EARLY MODERN EXPANSION AND THE POLITICIZATION OF OCEANIC SPACE*

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ABSTRACT. The definition of oceans as international politicized space is an integral but little analyzed aspect of early modern European expansion, which took place between about 1450 and 1800. In this essay I explore the implications of thinking about the development of European imperialism and global dominance in oceanic terms. I argue that oceanic, rather than terrestrial, dominance characterized early modern European empires, particularly in relation to Africa and Asia, where indigenous political and economic control prevailed. The long apprenticeship in mastering oceanic space contributed to the ability of Europeans to build land-based empires in Asia and Africa in the nineteenth century. As well, the international relationships worked out by Europeans in the nonstate but militarized arena of the high seas contributed to an emergent global order. Keywords: colonialism, European expansion, imperialism, international relations.

According to the United Nations, sixteen colonies remain in the world. Great Britain has ten; the United States, three; and France, New Zealand, and Spain, one each.¹ In addition, these countries, as well as the Netherlands and Australia, have overseas dependencies that are not technically “colonies,” a term of contested meanings.² Not incidentally, almost all of these dependencies are islands or islandlike enclaves, such as Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla. Individually and in total, they represent the first and last outposts of modern European imperialism, territorial manifestations of the politicization of oceanic space. As well, they suggest that control of the world’s oceans was a fundamental part of European empire building and remains a critical component of continued European and neo-European dominance in the postcolonial world.

Drawing on the rich historical literature that describes aspects of early modern expansion, I explore three broad implications of the oceanic dimensions of European imperialism. First, it engendered an expansive dynamic distinct from the dynamics of other seafaring peoples, whereby Europeans constructed a new kind of empire that differed significantly from land-based ones. Second, the centrality of oceanic control and the tenuousness of territorial control outside Europe forces us to reassess the agency of Asian, African, and American peoples in the history of the early modern world. Third, oceanic expansion reconfigured international relations, obliging expansionist powers to define the legal and diplomatic implications of interstate conflict in the extraterritorial arena of the high seas. This in turn elevated interstate relations in Europe from a regional system to a global one, which would come to define contemporary international relations.

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The Novelty of Oceanic Empires

The politicization and militarization of oceanic space, as much as its globalization, distinguished European oceanic expansion from that of other seafaring peoples. Austronesians had settled islands stretching from Rapa Nui (Easter Island) to Madagascar but did not maintain the political ties with their hearth societies necessary for empire building (Finney 1994). Muslim traders used maritime routes to carry trade goods and Islam as far east as the South China Sea, and emporia from Japan to East Africa allowed merchants to establish dense trading networks spanning thousands of kilometers. Politically, though, the Indian Ocean Basin continued to comprise dozens of autonomous polities, from large empires to small principalities to tribal-based societies, and political control stopped, in most instances, at the water’s edge. Fifteenth-century China demonstrated the ability, if not the intention, to establish an empire through long-distance oceanic expansion, until the government dismantled the navy and curtailed seaborne trade (Das Gupta and Pearson 1987; Ptak and Rothermund 1991; Pearson 1998). Thus when Europeans began their long-distance maritime ventures, trade and colonization were old processes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. But Europeans’ transoceanic political claims and their attempts to control and regulate access to the high seas were new phenomena.

The “extended polities” these maritime ventures engendered differed from the major land-based empires, whether ancient and medieval empires or the contemporary Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, Ming, and Russian Empires (Greene 1986; Paden 1995). Land-based empires grew by pressing into strategically important or weak areas on their frontiers or across narrow bodies of water, annexing territory and people. Ottoman encroachments into southeastern Europe provided part of the impetus for Iberian forays into the Atlantic Ocean. The fifteenth-century Portuguese court was divided over whether to spend money to confront Muslims in North Africa or to develop the Atlantic route around Africa to avoid them; the latter strategy ultimately prevailed (Boxer 1969). Between about 1450 and 1700, oceanic expansion did not inherently represent superior strength and at times represented precisely the opposite. England ostensibly stayed out of the Thirty Years’ War (1619–1648) and profited by acting as a neutral shipper. Caribbean waters, however, had not yet been incorporated into the European international order, allowing English pirates—despite England’s neutrality—to undermine Spain’s war effort by preying on ships carrying the silver and gold necessary to finance its armies (Andrews 1991). The land-poor Dutch shrewdly recognized the potential for power through expertise in maritime trade and shipping (Boxer 1965). Thus oceanic expansion opened up new opportunities for weaker polities to realign the balance of power within Europe and with its Muslim neighbors, achieved as much through control of the maritime environment as with territorial acquisitions in Africa, Asia, and the Americas (Symcox 1976; Chaudhuri 1985; Pearson 1987).

Spatially these new “seaborne” empires bore little resemblance to land-based empires, with their territorially contiguous provinces (Boxer 1965). The colonies of these new far-flung empires were separated from their metropoles, and often from...
other colonies, by thousands of kilometers of water. Emerging in a volatile and increasingly global environment, these overseas outposts of Europe were vulnerable to seaborne attacks by rival interests. The multiple nations vying for colonies, the ambiguity of international law for these new oceanic frontiers, and the difficulties monarchs faced in controlling their distant subjects forced Europeans gradually to define a new international order that could accommodate these new empires (Pagden 1995).

**Land-Poor Empires**

When we think about the expansion of Europe we often conflate an oceanic presence—or a bounded presence on an island or littoral—with continental territorial control. We ignore, forget, or do not realize that early modern Europeans controlled very little in the way of land, trade, people, or governments in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Most European-occupied territory was littoral or within easy reach of a saltwater port. Papal bulls and treaties dividing up the non-European world could not eliminate the practical reality that African, American, and Asian peoples dominated terrestrial space, even in the Americas, where introduced diseases raced ahead of the European presence and decimated local populations.

The three areas of the Americas in which Europeans did make significant territorial inroads before the eighteenth century were directly connected to the conquest of large pre-Columbian political or economic systems. The Spanish capitalized on their conquest of the Aztecs and the Incas to settle Central Mexico and Peru, while smaller groups of natives throughout Hispanic America resisted submission to Spanish authority and constrained colonization. The French penetrated the Great Lakes region of North America after the mid-seventeenth-century disruption of the Huron-Algonquin trading system, although they never established an inland settler presence that seriously displaced natives in the way that English settlers did along the Atlantic Seaboard (White 1991; Hinderaker 1997). Not until the discovery of gold in the Brazilian interior in the 1690s did the Portuguese establish settlements beyond easy reach of the Atlantic Ocean (Boxer 1969). Over more than 300 years and with great effort Europeans solidified the territorial claims in the Americas that ministers and diplomats asserted at distant negotiating tables. So limited was European knowledge of the American landscape—and so expansive their hubris—that at times they failed to recognize how clueless they were. The belief of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark that their expedition (1804–1806) could portage the Rocky Mountains in a day or two is testimony to just how slowly Europeans garnered geographical knowledge, not to mention political control, of the Americas (Jackson 1978; Marshall and Williams 1982).

European inroads in Africa and Asia were even more limited than they were in the Americas, consisting at first almost exclusively of a few cities and fortified trading posts. After initial military confrontations the Portuguese settled into negotiated trading relations with West Africans, establishing forts on offshore islands and littoral areas accessible by oceangoing vessels (Thornton 1998). In East Africa they seized
control of the port towns of Sofala and Kilwa and attempted to monopolize their trade. The Portuguese founded inland settlements in Angola and Mozambique; only in the former were they marginally successful, and there they only penetrated about 300 kilometers into the interior (Birmingham 1965; Newitt 1995; Pearson 1998). The late-nineteenth-century scramble for Africa and the ensuing bloody wars to enforce colonial submission only make sense if we recognize that during the previous four centuries of international commerce Africans controlled the production and marketing of goods (including slaves), to which Europeans gained access at a few important trading centers (Pakenham 1991).

In Asia the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch, the English, and the French, controlled trading ports, some taken by force, many occupied at the sufferance of local authorities and a few, such as Calcutta, created by Europeans (Murphey 1977). Although important to European trade and economies, the overall impact of these emporia on Asian economies remained limited for most of 300 years. Not until the conquest of Bengal by the British East India Company (EIC) in the 1750s and 1760s did Europeans make their first major territorial acquisition in Asia, an event that scholars of early modern Asia increasingly use to date the onset of European imperialism there. Vasco da Gama’s 1498 voyage to India is a more important event in the history of Europe than it is in the history of Asia (Leur 1955; Chaudhuri 1985; Das Gupta and Pearson 1987; Marshall 1993; Subrahmanyam 1993).

Only in the nineteenth century did Europeans make the territorial inroads into the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa that we associate with the height of imperialism (Bayly 1989; Pakenham 1991). The long ascent of Europeans to world dominance over the last half-millennium should not be confused with the actual achievement of global ascendancy less than two centuries ago. Although they derived considerable wealth from transoceanic trade, they remained dependent on commercial, financial, and production networks controlled by Asians, Africans, and native Americans and vulnerable to indigenous political leaders who could and did deprive them of access.

Transforming International Power

At the time of Bartolomeu Dias’s, Christopher Columbus’s, and Vasco da Gama’s voyages the open oceans were not politicized space. The seas, which had been navigated for thousands of years, were another matter. By venturing into the Atlantic Ocean, western Europeans could avoid the Islamic powers that controlled much of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Black Sea. When they sailed south and west, the challenges they met were not the armed fleets of rival powers but their own ignorance and fear, which in the short run they suppressed with hopes of economic gain and in the long run they mastered with island footholds, with a growing body of knowledge about winds and currents, and with the adoption and adaptation of new technologies (Fonseca 1995). To resolve the question of sovereignty that had arisen with the success of these new maritime ventures, the Portuguese and Spanish agreed to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which divided the non-Christian
world between themselves along a north–south line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands (Davenport 1967). This treaty, however, did not provide a solution that other Europeans would accept. Indeed, it would take most of three centuries to sort out the radically new international order that oceanic expansion created.

When the Portuguese rounded the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean, they entered waters that had been known and traversed by sailors for centuries. These waters were largely unmilitarized zones. The land-based empires bordering the Indian Ocean or the neighboring seas—in particular the Safavid and the Mughal Empires—did not have navies. Thus, when the Portuguese used their armed vessels to wrest control of islands and ports from local rulers, they met with relatively little resistance (Subrahmanyam 1993). They claimed sovereignty over the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and set as their objective the licensing of travel on the maritime trade routes, a politicization of oceanic space that had no equivalent in Asian practice (Chaudhuri 1985; Pearson 1987). Insufficient resources to coerce thousands of mariners, as well as Asian resistance, blunted the impact of this Portuguese claim of sovereignty. Rather than pay protection costs that licenses provided, many merchants simply relocated to ports not controlled by the Portuguese. Asian rulers employed various strategies to curb these newcomers’ aggrandizement of power. The Ming prohibited them from trading on the Chinese shore in the 1520s. The Ottomans expanded their naval fleet to keep open the Red Sea route to the Levant after the Portuguese blocked it and to limit Portuguese influence in the Persian Gulf. The Acehnese sultanate, founded in northern Sumatra in the early sixteenth century, organized a trading network between the Indonesian archipelago and South Asia that challenged Portuguese dominance in the intra-Asian trades. In the long run, peaceful accommodation was more profitable than coercion, and the Portuguese became just another player in the Asian trades (Hess 1970; Lane 1973; Chaudhuri 1985; Pearson 1987; Souza 1987; Subrahmanyam 1993).

This interim solution was short-lived, however. In the late sixteenth century, Dutch and English merchants penetrated the Asian markets, providing a European challenge to Portugal’s claim to sovereignty over the Indian Ocean and reinvigorating the contest for oceanic control. Significantly, events in Europe directly affected the timing of this new merchant presence, and it would be neither the first time nor the last that Europeans quite literally circumnavigated problems at home through oceanic expansion. In 1585 Philip II of Spain had closed the Lisbon spice market to merchants from the Netherlands and England, largely in reaction to the civil war he was waging against English-supported Dutch Protestants. Initially, English merchants who were interested in the Asian trades tried to avoid the Portuguese and Spanish altogether by searching for a northern oceanic route to India and by trading with Asians through the Russian Company and the Levant Company (Andrews 1984; Lawson 1993). Finding neither solution viable, they took the South Atlantic route to India, passing through Spanish- and Portuguese-dominated waters. Once in the Indian Ocean, the EIC, chartered in 1600 with limited capitalization, tried to avoid confronting the Portuguese and the Dutch directly, but within a decade com-
pany officials in Asia had informed the Board of Directors in London not to “expect any quiet trade” (Furber 1976, 40). At Surat, Portuguese influence kept the Mughal emperor from granting the EIC trading privileges in the city. In retaliation, the English attacked Indian ships and engaged the Portuguese in a naval battle near Surat’s harbor. In 1613 the emperor granted the English trading rights in Surat, partly to check the Portuguese, whom he subsequently expelled from the city in 1632. In Persia the EIC provided Shah Abbas the necessary naval support to oust the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622 (Furber 1976; Chaudhuri 1985; Subrahmanyam 1993).

The Dutch East India Company (voc), chartered in 1602 and more heavily capitalized than the EIC, began to trade in the Indian Ocean with the clear intention of militarily and commercially challenging the Portuguese and the newly arrived English (Boxer 1965; Furber 1976). The Dutch capture of a Portuguese galleon in 1604 prompted the Iberians to claim the Indian Ocean as exclusively Portuguese waters under the terms of the Treaty of Tordesillas. The voc hired the legal theorist Hugo Grotius to prepare the legal brief, and his treatise, *Mare Liberum*, became important in articulating the international law on freedom of the seas. The Dutch subsequently used Grotius’s arguments against the English attempt to exclude other Europeans from fishing in the North Sea and whaling in the North Atlantic waters around Spitzbergen (Butler 1992; Roelofsen 1992).

For most of the seventeenth century the Dutch were the ascendant European influence in Asian waters, with the English an increasingly strong competitor and the Portuguese in decline. Following the Portuguese precedent of controlling heavily traveled sea-lanes, the Dutch set their sights on monopolizing the spice trade of the Indonesian archipelago. They established Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1619 as the heavily fortified commercial center of their Asian interests. Asian rulers enlisted their assistance in rebuffing the Portuguese. The Japanese decision in 1634 to expel the Portuguese from Nagasaki and transfer their trading privileges to the Dutch had severe economic repercussions, because Japanese silver had provided much of the bullion the Portuguese used in Asian trade (Furber 1976).

Meanwhile, within Asian societies, emergent powers weakened the cohesion of the Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman Empires (Bayly 1989). Emblematic of this shift was the rise of Oman as an autonomous state organized around maritime commerce and naval strength in the western Indian Ocean. Capturing Mombasa from the Portuguese in 1698, the Omanis extended their political control over much of East Africa. On the high seas they provided a potent challenge to Europeans’ military dominance. What neither the Omanis nor other Asians did was to enter the inter-oceanic trades that linked the Indian Ocean and Atlantic Ocean markets. As well, in the eighteenth century European state navies, not just armed merchant ships, appeared more frequently in Asian waters, and in the nineteenth century the British state would challenge the Omanis through the EIC (Risso 1986).

The presence of the British Navy in the Indian Ocean created a functional separation of military and commercial power and marked a new stage in the politicization of Asian ocean space. Military expenses no longer had to be derived directly
from and balanced with commercial revenues, a shift in costs that was probably critical for the territorial expansion of the British Empire in Asia. In contrast, Dutch global influence had declined over the eighteenth century, in part because the States General of the Netherlands expected the provinces of Zeeland and Holland, the most direct beneficiaries of Asian commerce, to fund the navy out of maritime commercial revenues (Boxer 1965).

Successful and regular crossing of the Atlantic Ocean, unlike the centuries-old navigation of the Indian Ocean, was a European achievement. As a result, the dynamic here was primarily one of intra-European conflict. Geographically, three transatlantic circuits were charted within a few years of each other. The first, and historically the most prominent, was the mid-Atlantic circuit connecting Europe and the Caribbean. But the Portuguese pioneered a second, South Atlantic, route between West Africa and Brazil; and a third route, across the North Atlantic, soon opened the Newfoundland fishery to Europeans (Meinig 1986). During the sixteenth century the three remained separate arenas of competition, with growing commercial and military integration over the next two centuries.

In developing their Atlantic circuits, the Spanish and Portuguese initially faced little competition, except in littoral waters. In West Africa, local powers ably defended themselves against Portuguese depredations (Thornton 1998). Resistance by the Caribs and the Arawaks in the Lesser Antilles kept the Spanish from settling these islands (Boucher 1992). But, as knowledge of Atlantic navigation spread throughout the ports of western Europe, the Iberians found that their greatest adversaries were not indigenous peoples but roving French and English pirates who dogged their galleons and foreign merchants who interloped in African and American markets. Spain responded first by arming merchant ships and then by providing naval escorts for the annual fleet that left the Gulf Coast laden with bullion. Nevertheless, aggressive rivals persisted in their encroachments on Iberian interests. The Dutch, to compensate for the loss of salt supplies from southern Europe after Spain cut off trade during the revolt in the Netherlands, began to produce salt on Caribbean islands. English harassment of Spanish and Portuguese fishermen in Newfoundland, especially after 1585, effectively drove the Iberians out of the fishery, leaving the English to compete with the French for supremacy in the North Atlantic (Lounsbury 1934; Andrews 1984; Boucher 1989).

By the end of the sixteenth century, decades of Atlantic maritime conflict and European wars had so weakened Spain’s power that, in treaty negotiations with France and England in 1598 and 1604, respectively, the French and English asserted their right to establish colonies in areas not occupied by the Spanish (Quinn 1974; Appleby 1996). The French and English, as well as the Dutch, established colonies under the auspices of chartered companies or proprietors, to whom their Crowns gave the right to wage war against European rivals and indigenous peoples. Armed conflict among Europeans, most of it seaborne, became endemic in the seventeenth-century Atlantic world. Virginia sent armed ships to attack Acadia. The English Kirke family attacked and took Canada from the French. English and French pirates
continued to prey on Spanish shipping. A settlement of Scots on Cape Breton lasted only a few months before it was destroyed by the French. The Spanish destroyed the Puritan colony on Providence Island in the Caribbean. The Dutch drove the Portuguese out of the slave trade, as well as their settlements in Brazil (Boxer 1965, 1969; Andrews 1984; Boucher 1989; Appleby 1996). These armed engagements, to name but a few, dispersed struggling settlements, established competing claims, and forced the intervention of European states.

In short, transoceanic trade and colonization created significant new international conflicts and constellations of power outside existing arrangements. The insistence by the Netherlands, England, and France that Spain and Portugal could not claim sovereignty over the oceans necessitated state-to-state negotiations about the terms of interaction in this nonstate arena. The international community needed some consensus about where sovereign, territorial waters ended and the international zone began. Likewise, the control of subjects on the high seas, particularly pirates, required new laws and agreements, and the need to police trade and to suppress piracy demanded state-supported navies. Government expenditures in England accordingly rose during the seventeenth century, with naval expenditures accounting for a large portion of the increase (Braddick 1996). Meanwhile, a new range of trade laws, such as the Navigation Acts passed by the English Parliament beginning in the mid–seventeenth century, sought to guarantee that the profits of the new carrying trades would accrue to the home country. By the mid–eighteenth century the management of national economies, with a particular focus on overseas trade, had become a central function of governments (Pagden 1995).

Gradually, over the course of the seventeenth century, western European powers provisionally worked out many of these issues in treaty negotiations. For example, as part of the 1670 treaty between Spain and England conceding the latter’s conquest of Jamaica, the English government agreed to restrain its pirates. The crackdown in the Atlantic Ocean encouraged pirates to move into the Indian Ocean, where a large group planted itself on Madagascar and preyed on European shipping. These English-speaking pirates evinced such little regard for national ties that they captured English vessels, prompting the EIC to insist that the government control its own nationals (Thomson 1994).

The Nine Years’ War (1689–1697) inaugurated another long century of conflict that would not end until the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Over the course of that century the spread of European wars into overseas theaters made the world’s oceans highly contested spaces. From Hudson Bay to Madras and the Cape of Good Hope to Nootka Sound, warring Europeans attacked their enemies’ forts and settlements, and diplomats negotiated the futures of West Indian islands, Newfoundland fishing stations, fur-trade outposts, Asian emporia, and African slave-trading forts. Although the expenses of war drained the coffers of European states, the prospect of acquiring lucrative overseas colonies to offset the military costs figured in the calculations of how long to prosecute a war.
Throughout this era the edifice of European statecraft relied, in part, on the ability to compete in the transoceanic arenas. In the mid-eighteenth century the British and French states funded exploration in the Pacific Ocean, often through naval appropriations, rather than leaving it solely to private interests, as had happened for most of the seventeenth century (Williams 1998). Both states claimed the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) off the east coast of South America (as did Spain), intended as a last provisioning station before heading westward into the Pacific Ocean. Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, Saint Helena in the South Atlantic Ocean, and the Hawaiian Islands in the middle of the Pacific Ocean were similarly important island holdings as European states positioned themselves in increasingly politicized and militarized oceanic space (Gough 1980).

So critical were these islands in oceanic strategies and so vulnerable were they to environmental degradation that imperial states supported scientific research into managing them as sustainable ecosystems (Grove 1995). Overseas possessions also became integrated into state strategies for solving domestic problems, from the creation of Australia, Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), and Norfolk Island as British penal colonies to the incarceration of Napoleon on Saint Helena (Hughes 1986).

As these examples demonstrate, the control of oceanic space had become not just a commercial question but part of the construction of power in the European state system. Russia's attempts to gain greater access to the world's oceans beginning during the reign of Peter the Great is evidence of the shift taking place between empires defined by continental control—whether Russian, Hapsburg, Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, or Ching—and the empires defined by oceanic control—the British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch. After 1783 the United States successfully entered the competition for oceanic control, though maintaining a continentally focused and isolationist foreign policy.

The Legacy of Oceanic Empires

The ascendancy of oceanic control as a defining characteristic of power among European states and then throughout the world was more than three centuries in developing. In the nineteenth century, continentally focused imperial powers found themselves being outflanked, if not conquered, by aggressive European powers that used oceanic access to force territorial submission in Asia and Africa. In a broad overview of history, however, European territorial control in Africa and Asia was relatively brief. In many places it lasted a century or less, testimony to our need to see the political ascendancy of Europe in the world as an oceanic phenomenon.

With the rise of new powers in the late nineteenth century, particularly Germany and Japan, access to oceanic trade, the creation of new empires, and an arms race with naval capacity as a centerpiece continued to define relations among the great powers. As Germany aggressively acquired colonies, Great Britain reacted by creating new protectorates (such as the Cook Islands in 1888) in order to curb German imperial expansion (Porter 1996). In the early twentieth century, international tensions over control of the world's oceans figured in the controversies that led to the
two world wars. At the end of World War II reform of world trade helped diffuse some of the tension.

The contest for control of oceanic space has not disappeared, nor has the European and neo-European dominance of the oceans ended. Many of the remaining island dependencies continue to serve the strategic interests of distant metropolitan states. Guam and American Samoa provide the United States with military footholds in the Pacific Ocean. Saint-Pierre and Miquelon maintain France's territorial claim to the western Atlantic fishery. Island territories without permanent populations are used for military or scientific purposes. The British lease their Indian Ocean Territory to the United States for military facilities; the Antarctic territories of Australia, Great Britain, France, and New Zealand all have permanent research stations. Thus, in the twilight of oceanic empires, the colonial map is essentially one of far-flung island holdings. This fact should remind us that in the last five centuries oceanic space has been a central arena of imperial struggle.

NOTES

1. The sixteen are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Island, Saint Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and Western Sahara. Spain notified the United Nations on 26 February 1976 that it had ceased its participation in the temporary government of the Western Sahara and thus its international responsibility for the territory (Aldrich and Connell 1998). On 25 October 1999 the Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor, which until then had been categorized as a colony of Portugal.

2. France has départements et territoires d'outre mer (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna Islands, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, and Mayotte), most of which have representation in the metropolitan French government. Puerto Rico and the northern Mariana Islands are commonwealths of the United States. Australia designated Christmas Island, the Cocos Islands, and Norfolk Island as territories. Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles are autonomous parts of the kingdom of the Netherlands. The Cook Islands are free associations of New Zealand, and Niue is a dependency. Spain retains Ceuta and Melilla on the coast of North Africa and the Canary Islands off the coast of Africa. The Azores and the Madeiras are part of Portugal. As well, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, France, and the United States claim a number of island groups without permanent residents (Aldrich and Connell 1998).

REFERENCES


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