and appearance of action. Then, we infer the existence of other minds from the appearance of other persons' actions which are the effect of other minds.⁵

2.3. A question now arises. Other minds can never be perceived. Then, how can we infer them? We can observe only that our own actions are preceded by our minds. Since other minds are imperceptible (*adrśya*), we cannot apply the relation between our own minds and actions to them.⁶

On this problem, the Sautrāntikas explain that we can infer other minds from other persons' actions because our own minds are not fit to be a cause of other persons' actions. According to the Sautrāntikas, the unfitness is for the following three reasons:⁷

- 1) We do not experience that our own minds produce other persons' actions.
- 2) The actions based on our minds are observed in our own bodies, not in the body of another person.
- 3) If other persons' actions were based on our minds, other persons' actions would be experienced just like our own actions.

In principle, Dharmakīrti agrees with the Sautrāntikas. The cognitions in which our own actions appear are caused by our own minds, and then the actions appear as internal. Therefore, the cognitions, in which other persons' actions appear as external, should be produced by causes other than our minds.

The difference between the appearance of one's own actions and that of other persons' actions is taken into consideration here. According to Dharmakīrti, our own actions appear as things which are not separated from our body. But other persons' actions appear as things separated from our own body.⁸

However, Dharmakīrti notes that such a difference is not fundamental. There can be some exceptions. For example, although the movement of the stone cast by us and the movement of another person shaken by us appear as separated from our own body, they are caused by our own intentions. Therefore, Dharmakīrti concludes that whether the actions are separated from our own body or not is not a crucial factor in inferring other minds.⁹

2.4. Let us turn to the next problem. What is known through such an inference? Are other minds themselves known through it? If other minds themselves are known, the existence of an object other than one's own mind would be accepted. If not, other minds would not be known through the inference.¹⁰

On the problem, Dharmakīrti insists that another person's mind not in particular but in general is known through the inference. If mind in particular were known through the inference, the specific forms of another person's mind would be known through it just as those of one's own mind are known through perception.¹¹

In Dharmakīrti's epistemology, inference cannot reveal the unique characteristics of objects. It is concerned only with the universal. He reaffirms this in the *Santānāntarasiddhi*. He points out there that if inference could reveal the unique characteristics of objects, the following unacceptable results would occur:

- 1) There would be no difference between perception and inference.
- 2) Inference could be concerned neither with the things in the future and the past nor with unreal things.
- 3) The object of inference would have causal efficiency (*arthakriyāśakti*).¹²

Moreover, Dharmakīrti explains that inference is a means of valid cognition not because it reveals an object itself, but because our behaviors based on it do not fail us. The correspondence (*avisamvāda*) is regarded as a basis of its validity.¹³ The inference of other minds is concerned only with the universal. Although it cannot reveal other minds themselves, it is valid because our behaviors based on it do not fail us.¹⁴

2.5. As is well known, in the Buddhist tradition it is admitted that Yogins and Buddha can directly know other minds. Dharmakīrti, in the final portion of the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, takes up their knowledge of other minds.

Firstly, Dharmakīrti points out that Yogin's knowledge of other minds does not reveal other minds themselves. They are considered to know other minds not because they know other minds themselves but because those which have great resemblance to other minds clearly appear in their knowledge. They do not truly know other minds. According to Dharmakīrti, Yogins are not free of the distinction between the *grāhya* 'object apprehended' and the *grāhaka* 'subject apprehending', because they have not attained enlightenment yet. Yogin's knowledge of other minds is regarded as valid just because their behaviors based on it do not fail them.¹⁵

To the problem whether Buddha knows other minds themselves or not, Dharmakīrti comments only that Buddha's omniscience is beyond our understanding because Buddha's knowledge is beyond our knowledge and words.¹⁶

2.6. The inference of other minds stated in the *Santānāntarasiddhi* can be summarized as follows:

Observing in our own bodies that the appearance of our bodily and verbal actions is preceded by the activity of our minds, we establish the causal relation between the mind and the appearance of action. Then we infer other minds from the appearance of actions which are not caused by us and which appear as separated from our body in most cases. Other minds in general are known through the inference. It is regarded as valid because of its correspondence.¹⁷

3. RATNARKĪRTI'S *SANTĀNĀNTARADŪṢAṆA*

3.1. Let us turn now to Ratnakīrti's *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa*. There, Ratnakīrti explains in detail that other minds cannot be inferred at all and denies their existence. First of all, he states opponent's view as follows:

Some people explain as follows: There exist other minds, which are known through inference. Observing that our verbal and bodily actions appear immediately after our intentions (*icchācitta*) and that they do not appear in the absence of [our intentions], we first determine the causal relation between intention and appearance of verbal [and bodily] action. Causal relation is then established by perception and non-perception and consists of positive and negative concomitance. And then, observing that verbal and bodily actions separated [from our own body] appear even when any intentions

are not perceived, we infer [other] intentions to be the cause of the [appearance of the actions]. Thus, other minds are established.¹⁸

Here, we notice, this argument is quite similar to Dharmakīrti's. In the *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa*, Ratnakīrti refutes the Vijñānavādin's argument for the existence of other minds as it is stated by Dharmakīrti in the *Santānāntarasiddhi*.

3.2. Let us examine Ratnakīrti's refutation. First of all, Ratnakīrti analyzes the intention which is regarded as a cause of the appearance of actions. Is it perceptible for one who infers, or does the inference use intention in general, which need not be qualified by perceptibility or imperceptibility?¹⁹

Firstly, if it is perceptible, its nonexistence will be proved. While inferring, we do not perceive the intention and therefore we will establish its absence by the non-perception of a perceptible object (*dr̥śyānupalabdhi*). If we do perceive it, there is no need to infer it.²⁰

Secondly, if intention in general is regarded as a cause of the appearance of action, how is the causal relation established? We can determine only that our own intention, which is perceptible, is the cause of the appearance of our action. We can never determine that intention in general is the cause of the appearance of action.

Even if a particular fire is remote in space or time, we can suppose that it should be perceived if it were here. Accordingly, we can determine the causal relation between fire and smoke in general. However, we can never perceive the fire of digestion (*jaṭharāgni*), which is substantially different (*svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa*) from the fire regarded as the cause of smoke. Therefore, we cannot determine that a fire common even to the fire of digestion is the cause of smoke. As for intention, we cannot suppose that intention common to other persons should be perceived if it were here. It is substantially different from the intention regarded as the cause of the appearance of action. Thus, we can never determine that intention in general is the cause of the appearance of action.²¹

Here, the following objection is raised: Intention in general can be regarded as perceptible in reference to self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) because other persons' intentions are perceived by their self-consciousness.²² Ratnakīrti answers this by pointing out that we should not take into consideration the person other than the one who infers. If we could regard something as perceptible on the basis of other persons' experience, a goblin (*piśāca*) would be perceptible. A goblin can be perceived by some Yogins or another goblin. Since we can never perceive other persons' minds, a mind common to other

persons' should not be regarded as perceptible. Here, Ratnakīrti seems to point out that only by observing our own mind and the appearance of our action, we cannot establish a rule applicable to other minds.²³

As we have seen, Dharmakīrti explains that it is a mind in general that is proved. Such a theory is refuted by Ratnakīrti here. Moreover, it is noted that Mokṣākaragupta, in the *Tarkabhāṣā*, regards other persons' minds as perceptible on the grounds that they are perceived by other persons' self-consciousness. He insists there that we can establish the inevitable relation between mind in general and action in general, and that we can infer the existence of other minds.²⁴ But such a standpoint is rejected here.

Thus, Ratnakīrti refutes the proof of other minds' existence by pointing out that a mind neither in general nor in particular is fit to be proved.

3.3. Let us turn now to the next refutation. After Ratnakīrti finds faults with the argument for the existence of other minds, he presents an argument against it (*bādhaka*). He points out the non-appearance of the distinction between one's own mind and another.

If other minds were existent, one's own mind should be distinct from them. But such a distinction never appears. Ratnakīrti quotes Jñānaśrīmitra's words from the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*.

If one's own mind is distinct from another by nature, it should appear together with a limiting object (*avadhi*), [i.e., another mind]. [Therefore, one's own mind should not be distinct from another.] Nor should it be apprehended that [one's own mind] is identical with [another mind]. (RNA 147,17–18 = JNA 458,21–22. Cf. JNA 570,15–16).

Even if one has a distinction, other things do not appear at all. Then, what is it distinct from? (RNA 147,19 = JNA 456,24. Cf. JNA 573,19.)

Our notion of distinction depends on the knowledge of two things. When we know only one of them, we can never distinguish one from another. The distinction between one's own mind and another also depends on the knowledge of them. But we can only perceive our own minds.

For example, while perceiving our own minds, we cannot perceive a rabbit's horn. Therefore, we cannot make a distinction between our minds and a rabbit's horn. Similarly, since we cannot perceive other minds, we cannot make a distinction between our own minds and other minds.²⁵

Ratnakīrti refers to the following three difficulties in admitting the distinction between one's own mind and another:

Firstly, if the distinction between one's own mind and another is admitted, the distinction between one's own mind and external objects should be admitted as well. The Vijñānavādins, who deny the existence of external objects, cannot admit the existence of other minds. Ratnakīrti seems to point out that the acceptance of the existence of other minds is contradictory to the theory of *vijñaptimātratā*.²⁶

Secondly, if the distinction is admitted, causality should be admitted. The apprehension of causality presupposes that of distinction. However, since two things differing in time are not apprehended together, the distinction between them cannot be apprehended. Therefore, in reality, causality can never be known. Ratnakīrti quotes Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* III 4d: *saṃvṛtyāstu yathā tathā*. There, Dharmakīrti insists that causal efficiency was admitted only conventionally. The acceptance of the distinction conflicts with Dharmakīrti's statement.²⁷

Thirdly, the acceptance of the distinction is contradictory to the theory of *citrādvaita*. The Vijñānavādins, who prove the nonduality of cognition, if they admitted the distinction between one's own mind and the mind of another, could not reject the objection that the theory is refuted by perception grasping a distinction. Since cognition has nonduality, no distinction can be perceived. Ratnakīrti, here, pays attention to the inconsistency with the theory of *citrādvaita*.²⁸

3.4. Here, the next objection is raised. By which means is the non-existence of other minds proved? The existence of other minds may be refuted in the above manner. But, is there any means of establishing the nonexistence of other minds? It cannot be established through perception, because perception leads us to affirmative judgement and not to negative judgement, nor through inference, because imperceptible objects cannot be proved to be nonexistent through inference. Since other minds are regarded as imperceptible, we can not prove them to be either existent or nonexistent.²⁹

Answering this, Ratnakīrti presents the proof of the nonexistence of other minds as follows:

[Vyāpti:] If something (X), being perceived, does not appear in some form (Y), then X cannot be dealt with as a thing existing in that form (Y). For example, a blue thing, which does not appear in the yellow form, cannot be dealt with as a thing existing in the yellow form. [Pakṣadharmatā:] One's own mind, being perceived, does not appear in a form distinct from other minds. This is, with regard to distinction, the non-perception of the object itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*), without any reference to the qualifier "perceptibility". This is formulated when it is denied that another mind is identical with one's own mind.³⁰

Here, Ratnakīrti does not directly prove the nonexistence of other minds. Since they are imperceptible, their nonexistence cannot be proved by inference. Therefore, he denies the distinction between one's own mind and other minds. He considers that the denial of the distinction implies the nonexistence of other minds.

Ratnakīrti explains that the probans is not illegitimate (*asiddhi*). If the distinction appeared, the limiting object (*avadhi*), i.e., another mind, would appear. Since another mind is not perceived, the distinction between one's own mind and another is not perceived.³¹

Thus, denying the distinction between one's own mind and another, Ratnakīrti proves the nonexistence of another mind. According to him, other minds are unreal, just as a rabbit's horn, the universal (*sāmānya*) and so on.³²

3.5. Finally, Ratnakīrti argues about Buddha's knowledge of other minds. If there exist other minds, how does Buddha know them? Ordinary people may suspect that there exist other minds, but Buddha, who is an omniscient being (*sarvajña*), does not have such a suspicion at all. If other minds are existent, he should indubitably know them. But, by which means does Buddha know them? First, he does not know them by inference, because the inference of other minds is not correct, as we have seen. If he knew them by inference, he would know them indirectly and therefore he would not be omniscient. Secondly, he cannot know them by perception. If Buddha knows other minds by perception, there would exist the *grāhya-grāhaka* relation between other minds and Buddha's mind, and consequently the theory of external object (*bahirarthavāda*) would be accepted.³³

The last point is noteworthy. Ratnakīrti, here points out that the acceptance of the existence of other minds is contradictory to the theory that the *grāhyagrāhaka* relations are denied in the ultimate sense. The Vijñānavādins, who advocate the theory of *vijñaptimātrata*, should not accept that a mind other than one's own is grasped by perception.³⁴

Thus, Ratnakīrti concludes that other minds do not exist at all. According to Ratnakīrti, therefore, even if Buddha does not know them, the fault that he would not be omniscient does not follow. Since other minds do not exist at all, Buddha never knows them.³⁵ Here, Ratnakīrti clearly denied Buddha's knowledge of other minds. Such a standpoint seems to contradict the traditional view that Buddha can know other minds. But Ratnakīrti does not offer any comments on this contradiction.³⁶

3.6. Moreover, Ratnakīrti calls our attention to the point that the existence of other minds is denied not in the conventional sense but in the ultimate sense. He does not intend that other minds are suspected to be existent from any viewpoints. In our conventional world, there may be such a suspicion. Otherwise, we could not act with respect to other persons.

Even if one who denies the existence of other minds says to others that other minds do not exist at all, there is no fault of self-contradiction. Although other minds are not ultimately existent, in the realm of convention, one can speak about it to others in order to enlighten them.³⁷

Thus, Ratnakīrti introduces the theory of two truths, i.e., the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) and the ultimate (*paramārtha*), to the problem of other minds. On the level of the ultimate truth, the distinction neither between *grāhya* and *grāhaka* nor between one's own mind and another exists. Nonduality is admitted as ultimate.³⁸

As I have examined in another paper,³⁹ Prajñākaragupta and Jñānaśrīmitra explain that both causality and validity are admitted only in the conventional sense because nonduality is ultimate. The notion of causality needs the cognition of two things. But, since two things cannot be cognized in reality, causality is not truly known. Similarly, validity based on correspondence needs two cognitions. But, each of two cognitions reveals its own object only, and it does not reveal the correspondence between them. Therefore, validity based on correspondence is not truly known. Both causality and validity are objects of empirical knowledge which has not yet been analyzed. Our notion of them is only a mistaken belief. Therefore they are admitted only in the conventional sense.⁴⁰ Ratnakīrti's view on other minds is quite similar to these views on causality and validity. In the ultimate sense, other minds are denied because the distinction between one's own mind and another is not known at all. But they are not denied in the conventional sense.

We must remember here that Dharmakīrti, in the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, explains that the validity of Yogin's knowledge of other minds is guaranteed only by its correspondence. He notes there that a Yogin is not free of the distinction between *grāhya* and *grāhaka*. (See 2.5.) Dharmakīrti seems to understand that if other minds were perceived, there would be the *grāhya-grāhaka* relation between one's own mind and other minds. The acceptance of the existence of other minds, just as that of the existence of external objects, is contradictory to the theory of *vijñaptimātratā*. In this respect, Dharmakīrti, in the *Santānāntarasiddhi*,

deals with other minds only in the conventional sense. Moreover, as we have seen, he often insists that the inference of other minds can be regarded as valid because of its correspondence. Such an inference is conventional and is denied on the level of the ultimate truth. But, he does not clearly mention that the existence of other minds is denied in the ultimate sense. He comments only that Buddha's knowledge is beyond our argument.⁴¹

Here, we may recall Jñānaśrīmitra's remarks on causality in the *Kṣaṇabhāṅgādhyāya*. He explains there that although causality is admitted only in the conventional sense, it cannot be refuted on the level of the ultimate truth. In the ultimate sense, all distinctions disappear. The distinction neither between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* nor between *sādhana* and *sādhya* exists. Since our logical arguments, both proof and refutation, are based on the premise that such a distinction is existent, they are only conventional. In this sense, on the highest level, causality cannot be refuted.⁴² The same may be true of the existence of other minds. It is admitted only in the conventional sense, and is denied in the ultimate sense. But, it cannot be refuted on the level of the ultimate truth. Therefore, the existence of other minds should not be refuted. It does not matter whether the existence of other minds is known in the conventional sense or in the ultimate sense. The ultimate truth is beyond our argument.⁴³ Ratnakīrti insists that his refutation is not absolute. We should cling neither to the acceptance of other minds nor to the denial of it.⁴⁴

4. CONCLUSION

Dharmakīrti, in the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, argues for the existence of other minds from the standpoint of the Vijñānavādins. Ratnakīrti, on the other hand, argues against it in the *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa*. Their views are seemingly contradictory to each other. Ratnakīrti, however, denies it in the ultimate sense, not in the conventional sense. According to him, on the level of the highest truth, the existence of other minds is denied as is causality. Nonduality is ultimately admitted. But, from this point of view, all distinctions disappear. In this sense, therefore, neither the argument for nor the argument against the existence of these things is absolute. The ultimate truth is beyond our argument.

NOTES

¹ Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntarasiddhi* was translated into modern languages in Stcherbatsky (1922), Kitagawa (1955), and Katsura (1983). Ratnakīrti's *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa*

had been translated into English by Yuichi Kajiyama (Kajiyama, 1965), who recently published a Japanese translation of the same work. (Kajiyama 2000) The problem of other minds in the Buddhist epistemological tradition was treated with in Sharma (1985), Negi (1997), etc.

² PV III 68: *siddhañ ca paracaitanyapratipatteḥ pramāṇadvayam / vyāhārādaḥ pravṛtteḥ ca siddhas tadbhāvaniścayaḥ //*

³ SS 1,5–7: *rang lus blo sngon du 'gro ba yi / bya ba mthong nas gzhan la'ang de / 'dzin phyir gal te blo shes 'gyur / ...* (Rāmakaṅṭha's *Nareśvaraparīkṣāvṛtti*, Kashmir Series, p. 62. . . .: *buddhipūrvam kriyām drṣṭvā svadehe 'nyatra tadgrahaṇāt / jñāyate yadi dhīś* (cittamātre 'py eṣa nayāḥ samāḥ // See Kitagawa 409.) Cf. *Siddhiviniścayaṭikā* I 164–167, *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* 303, *Tattvārtharājavārttika* 26.); SS 4,18–5,2: *gal te bdag nyid la bya ba dang brjod pa sems kyi g-yo ba sngon du 'gro ba can dag mthong nas / gzhan la de dag mthong bas g-yo ba rjes su dpog par byed na / ...* C. PV III 475cd–476c: *pratyakṣaṇ ca dhiyam drṣṭvā tasyāś ceṣṭābhīdhādikam // paracittānumānañ ca na syād ātmany adarśanāt / sambandhasya ...*

⁴ SS 5,2–6,5: *sams tsam du smra bas kyang gzhan gyi sams rjes su dpag par nus te // 1 // de yang shes pa gzhan gyi g-yo ba'i khyad par med par lus dang ngag gi rnam par rig byed du snang ba'i shes pa de lta bu dag yod par ni mi 'dod do // 2 // Cf. SS 29, 17–32, 17: re zhig bya ba de nyid kyi kyang sams de ci ste rtogs par byed // 40 // sams kyi 'bras bu yin pa'i phyir ro // 41 // de'i 'bras bu yin pa ni sams gzhan la yang 'dra bas ci ste rtogs par mi byed // 42 // gzhan yang gal te bya ba de rang yod pa tsam gyis rang gi rgyud rtogs par byed na ni / mi dmigs pas kyang de lta bu rtogs par 'gyur ro // 43 // gal te rtags ni shes pa la ltos pa'i phyir mi 'gyur ro zhe na // 44 // de la de'i tshe gzhan gyi sams las ni bya ba'o / bya ba las ni shes pa'o / shes pa las ni de rtogs pa'o zhes bya ba brgyud pa 'dis ci zhig bya // 45 // bya bar snang ba gzhan gyi sams las rab tu skye ba'i chos can gyi shes pa kho na 'di* rtogs par byed pa yin par 'gyur te // 46 // de rtogs pa ni tha mar yang de la brten pa'i phyir ro // 47 // (*B: 'dis; D: 'di)*

⁵ As Katsura (1983) pointed out, the inference stated by Dharmakīrti in the *Santānāntarasiddhi* is similar in essence to the so-called 'argument from analogy' for other minds in Western philosophy.

⁶ SS 6,15–16: *gal te gzhan gyi shes pa'i byed pa mi dmigs pa'i phyir gzhan gyi blo rjes su dpag par mi rung ngo zhe na / Cf. RNA (ISD) 45.13–14: nanu yadi drṣyāgnidhūmasāmānyayor iva drṣyātmanor kāryakāraṇasāmānyayoḥ pratyakṣāgnidhūmasāmānyayor iva drṣyātmanor eva kāryakāraṇasāmānyayoḥ pratyakṣānupalambhato vyāptis tadā paracittānumānaḥ /; TBh 44,10–12: nanu yadi drṣyāgnidhūmasāmānyayor iva drṣyātmanor eva kāryakāraṇasāmānyayoḥ pratyakṣānupalambhato vyāptis, tadā samtānāntarānumānaḥ na syāt, paracittasyādrṣyātmakatayā vyāptigrahaṇakāle 'nantarbhāvād iti cen ...* (TBht D355b5–6: 'o na bltar rung ba'i me dang du ba spyi dag gi bzhin du bltar rung ba'i bdag nyid kho na'i 'bras bu dang rgyu spyi dag nyid kyi khyab pa mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa las yin na de'i tshe *gzhan gyis sams rjes su dpag pa nyams te / gzhan gyi sams ni bltar mi rung ba nyid kyi khyab pa 'dzin pa'i dus na nan du 'dus pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhe na ...*)

⁷ SS 8,3–10,6: *gal te bdag nyid kyi sams gzhan la yod pa dag gi rgyu mtshan nyid du mi rung ba'i phyir gzhan gyi sams shes par 'gyur ro zhe na / ci ltar mi rung // 5 // (1)rang gi kun nas slong ba'i sams so sor yang dag par myong ba med pa'i phyir dang // 6 // (2)bdag nyid gyi sams kyi rten can yang bdag nyid la mthong ba'i phyir te // 7 // (3)de dag kyang de lta bu yin na ni de dang 'dra bar dmigs par 'gyur ba zhig na* // 8 // de lta ma yin par mthong bas / rgyu mtshan gzhan grub pa yin no zhe na // 9 // (*B: dmigs par 'gyur; D: dmigs par 'gyur ba zhig na)*

⁸ SS 10,12–11,5: gzhan la yang rang gi kun nas slong bar byed pa'i sems yang dag par myong ba med pas 'dra la / 10 / rnam par rig byed du snang ba'i shes pa rang gi sems kyi g-yo ba'i rgyu mtshan can dag kyang *kha nang du bltas pa'i snang ba* yin par rtogs pa'i phyir / *kha phyir bltas pa'i ba dag* rgyu mtshan gzhan las skye bar 'gyur ro // 11 //; SS 13,9–10: *rnam par chad pa dang rnam par ma chad par snang bas* byas pa'i khyad par ni...

⁹ SS 15,1–17,15: 'o na ci zhe na / rnam par chad pa la yang bya ba'i khyad par du snang ba kho na yin no // 17 // mda' dang rdo 'phang ba dang / rgyogs dang sprul ba dang gzhan gyis rab tu bskyod pa la sogs pa'i bya ba'i khyad par du snang ba can rnam yul chad par snang ba yang g-yo ba sngon du 'gro ba can yin pa'i phyir la / 18 / gzhan gyis byas pa'i g-yo ba la sogs pa rnam par ma chad pa yin yang de sngon du 'gro ba can ma yin pa'i phyir ro // 19 // de lta bas na 'dir bya ba'i khyad par tsam gyis g-yo ba rtogs pa yin par rigs so // 20 //; SS 34, 5–6: khyad par 'di ni phal che ba'i dbang du byas pa yin no //

¹⁰ SS 51,2–8: ci ste bya ba la sogs par snang ba'i rnam par shes pa 'bras bu'i rtags las skyes pa gzhan gyi sems shes pa *de* gzhan gyi sems yul du byed dam / 'on te ma yin te / yul du byed na ni don gzhan yin par 'gyur ro // yul du mi byed na ni shes pas pha rol gyi sems yod pa ci ltar shes te / de'i ngo bo nyid ma shes par de 'grub pa mi srid pa'i phyir ro zhe na // 66 //* (*B: de dag; P: de)

¹¹ SS 52,10–55,8: 'di yang thal bar 'gyur ba mtshungs te // 67 // bya ba dang tshig dag gis gzhan gyi sems rtogs pa ltar na yang *de'i ngo bo'nyid yul du byed na ni / de'i tshé rang gi sems shes pa bzhin du de'i rnam pa yang shes par thal bar 'gyur ro // de mi shes na ni des de'i ngo bo nyid ci ltar 'dzin // 68 // gal te rtags kyi ni spyi rtogs pa'i phyir rnam pa rtogs pa ma yin no zhe na // 69 // spi de ci gzhan gyi sems nyid yin nam / 'on te gzhan zhig gam / 'on te brjod du mi rung zhig yin // 70 // gzhan nyid dang brjod du mi rung ba nyid dag gcig yin na ni 'dis spyi de kho na gzung gi / gzhan gyi sems mi ma yin na / ci ltar 'dis de rtogs par 'gyur // 71 // spyi gzhan gyi sems nyid kyang ma yin te / de yod na de'i rnam pa yang shes par thal bar 'gyur ro zhes bshad zin te // 72 // 'di ni rjes su dpag pa'i tshul yang ma yin no // 73 // Cf. SS 19,2–3: de lta bas na bya ba'i khyad par gyi spyi ni g-yo ba'i khyad par spyi rtogs par byed pa yin no // 22 //; SS 33,7–9: g-yo ba tsam gyi spyi ni bya ba dang brjod pa'i shes pa spyi'i rgyu yin pas 'bras bus rgyu rtogs pa yin no //*

¹² SS 55, 12–15: rjes su dpag pa ni don gyi rang gi ngo bo 'dzin par byed pa ma yin te / mngon sum dang 'dra bar snang ba khyad par med pa la sogs par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // 74 //; SS 57, 14–58,2: du ba la sogs pa'i rtags las skyes pa yang me la sogs pa'i rang gi ngo bo'i yul can ma yin te / ⁽¹⁾*mthong ba dang khyad par med par thal bar 'gyur ba'i* phyir ro //* ⁽²⁾*rjes su dpag pa 'das pa la sogs pa dang / ngo bo nyid med pa dag la yang 'jug par mi 'gyur ba'i phyir dang /* ⁽³⁾*don byed par thal bar 'gyur ba'i yang phyir ro // 77 //* (*B: pa'i; D:ba'i) Cf. NB I 16–17: anyat sāmānyalakṣaṇam // 16 // so 'numānasya viśayaḥ // 17 //

¹³ SS 56,10–18: de'i phyir 'di ni tshad ma nyid ma yin no // 75 // *de'i rang gi ngo bo mi 'dzin kyang mngon par 'dod pa'i don la mi slu bas tshad ma nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // 76 //* Cf. PV II 1a–b: pramānam avisamvādi jñānam; PV III 56: abhiprāyāvisamvādād api bhrānteh pramānatā / gatir apy anyathā drṣṭā pakṣaś cāyam kṛtottaraḥ //

¹⁴ SS 58, 15–19,5: gzhang gyi sems rjes su dpag pa la yang *mngon pa 'dod pa'i don la mi slu ba* yod pa kho na ste // 78 // 'jug par byed pa de'i sgo nas srog chags gzhan yod par rtogs nas yang nas yang du tha snyad dag la 'jug na / de'i dbang gis 'byung ba'i don thob pa'i phyir ro // 79 //

¹⁵ SS 68,9–71,7: *gnas ma gyur pa'i phyir rnal 'byor pa gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa rnam kyi gzhan gyi sems shes pa yang / tha snyad la mi slu ba nyid kyi gzugs la sogs pa mthong ba bzhin du tshad ma nyid yin no*

// 90 // rnal 'byor gyi stobs kyis ni de dag la shes pa gzhan gyi sems kyis rnam pa'i
bye brag gi rjes su byed pa gsal bar snang ba 'byung bar 'byur te / las dang lha la
sogs pa'i byin gyis rlabs kyis stobs kyis rmi lam bden pa mthong ba bzhin no // 91
// de dag la yang gzhan gyi sems kyis yul can nyid kyis shes pa 'byung ba ni yin te
/ de dag kyang rang gi sems snang ba de dang rnam pa mtshungs pa kho na nyid
shes pa las / gzhan gyi sems shes pa zhes bya ba nges par gzung bas tha snyad
'dogs so // 92 // mngon sum de ni de'i rnam pa'i rjes su byed pa gsal bar snang
ba'i phyr dang / mi slu ba'i tshad ma zhes bya bar 'dod do // 93 //

¹⁶ SS 71,18–72,3: bcom ldan 'das kyis don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam
gyis mi khyab ste / rnam pa thams cad du shes pa dang brjod pa'i yul las 'das
pa'i phyr ro // 94 // Cf. *Viṃśatikā* 22: vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadr̥ṣī mayā /
krteyam sarvathā sā tu na cintyā buddhagocaraḥ // 22 //

¹⁷ SS 33, 7–34,6: g-yo ba tsam gyi spyi ni bya ba dang brjod pa'i shes pa syi'i
rgyu yin pas 'bras bus rgyu pa yin no // 48 // de la bdag nyid kyis g-yo ba'i rgyu
mtshan can ni kha nang du bltas par 'jug la / gzhan ni gzhan du yin te / khyad par
'di ni phal che ba'i dbang du byas pa yin no // 49 //

¹⁸ SD 145, 6–11: evaṃ hi kecid ahuḥ / asty eva santāntaram anumāna-
pratītam / tathā hīcchācittasamanantaravyāhāravavyahārābhāsasya darśanāt
tadabhāve cādarśanād vyāhāryābhāsasya kāryakāraṇabhāvam ātmasantāne
'vadhāryecchācittasyāpratisamvedanasamaye 'pi *vicchinnavyāhāryābhāsadarśanāt*
tatkāraṇabhūtam icchācittam anumānamānam santānāntaram eva vyavatiṣṭhata iti /

¹⁹ SD 145, 12–13: atredam ālocyate / tad icchācittam vyāhāryābhāsasya kāraṇatayā
vyavasthāpyamānam anumātur ⁽¹⁾*darśanayogyam* atha ⁽²⁾*dr̥ṣyādr̥ṣyaviśeṣānapekṣam*
icchāmātram /

²⁰ SD 145, 13–16: yadi tāvad ādya vikalpas tadānumātur darśanayogyatvād
icchācittasyānumānakāle 'nupalabdhir abhāvam eva gamayati anupalambhākhyā-
pratyakṣabādhitatvāt kvānumānavakāśas tasya / yadi punar icchācittam anumānakāle
'py anubhūyeta, tadā kim asyānumānena /

²¹ SD 145,23–146,6: atha dvitīyo vikalpaḥ / tathā hīcchācittamātram
svaparasantānasādhāraṇadr̥ṣyādr̥ṣyaviśeṣānapekṣam vyāhāryābhāsam prati
kāraṇatayāvadhāryate / tadavadhāraṇam kena pramāṇena / vyāhāryābhāsasya
hīcchāmātrābhāve 'bhāvam pratītya tadutpattisiddhigaveṣaṇā / na cecchāmātrasya
svaparasantānasādhāraṇasya svasamvedanenānyena vābhāvaḥ śakyāvagamaḥ /
yathā hi vahnimātrasya deśakālavavahitasyāpi dhūmotpādadeśakālayor yadi syād
upalabhyetaiva mayeti sambhāvitasyānumātrpuruṣendriyapratyakṣeṇa dhūmotpādāt
prāgabhāvo 'vadhāryamāṇas tadutpattisiddhim adhyāsayatīti vyavahitadeśakālasyāpi
vahner dhūmamātram prati kāraṇatvāvadhāraṇam, svabhāvaviprakṛstasya
tu jaṭharabhavādisādhāraṇasya sarvathānumātrpuruṣāśakyābhāvapratītikasya
vyāptibahirbhāva eva / tathātrāpicchācittam *parasantānasādhāraṇam api*
yāvād yadīha syād upalabhyetaiva mayeti yadi sambhāvayitum śakyeta tadā
tadvyatīrekasiddhidvāreṇa kāraṇatayāvadhāryate / kevalam svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭe
cittamātre 'stamiteyam katheti //

²² SD 146, 12–15: athecchācittamātram svasamvedanamātrāpekṣayā na
svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭam / na hy agnir apy eko yenaivendriyavijñāna dr̥ṣyate tenaivāno 'pi
dr̥ṣyaḥ* / tatra yathā cakṣurvijñānamātrāpekṣayā agnimātram dr̥ṣyam iti vyavasthāpyate
tathātrāpi *svasamvedanamātrāpekṣayā icchācittamātram svaparasantānasādhāraṇam*
*api dr̥ṣyam eveti / (*RNA: dr̥ṣyam)*

²³ SD 146,16–25: atrocyate / kim atra mātraśabdenānumātrpuruṣasambandhāsam-
bandhābhyām aviśeṣitam yasya kasyacit puruṣasyendriyajñānam vastuviṣayīkurvaṇam
asya dr̥ṣyatāsambhāve 'pi nānimitam abhimatam / yady evaṃ piśācādir api
dr̥ṣyaḥ syāt / so 'pi hi kasyacit pumso योग्यदेह स्वजातियस्या वा पिśācāntarasya
bhavaty evendriyajñānagocara iti na kaścit svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭaḥ syāt / tasmād

anumātrpuruṣasambandhitvam anāpasya vijñānasya svalakṣaṇādibhedanirāsapara eva mātrāśabdo yuktah / etad evāśaṅkya Dharmottareṇābhīhitam – “ekapratīpattrapekṣam cedam pratyakṣalakṣaṇam /” (NBṬ 104,5–6.) ityādi / *tenaivaṃ dr̥śyatāsambhāvanā yadīha deśe kāle vā syād ghaṭādir niyamenopalabhyeta, madīyasya cakṣurvijñānamātrasya viśayībhaved iti / paracitte tu na śakyam evam / yadīha paracittam syāt niyamenā madīyasya svasaṃveda[na]mātrasya viśayi syād iti //*

²⁴ TBh 44,13–14: svasaṃvedanam hi tatra vyāptigrāhakam / svaparasaṃtānagatasvasaṃvedanamātrāpekṣayā paracittasyāpi dr̥śyatvāt / (TBhṭ D355b6–7: gang gi phyir rang rig pa ni der khyab pa 'dzin pa po ste / rang dang gzhan gyi rgyud du son ba'i rang rig pa tsam la blots pas na / gzhan gyi sems kyang bltar rung ba tsam nyid kyi phyir to //) Cf. RNA (ISD) 45,16ff.

²⁵ SD 147, 6–25: evaṃ tarhi santānāntarasādhakasyābhāvād bādhakasyāpi kasyacid adarśanād bhavatu tatra sandeha eveti kecit / tair idam bādhakam abhidhīyamānam avadhīyatām / yadi hi santānāntaram sambhavet tadā tato bhedena svasantānasyāvaśyam bhavitavyam / anyathā svasantānād api prakāśamānātasya parasantānābhimatasya bhedo na syāt / na cābhedaḥ tayor iti svasantānād bhedābhedābhyām abādhyasya parasantānasya sāmānyasaśaviṣṇādivad abhāva evāyāta iti katham sandehah / tasmāt parasantānāpekṣayā svasantānasya bhedo 'py avaśyam bhāvyaḥ / sa ca bhedaḥ santānasya svabhāvaḥ svasantāne pratibhāsamāne niyamena pratibhāseta / katham aparathā pratibhānapratibhānalakṣaṇaviruddhadharmādhyāse 'pi svasantānasya prasantānād bhedaḥ svabhāvātām āśādayet // na cāsau bhedaḥ pratibhāsete / bhedaḥ pratibhāse hi upagamyamāne tadavadhibhūtasīyāpi parasantānasya pratibhāso durapahnavah syāt /

*asmād bhīnam itīdam cet svarūpaṃ svasya cetasaḥ /
sāvadhē asya bhāsaḥ syān na vā grāhyaṃ tadātmanā //* (Cf. JNA 458,21–22; 570, 15–16.)

bhede 'nyaleśam api naiti kuto bhīnnaḥ / (Cf. JNA 456,24; 573,19.)

evamādikam aśeṣam iha pravacanapradīpaśrīśākārasaṅgrahādivacanam anusmaryatām / yathā hi svasantānamātre pariṣphurati śaśaviṣṇānād asphurato na bhedaḥ pratibhāti tathā parasantānād api sphuraṇavirahīno na bhāty eva bhedaḥ / na hi parasantānāpekṣayā kaścīd viśeṣaleśah svasantānasya pariphurati yo nāsti śaśaviṣṇāpekṣayā / na ca śaśaviṣṇānaparasantānāv apekṣya samāne svasantānapratibhāse śaśaviṣṇāpekṣayā na bhedo nāpy abhedaḥ pratibhāti / parasantānāpekṣayā tu bheda eva bhātīty evam avasthāpayitum śakyam / Cf. PV III 212–213: paricchedo 'ntar anyo 'yam bhāgo bahir iva sthīth / jñānasyābhedino bhedaḥ pratibhāso hy upaplavaḥ // 212 // tatraikasya apy abhāvena dvayam apy avahīyate / tasmāt tad eva tasyāpi tattvam yā dvayaśūnyatā // 213 //; PVA 293,21–24: advaite 'pi katham vṛttir iti codyanirākṛtaḥ / yathā balis tathā yakṣa iti kiñ kena saṅgatam // 410 // anenāitad api nirākṛtaḥ / “advaita katham paraprabodhanāya pravarttata” iti / svaparayor asyārthasyāsiddheḥ / ayam paro 'han na para iti svasaṃvedam evaitad udayam āśādayati / nātra paramārthato vibhāgaḥ / aham praśnayitā paraḥ kathayati dvayor api svākāroparaktapratyayasamvedanam evaitan na tu vibhāgaḥ svapnapratyayavat / unmattapratyayapralāpavac ca /; NBhū 140,16–19: tad evaṃ grāhyagrāhakayor abhedavādinām svasantāne ['pi] jñānāntaragrahaṇam nāsti, kutaḥ santānāntarasiddhiḥ? tatas ca paralokabuddhādivārtāpi dūrotsāritāivety asamañjasaṃ sarvam eva saugatam śāstram iti / na hi bhedaḥ siddhau sādhanadūṣaṇādivyavahāra upapadyate /

²⁶ SD 148,7–10: kiṃ ca mā nāma bhāsiṣṭa bahirarthaḥ kasyacid api tathāpi katham tadabhāvasiddhir bhedaḥ pratibhāsaḥ byupagamavādina itīyamātram iha vivakṣitam / na cātra kaścīd doṣah / tasmād bahirarthena sādhanānam santānāntaram iti katham vijñaptivādinām api sammatam bhaviṣyati / Cf. NBhū 152,2ff.: api ca svapnavat sarvapratyayā nirālambanā itī bruvānasya katham santānāntarasiddhiḥ? na hi svapnadṛṣṭāntābhyām gamanavacanapratibhāsaḥ byām vāstavī puruṣāntarasiddhir upapadyate ...

²⁷ SD 148,10–17: kiṃ ca kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'pi vijñānadvayasya bhedapratibhāsavadīnā bādhitum aśakyāḥ / pūrvabhāvinī hi saṃvittih parasamvittyapekṣayā bhedaṃ pūrvatvaṃ cātmano gr̥hṇāty evāvadhīpratibhāsavigame 'pi // parabhāviny api saṃvittih pūrvasamvittyapekṣayā bhedaṃ paratvaṃ cātmano 'dhigacchaty eva santānāntaravad itī niyatapūrvaparabhāvalakṣaṇe kāryakāraṇabhāve 'vabhāsamāne 'vasiyamāne ca nīlādicitrākāravat katham

saṃvṛtyāstu yathā tathā (PV III 4d)

iti bhagavato vārttikakārasya vacanena phalitam atra mate / Cf. PVA 606,29: asmākaṃ tu advaitavadīnāṃ na paramārthataḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvo nāma /; JNA 417,22–418,2: tathā ca sūtram, “hetupratyayavyāvṛttim kāraṇasya niṣedhanam / cittamātravyavasthānam anutpādaṃ vadāmy aham //” (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* X 592) anutpādam itī phalanīṣedhaḥ / cittamātrasthitir eva hetuphalanīṣedho vyaktaḥ / See Inami (2000).

²⁸ SD 148,17–20: api ca citrākāracakre dharminy advaitasādhanaṛtham upan-yastasya prakāśamānatvādihetor bhedagrāhakapratyākṣāpahrtaviṣayatvam udbhāvayataḥ pratīvadīno bhedagrahaṇam anumanyamānena santānāntarasandehaṃ ca vinā katham uttaritavyaṃ bhavatā / Cf. NBhū 140,16–17: tad evaṃ grāhyagrāhakayor abhedavadīnāṃ svasantāne ['pi] jñānāntaragrahaṇam nāsti, kutaḥ santānāntarasiddhiḥ?

²⁹ SD 148,21–23: nanv evaṃ api santānāntarābhāvaḥ kena pramāṇena siddhaḥ / na tāvat pratyakṣeṇa tasya vidhiviṣayasya pratiṣedhasādhanaṇādhikārāt / nāpy anumānena, tasya dr̥ṣyābhāvasādhanaṇanīyatasyātīndriyaparacittābhāvasādhane 'navatārād itī cet /

³⁰ SD 148,23–28: atra brūmaḥ / santānāntarasāmbhave niyatābhāvaḥ tato bhedaḥ svacittasya / abhede svasantānāt parasantāna eva syāt / yathā ca yad upalabhyamānaṃ yena rūpeṇa na bhāsate na tat tena rūpeṇa sadvyavahārayogyam yathā nīlam pītarūpeṇa / nopalabhyate ca svacittam upalabhyamānaṃ parasantānād bhinne[na] rupeṇeti bhedasya svacittatādātmyanīṣedhe dr̥ṣyaviṣeṣaṇaprayogānapekṣā svabhāvānupalabdhir iyam //

³¹ SD 148,29–30: nāpy asiddhiḥ bhedapratibhāse tadavadher api pratibhāsapṛpteḥ / avadhīpratibhāse tu bhedapratibhāsābhāvaḥ śaśaviṣānābhedapratibhāsābhāvavāt siddha eva / Cf. SD 147,15–20: bhedapratibhāse hi upagamyamāne tadavadhibhūtasyaṅpi parasantānasya pratibhāso durapahnavāḥ syāt / “asmād bhinnam itīdam cet svarūpam svasya cetasaḥ / sāvadher asya bhāsaḥ ayān na vā grāhyam tadātmanā // (= JNA 458,21–22; 570,15–16.) bhede 'nyaleśam api naiti kuto bhinnāḥ / (= JNA 456,24; 573,19.)” evamādikam aśeṣam iha pravacanapradīpaśrīśākārasaṅgrahādivacanam anusmaryatām /; PVA 240.10–11: sajjātyavijātyavyāvṛttibhājo hi jagati janmabhūtaḥ / te yato yato vyāvarttante tatas tato bhedaṃ avadhībhedopakalpitaṃ taṃ tam upādānam ādāya nānādharmāṇaḥ pratīyante /; JNA 459.1–2: tasmād avadher abodhe 'vadhimato matir itī vimatir eveti kutaścid bhedagrāhi pratyakṣam apratibhāsinaḥ /; JNA 458,24: avadhīr api hi sambandhiviṣeṣa eva /

³² The denial of the existence of other minds has been understood as a kind of solipsism (see Kajiyama, 1965, etc.) According to Ratnakīrti, however, the denial of other minds does not mean the affirmation of the sole existence of one's own mind. Ratnakīrti, who refuses the distinction between one's own mind and others, must deny not only the existence of other minds but also the existence of one's own mind. For the notion of “one's own mind” also depends on the same distinction. When the distinction disappears, even one's own mind cannot survive at all. Moreover, if the notion of “one's own” or “self” were admitted, the *ātmavāda* would be accepted. We should remember Dharmakīrti's words: “When self exists, the notion of “other” occurs. From the distinction between self and others, the attachment [to self] and the hatred [for others] arise. Connected to these two [i.e., the attachment to self and the hatred for others], all vices arise.” (PV II 219 (Miyasaka ed. PV I 219cd–220ab): ātmani satī parasamjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau / anayoḥ saṃpratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante //

³³ SD 149,3–8: api ca santānāntare tāvad arvāgdr̥ṣāṃ sandeho bhavadbhir anumanyate / bhagavatas tu kim avasthāpyatām / samdehāvasthāpane katham sarvajñatā / vidyamānam eva kadācit santānāntaram bhagavatā nāvadhāryate tathāpy asau sarvajña iti katham etat / anumānam ca santānāntaraviṣayaṃ prāg eva cintitam / na cānumānena pratitāv api sarvajñatā bhavitum arhati / *pratyakṣena paracittapratītau grāhyagrāhakabhāvo* 'pi paracittasya bhagavaccittena sahāyāta iti bahirarthavāda eva mukhāntareṇopagataḥ syāt, katham ayaṃ vañcayati vādaḥ //

³⁴ Cf. Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa 80,3–9: tathā sarvajñānāsya tajjñeyasya cetarajanacittasya sahopalambhaniyame 'pi bhedābhyupagamād anekāntaḥ / nanu sarvajñāḥ santānāntaram vā nesyaṭe tat katham ayaṃ doṣaḥ? ity asat; sakalalokasākṣikasya santānāntarasyābhyupagamamātrenābhāvāsiddheḥ / sugataś ca sarvajño yadi paramārthato nesyaṭe tarhi kimartham "pramāṇabhūtāya" ityādināsau smarthitāḥ stutaś cādvaitādiprakaraṇānām ādau dignāgādibhiḥ siddhiḥ /

³⁵ SD 149,9–10: asmādīyamatena tu paracittaṃ nāsty eveti tadavadhāraṇakṛto na* bhagavataḥ sarvajñatākṣatidoṣaḥ / (*RNA: [na]) Cf. TSP 693,6–10: na ca buddhasya bhagavataś cittena parasantānavarttinaś cittakṣaṇā avasīyante; tasya bhagavataḥ sarvāvaranavigamena grāhyagrāhakakalaṅkarahitatvāt / yatoktam – "grāhyam na tasya grahaṇam na tena jñānāntaragrāhyatayāpi sūnyam" iti /

³⁶ Commenting to the last portion of the *Santānāntarasiddhi*, Vinītadeva refers to the four kinds of Buddha's knowledge, i.e., 1) *ādarśajñāna*, 2) *pratyavekṣaṇajñāna*, 3) *amatājñāna*, and 4) *kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna*. According to him, only the first one is beyond the conventional world, and is the all-knowing knowledge in the ultimate sense. The others, which are obtained after the enlightenment, are conventional. Vinītadeva, who calls our attention to the variations of Buddha's knowledge, may suggest that Buddha knows other minds not by his ultimate knowledge, but by the conventional knowledge obtained after the enlightenment. SST 72,116–73,20: yang de bzhin gshes pa rnam kyi don thams cad mkhyen pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / me long lta bu'i ye shes kyi chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid de bzhin nyid mkhyen pa dang / so sor rtogs pa'i ye shes kyi dngos po thams cad du mkhyen pa'o // de la me long lta bu'i ye shes gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang yang dag par bral ba chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nvid de bzhin nyid rig pas / don thams cad mkhyen pa don dam par thams cad mkhyen pa ni yin te / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes kyi ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro // so sor rtog pa'i ye shes 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes kyi rjes las thob pa gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang ldam pas / dngos po phra ba dang / sgrub pa dang / bskal pa thams cad rnam pa thams cad du mkhyen pa pa ni 'jig rten pa'i rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa yin te / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes kyi rjes la thob pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes kyi ngo bo yin pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir so sor rtog pa'i ye shes la don thams cad mkhyen pa'i tshul mi 'gal lo // de la gzung ba dang 'dzin par rnam par rtog pa yod par khas blangs pas phyin ci log pa yang ma yin te / de phyin ci ma log pa nyid du gzigs pa'i phyir ro // mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i dngos pa tsam gyi yul can yin pa'i phyir / me long lta bu'i ye shes la dmigs pa yin no // bya ba sgrub pa'i shes ni rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid kyi yul can yin no // de lta na de bzhin gshes pa ni ye shes bzhi'i rang bzhin yin la / de la me long lta bu'i ye shes ni 'jig rten las 'das pa yin no // de'i rjes las thob pa gzhan dag ni 'jig rten pa yin no // des bas na bcom ldan 'das kyi don thams cad mkhyen pa ni ye shes bzhi po 'di dag la ci rigs par sbyar bar bya'o //

³⁷ SD 149,10–11: yāvac ca *bhedagrahaṇābhimānarūpā samvṛitis* tāvat santānāntare sandehāt tadavadodhanārtham vacanādir api pravartata iti svavacanavirodho 'pi na sambhavaty eva /

³⁸ SD 149,11–13: na khalu santānāntaraviṣayaḥ sarvathā sandeho nāsty evety abhi-matam asmākam, api tu *paramārthagatir iyaṃ upadarśitā* /

³⁹ Inami (1998).

⁴⁰ PVA 183,16–17: anvavyatirekābhyān kārṃyākāraṇatāgatiḥ* / pramāṇān ca** na tatrāsti pratyakṣam anumā tathā // 146 // pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām anvavyatirekayoḥ / gatir yady anumānāt syād itaretarasamśrayaḥ // 147 // (*PVA: kārṃyākāraṇatāgatiḥ; **PVA: pramāṇān ja); PVA 184,21: tad eva punar āyātam samvṛtyā śaktatāgatiḥ* / anirūpitatattvā hi pratītis samvṛtir matā // 152 // (*PVA: śaktatāgatiḥ); PVA 4,8: dviṣṭhasambandhasamvittir naikarūpapavedanāt / dvayasvarūpagrahaṇe sati sambandhavedanam // 3 //; PVA 25,19–20: sāmvyavahārikam etad iti pratipāditam / sāmvyavahāras ca vicāryamāṇo viśīryata eva /; PVA 25,24–25: sāmvyavahārikam prāmānyam pratipādayatā paramārthata ekam eva svasamvedanam pratyakṣam ity uktam bhavati /; PVA 292,19–23: na khalu pratyakṣataḥ pūrvāparavastudvayagrahaṇam / kārṃyābhimatagrahaṇakāle smaraṇam eva kārṃyābhimate / yadā sa gr̥hyate tadā svarūpeṇaiva grahaṇan na kārṃyāntvena / kārṃyāyāgrahaṇāt / kārṃyagrahaṇakāle ca tadatītam smaranagocara eva / na ca smaraṇam ananubhūte na ca kārṃyāntvāsānubhavaḥ katham smaraṇam / atha kārṃyākāle 'pi tad anubhūyata iti matiḥ / tathā sati pūrvārūpātānubhāvābhāvāt samānakālatayāśakyavivecanatvād abheda eva kutaḥ kārṃyākāraṇabhāvāḥ /; PVA 295,13: anvavyatirekābhyām bhedasyāsyā prakalpanā / anādivāsanāsaṅgād anvavyatirekavit // 428 //; PVA 295,16: na cānvavyatirekayoḥ paramārthataḥ samvedanam iti pratipāditam /; PVA 295,23–24: na ca paramārthato 'nvavyatirekapatipattir anyatrābhimānāt / abhimānamātram eva skalam iti /; PVA 295,31–32: paramārthataḥ tu svasamvedanam ekam eva / nānyenānyasyā grahaṇasambhavaḥ /; PVA 606,29: asmākaṃ tv advaitavādinām na paramārthataḥ kārṃyākāraṇabhāvo nāma /; JNA 416,18–20: samvādāc ca prāmānyam, na ca kvacid bhinne vastuni samvādāḥ / tasmāt svavedanātīriktasyā prāmānyam sāmvr̥tam eva, tathā hetuphalavyavahāro 'pi sāmvr̥ta eva, ekapratītikatvad ubhayoḥ /

⁴¹ SS 69,2–4: gal te gzhan gyi sems kyi rang gi ngo bo mngon sum du shes par gyur na ni de'i gzung ba don bzhan yin par 'gyur ro //; SS 68,9–13: gnas ma gyur pa'i phyir rnal 'byor pa gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa rnams kyis gzhan gyi sems shes pa yang / tha snyad la mi slu ba nyid kyis zgugs la sogs pa mthong ba bzhin du tshad ma nyid yin no // 90 // Cf. VimśV ad Vimś 21: yathā tannirābhilāpyenātmanā buddhānām gocaraḥ / tathā tadajñānāt tadubhayaṃ na yathārtham vitathāpratibhāsatayā grāhyagrāhakavikalpasyāprahīnatvāt /; VimśT D194a6–7: gal te gzhan gyi sems shes na de'i tshe gzung dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par khas blangs pas rnam par rig pa nyid nyams 'gyur ro //

⁴² JNA 10,19–21: na ca tasya dūṣanena kṣaṇabhaṅgavādināḥ kiñcit / hetuphalāpalāpino 'pi yadi tadapalāpāya nyāyasambhava, tadā tad api na dūram iti kim atra nirbandhena / Cf. PV I 85–86: dharmadharmivyavasthānaṃ bhedo 'bhedaś ca yādṛśaḥ / asamīkṣitatattvārtho yathā loke pratīyate // 85 // taṃ tathā ca yādṛśaḥ / asamīkṣitatattvārtho yathā loke pratīyate // 85 // taṃ tathā eva samāśritya sādhyasādhanasamsthitiḥ / paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate // 86 //; NBhū 140,18–19: na hi bhedaśyāsiddhau sādhanadūṣaṇādīvyavahāra upapadyate /

⁴³ JNA 452,6–8: santānāntarabhāvo 'yam na siddhaś cet phalāṅgavat / santānāntarasiddhiḥ kim sāmvr̥tyāstu* yathā tathā // vāstu kim atra nirbandhena? (*JNA: sāmvr̥tyā tu) Cf. JNA 4,24–25: sā matā cet sāmvr̥tyā*, na paramārthena / astu yathā tathā sāmvr̥tyā** paramārthena vā, kim atra nirbandhena? (*JNA: sābhāsā cet sāmvr̥tyā; **JNA: sāmvr̥tyā)

⁴⁴ SD 149,13–14: idam hi santānāntarābhāvasādhanam advayasādhanena sādhanam itī naikaniyataḥ svavacanādivirodhas tatparihāro vā /

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ABBREVIATIONS

- ĪSD *Īśvarasādhana-dūṣaṇa* of Ratnakīrti: RNA 32–57.
- JNA *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ*, ed. A. Thakur, 2nd edn. Patna 1987.
- KA *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* of Jñānaśrīmitra: JNA 1–159.
- NBhū *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña.
Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣaṇam, ed. Svāmī Yogindrānandaḥ. Vāraṇasī 1968.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti. In: Yūsho Miyasaka, ed. *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/72). [Chapters I (svārthānumāna), II (pramāṇasiddhi), and III (pratyakṣa) correspond to III, I, and II in Miyasaka's edition respectively.]
- PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta.
Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam), ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāna. Patna 1953.

- RNA *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ*, ed. A. Thakur, 2nd edn. Patna 1975.
- SD *Santānāntaradūṣaṇa* of Ratnakīrti: RNA 145–149.
- SS *Santānāntarasiddhi* of Dharmakīrti, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica XIX. Petrograd 1916.
- SSŚ *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* of Jñānaśrīmitra: JNA 367–513.
- SST *Santānāntarasiddhiḥikā* of Vinītadeva, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica XIX. Petrograd 1916.
- TBh *Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta, ed. H. R. R. Iyengar. Mysore 1952.
- TBht Tibetan translation of Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*. sDe dge edn., No. 4264.
- TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981, 1982.
- Viṃś *Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu. In: *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Deux Traités de Vasubandhu, Viṃśatikā (la Vingtaine) accompagnée d'une Explication en Prose et Triṃśikā (la Trentaine) avec la commentaire de Sthiramati I*, ed. Sylvain Lévi. Paris 1925.
- ViṃśV *Viṃśatikāvṛtti* of Vasubandhu. See Viṃś.
- ViṃśT *Viṃśatikāḥikā* of Vinītadeva. sDe dge edn., No. 4065.

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