

Steps in Briefing Cases

- Facts
 - Identification of parties and their roles.
 - Identification of action
 - Identification of statute
 - Elements of statute
- Issue
 - What is the main question the court is answering?
- Procedural History
 - What is the legal history of this case? What happened in lower courts?
- Rule (Holding)
 - What is the basic rule that the court decided on and used to decide this case? (Often there is no new rule but just the application of the existing case law or statute or both.)
- Analysis
 - What is the reasoning that the court used in coming to a decision in this case?
- Judgment (Disposition)
 - What did the court decide should be done in this particular case?

Example: The sleeping burglar

Megan has been diagnosed as having a sleep disorder that causes her to sleepwalk--wander while she is asleep. While she is sleepwalking, she has no control over her behavior and does not even know what she is doing. She has been under the treatment of a doctor who has prescribed sleeping pills that greatly reduce her sleepwalking but she does not like the way they make her feel in the morning so she seldom takes them. One night she sleepwalks over to the dorm room next to hers and takes the laptop lying on the desk. In the morning, the laptop owner sees the laptop in Megan's room and calls the campus police who arrest Megan for burglary. She is convicted by a jury in Superior Court. She appeals her conviction on the grounds that the judge refused to allow evidence of her sleep disorder to be presented to the jury.

Statute: In the State of Calivada, where this takes place, a person commits burglary if the person breaks and enters the residence of another after sundown with the intent to commit a felony.

While we note that the defendant met all the requirements of the statute save one, we hold that sleepwalking is a disorder that makes it impossible to meet the intent requirement of the Calivada's burglary statute. We thus reverse this conviction and remand this case back to Superior Court for retrial.

McBOYLE v. UNITED STATES 283 U.S. 25 (1931), U.S. Supreme Court

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was convicted of transporting from Ottawa, Illinois, to Guymon, Oklahoma, an airplane that he knew to have been stolen, and was sentenced to serve three years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of \$2,000. The judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 43 F. (2d) 273. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court on the question whether the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act applies to aircraft. 26*26 Act of October 29, 1919, c. 89, 41 Stat. 324; U.S. Code, Title 18, § 408. That Act provides: "Sec. 2. That when used in this Act: (a) The term 'motor vehicle' shall include an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails; . . . Sec. 3. That whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both."

Section 2 defines the motor vehicles of which the transportation in interstate commerce is punished in § 3. The question is the meaning of the word 'vehicle' in the phrase "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails." No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance working on land, water or air, and sometimes legislation extends the use in that direction, e.g., land and air, water being separately provided for, in the Tariff Act, September 22, 1922, c. 356, § 401 (b), 42 Stat. 858, 948. But in everyday speech 'vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing moving on land. Thus in Rev. Stats. § 4, intended, the Government suggests, rather to enlarge than to restrict the definition, vehicle includes every contrivance capable of being used "as a means of transportation on land." And this is repeated, expressly excluding aircraft, in the Tariff Act, June 17, 1930, c. 997, § 401 (b); 46 Stat. 590, 708. So here, the phrase under discussion calls up the popular picture. For after including automobile truck, automobile wagon and motor cycle, the words "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" still indicate that a vehicle in the popular sense, that is a vehicle running on land, is the theme. It is a vehicle that runs, not something, not commonly called a vehicle, that flies. Airplanes were well known in 1919, when this statute was passed; but it is admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or in the debates in Congress.^{27*27} It is impossible to read words that so carefully enumerate the different forms of motor vehicles and have no reference of any kind to aircraft, as including airplanes under a term that usage more and more precisely confines to a different class. The counsel for the petitioner have shown that the phraseology of the statute as to motor vehicles follows that of earlier statutes of Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio, Michigan and Missouri, not to mention the late Regulations of Traffic for the District of Columbia, Title 6, c. 9, § 242, none of which can be supposed to leave the earth.

Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used.

Judgment reversed.